The Supreme Court of India has delivered a landmark judgment reaffirming the procedural flexibility within arbitration proceedings, particularly concerning the requirement of notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In the case of M/s Bhagheeratha Engineering Limited v. State of Kerala[1], a Division Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan set aside the Kerala High Court’s judgment, which had held that an arbitral tribunal cannot decide disputes beyond those specifically referred through a Section 21 notice. The Supreme Court clarified that the non-issuance of such notice does not strip a party of its right to raise claims before an arbitral tribunal if the claim is otherwise valid and the disputes are arbitrable under the arbitration agreement.

Background and Factual Matrix

The appellant, M/s Bhagheeratha Engineering Limited, was awarded four road maintenance contracts under the Kerala State Transport Project, which was funded by the World Bank. These contracts contained a multi-tiered dispute resolution mechanism under the General Conditions of Contract. The mechanism required disputes to first be referred to an Engineer, then to an Adjudicator within fourteen days if the Engineer’s decision was unacceptable, and finally to arbitration if the Adjudicator’s decision was disputed within twenty-eight days of the written decision.

The appellant raised four disputes before the Adjudicator concerning payment issues related to price adjustments for bitumen and petroleum products, escalation during extended periods, and interest on delayed payments. The Adjudicator, by his decision dated August 14, 2004, ruled in favor of the appellant on disputes numbered one and three, while ruling against the appellant on disputes two and four. Despite this decision, the respondent State did not settle the final bills submitted by the appellant.

On October 1, 2004, the respondent State issued a letter to the appellant stating that the Adjudicator’s award on Dispute No. 1 was unacceptable and expressed its intention to refer the matter to arbitration, appointing its arbitrator. The State’s letter specifically mentioned only Dispute No. 1. The appellant responded by pointing out that the twenty-eight-day period for referring disputes to arbitration had expired, making the Adjudicator’s decision final and binding. However, after subsequent correspondence, both parties agreed to constitute an arbitral tribunal.

The arbitral tribunal, after addressing jurisdictional objections under Section 16 of the Act, proceeded to adjudicate all four disputes and passed an award in favor of the appellant on June 29, 2006, awarding a total sum of Rs. 1,99,90,777 along with post-award interest. The respondent challenged this award under Section 34 before the District Judge, who set aside the award and restored the Adjudicator’s decision. On appeal under Section 37, the Kerala High Court upheld this decision on the ground that the tribunal was appointed only to adjudicate Dispute No. 1, as the appellant had never issued a separate Section 21 notice for disputes two through four.

Legal Framework Governing Arbitration Proceedings

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration, and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The Act draws heavily from the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and aims to minimize judicial intervention while maximizing party autonomy in dispute resolution[2].

Section 21: Commencement of Arbitral Proceedings

Section 21 of the Act provides: “Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent.” This provision establishes the temporal milestone for the commencement of arbitral proceedings and operates on the principle of party autonomy, as indicated by the opening phrase “unless otherwise agreed by the parties.”

The primary purpose of Section 21 is to determine the commencement date of arbitration proceedings for calculating the limitation period. The provision ensures that both parties are informed about the initiation of arbitration proceedings, thereby upholding principles of natural justice. While courts have consistently held that issuance of a Section 21 notice is mandatory for determining limitation[3], the Supreme Court has now clarified that failure to issue such notice does not necessarily invalidate the arbitration proceedings if the claim is otherwise valid and arbitrable.

Section 23: Statement of Claim and Defence

Section 23 of the Act mandates that within the period agreed upon by the parties or determined by the tribunal, the claimant shall state the facts supporting the claim, the points at issue, and the relief sought. The respondent must state his defence in respect of these particulars. Sub-section (2A) specifically provides that “the respondent, in support of his case, may also submit a counter-claim or plead a set-off, which shall be adjudicated upon by the arbitral tribunal, if such counter-claim or set-off falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement.”

Sub-section (3) further provides that “unless otherwise agreed by the parties, either party may amend or supplement his claim or defence during the course of the arbitral proceedings, unless the arbitral tribunal considers it inappropriate to allow the amendment or supplement having regard to the delay in making it.” This provision demonstrates the flexibility built into the arbitral process, allowing parties to modify their claims during the proceedings.

Section 16: Jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal

Section 16 empowers the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. This principle, known as “kompetenz-kompetenz,” allows the tribunal to determine whether it has the authority to adjudicate disputes brought before it. The tribunal’s jurisdiction is derived from the arbitration agreement itself, not from the initial notice of invocation.

The Supreme Court’s Analysis and Reasoning

Conduct of the Respondent as a Waiver

The Supreme Court emphasized that the sequence of events demonstrated a clear waiver by the respondent of procedural requirements. The Court noted several critical factors: the appellant had referred all four disputes to the Adjudicator, and while the respondent questioned the timeliness of this reference before the arbitral tribunal, no such objection was raised before the Adjudicator himself. The Adjudicator proceeded to decide all four disputes on merits.

Moreover, when the respondent sought to refer Dispute No. 1 to arbitration on October 1, 2004, this was done fifty-six days after the Adjudicator’s decision, well beyond the twenty-eight-day period stipulated in the contract. The High Court itself had found that this twenty-eight-day time limit offended Section 28(b) of the Indian Contract Act. When the appellant objected to this delay, the respondent wrote back stating that the issue of delay could itself be referred to the arbitrator and that they disagreed with the Adjudicator’s recommendations. This indicated that the respondent never treated the Adjudicator’s decision as final and binding.

Most significantly, before the arbitral tribunal, the respondent filed an application seeking to declare the entire decision of the Adjudicator as null and void on the ground that the reference to the Adjudicator had violated the contract’s time limits. The arbitral tribunal, while addressing the Section 16 objection, held that the appellant’s claims remained unsettled and that the arbitration clause was comprehensive enough to include any matter arising out of or connected with the agreement.

The Supreme Court relied on its earlier decision in M.K. Shah Engineers & Contractors v. State of M.P.[4], which established that a party cannot take advantage of its own wrong. Where one party has by its own conduct disabled the performance of procedural prerequisites, it will be deemed that such requirements were waived. The Court observed that procedural steps preceding the operation of an arbitration clause, though essential, are capable of being waived, and if one party has frustrated such steps through its own conduct, it cannot subsequently rely on non-compliance to exclude the applicability of the arbitration clause.

Limited Purpose of Section 21

The Supreme Court clarified that Section 21 serves a limited procedural purpose. The provision is concerned only with determining when arbitration proceedings commence for the purpose of reckoning limitation. There is no mandatory prerequisite for issuance of a Section 21 notice prior to commencing arbitration. The failure to issue such notice may affect the computation of limitation for specific claims but does not render the arbitration proceedings invalid if the claim is otherwise valid and the disputes fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

In ASF Buildtech Private Limited v. Shapoorji Pallonji & Company Private Limited[5], Justice Pardiwala (one of the judges in the present case) had observed that Section 21 is procedural rather than jurisdictional. It does not serve to create or validate the arbitration agreement itself, nor is it a precondition for the existence of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Rather, it merely operates as a statutory mechanism to ascertain the date of initiation for reckoning limitation.

The Court noted that the language of Section 21 refers to “particular dispute,” which indicates that the provision is concerned only with determining when arbitration is deemed to have commenced for the specific dispute mentioned in the notice. This does not mean that the tribunal’s jurisdiction is confined to only those disputes mentioned in the notice of invocation. The term “particular dispute” does not mean all disputes, nor does it restrict the tribunal’s jurisdiction, which emanates from the arbitration agreement itself.

Scope of Arbitration Agreement Controls Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court emphasized that once an arbitral tribunal is constituted, the scope of reference is determined by the arbitration agreement and Section 23 of the Act, not solely by the initial notice of invocation. In the present case, the arbitration clause was widely worded, providing that any dispute or difference arising between the parties relating to any matter arising out of or connected with the agreement shall be settled in accordance with the Act.

The Court reiterated the principles laid down in State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises[6], which held that where an arbitration agreement provides that all disputes between the parties relating to the contract shall be referred to arbitration, the claimant is not bound to restrict his statement of claim to the claims already raised by notice. Unless the arbitration agreement requires the arbitrator to decide only specifically referred disputes, the claimant can amend or add to the claims already made while filing the statement of claim or thereafter.

Similarly, a respondent is entitled to raise a counterclaim and amend or add to it, unless the parties have otherwise agreed. The Court noted that where the arbitration clause is of wide amplitude covering any dispute arising out of or connected with the contract, both the claimant and respondent are entitled to make any claims or counterclaims and further entitled to add to or amend such claims, provided they are arbitrable and within limitation.

Terminology: Claimant and Respondent

The Supreme Court addressed the respondent’s argument that the appellant could not be referred to as a “claimant” because it had not issued a Section 21 notice. The Court held this contention to be completely untenable. Once an arbitral tribunal is constituted, claims, defence, and counterclaims are filed. The party which normally files the claim first is, for convenience, referred to as the “claimant,” and the party which responds is called the “respondent.” The respondent is entitled to file a counterclaim along with the defence statement. Therefore, the nomenclature of parties as claimant or respondent is not dependent on who issued the Section 21 notice but on who files the claim statement first before the tribunal.

Judicial Precedents Supporting the Decision

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service

The Supreme Court referred to Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service[7], where it was held that when a reference to arbitration is made by the court covering all disputes between the parties, the occasion to make a counterclaim could arise only after the order of reference. Refusing to consider the counterclaim merely because it was not raised at an earlier stage would disclose an error of law. This case established that counterclaims need not be preceded by a separate notice and can be raised during the arbitral proceedings.

Adavya Projects Private Limited v. Vishal Structurals Private Limited

In a recent decision, Adavya Projects Private Limited v. Vishal Structurals Private Limited[8], the Supreme Court reiterated that claims and disputes raised in the Section 21 notice do not restrict and limit the claims that can be raised before the arbitral tribunal. The consequence of not raising a claim in the notice is only that the limitation period for such claim will be calculated differently. However, non-inclusion of certain disputes in the Section 21 notice does not preclude a claimant from raising them during arbitration, as long as they are covered under the arbitration agreement. The Court specifically held that merely because a respondent did not issue a notice raising counterclaims, he is not precluded from raising the same before the tribunal, as long as such counterclaims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

Implications for Arbitration Practice

Flexibility in Arbitral Proceedings

This judgment reinforces the principle that arbitration is a flexible and party-centric dispute resolution mechanism. The technical requirement of a Section 21 notice should not be used as a tool to defeat substantive justice. Where parties have agreed to a broadly worded arbitration clause covering all disputes arising out of or connected with the contract, the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is determined by that agreement, not by the initial invocation notice.

Party Conduct and Waiver

The decision underscores the importance of party conduct in arbitration proceedings. Where a party’s own actions demonstrate an intention to have all disputes resolved through arbitration, that party cannot subsequently rely on technical procedural defects to limit the tribunal’s jurisdiction. This prevents parties from taking inconsistent positions and ensures that disputes are resolved on their merits rather than on procedural technicalities.

Limitation Considerations

While the judgment clarifies that lack of a Section 21 notice is not fatal to a claim, practitioners must remain mindful that such notice serves an important purpose in determining the limitation period for claims. Claims that are not mentioned in the initial Section 21 notice may face different limitation calculations. The date on which such claims are first raised before the tribunal becomes relevant for determining whether they are within the limitation period.

Drafting Arbitration Clauses

The judgment has implications for drafting arbitration clauses. Parties who wish to limit the tribunal’s jurisdiction to only specifically referred disputes must expressly provide for such limitation in the arbitration agreement. In the absence of such express limitation, a broadly worded arbitration clause will be interpreted to cover all disputes arising out of or connected with the contract, regardless of whether they were mentioned in the initial notice invoking arbitration.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in M/s Bhagheeratha Engineering Limited v. State of Kerala represents a pragmatic approach to arbitration law that prioritizes substance over form. The judgment clarifies that Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 serves primarily to determine the commencement date of arbitral proceedings for limitation purposes. The non-issuance of a Section 21 notice for specific disputes does not necessarily deprive a party of the right to raise claims before an arbitral tribunal, provided those claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement and are otherwise valid and arbitrable.

The Court’s emphasis on party conduct and the principle that no one should be allowed to take advantage of their own wrong ensures that arbitration proceedings remain focused on resolving disputes on their merits. By holding that the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is determined by the arbitration agreement and not merely by the initial notice of invocation, the Supreme Court has reinforced the flexibility and efficiency that are hallmarks of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.

This judgment serves as an important reminder that while procedural requirements have their place in ensuring fairness and orderliness in arbitral proceedings, they should not be used as tools to defeat substantive justice. The decision strikes a balance between respecting procedural requirements and ensuring that parties who have agreed to resolve their disputes through arbitration are able to do so effectively and comprehensively. Legal practitioners and arbitrators must take note of these principles when advising clients on arbitration strategy and when conducting arbitral proceedings.

References

[1] M/s Bhagheeratha Engineering Limited v. State of Kerala, Civil Appeal No. 39 of 2026, decided on January 7, 2026. Available at: https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/arbitration-lack-of-s-21-notice-not-fatal-if-claim-is-otherwise-valid-arbitrable-supreme-court-518448

[2] The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Available at: https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1978/3/a1996-26.pdf

[3] Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Ozone Overseas Pvt. Ltd., (2017) Delhi High Court. Discussed in: https://elplaw.in/leadership/elp-arbitration-update-essential-ingredients-of-the-notice-invoking-arbitration-under-section-21-of-the-arbitration-conciliation-act-1996/

[4] M.K. Shah Engineers & Contractors v. State of M.P., (1999) 2 SCC 594. Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/138599/

[5] ASF Buildtech Private Limited v. Shapoorji Pallonji & Company Private Limited, (2025) 9 SCC 76. Cited in the judgment.

[6] State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises, (2012) 12 SCC 581. Cited in the Supreme Court judgment.

[7] Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service and Others, (1991) 1 SCC 533. Cited in the Supreme Court judgment.

[8] Adavya Projects Private Limited v. Vishal Structurals Private Limited, (2025) 9 SCC 686. Available at: https://lawtrend.in/section-21-notice-not-mandatory-for-every-claim-respondents-conduct-can-expand-scope-of-arbitration-reference-supreme-court/

[9] Section 21, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Full text available at: https://ibclaw.in/section-21-commencement-of-arbitral-proceedings/

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Introduction

The Supreme Court of India has reiterated the principle of minimal judicial interference in arbitration proceedings, underscoring the judiciary’s restrained approach when dealing with challenges to arbitral awards under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This directive came in the judgment concerning National Highways Authority of India vs. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd., where the Court upheld the sanctity of arbitral tribunal decisions regarding contract interpretation in arbitration.

Judicial Scrutiny under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act: A Narrow Scope

Fundamental Rulings 

In its decision, the Supreme Court cited seminal cases including MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. and UHL Power Company Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, emphasizing the constricted scope of judicial review permissible under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The Court observed:

“The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 is relatively narrow and the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is all the more circumscribed.”

This delineation points to a foundational aspect of arbitration in India, where courts are cautious not to overstep their boundaries, respecting the arbitral process’s autonomy and expertise.

Specific Case Analysis

The dispute revolved around various claims related to construction contracts managed by the National Highways Authority of India. The arbitration tribunal had provided awards favoring Hindustan Construction Company, which were contested under Section 34.

Key Judgment Excerpts:

– Claim Interpretation: “If, after considering the material on record, the Arbitral Tribunal takes a particular view on the interpretation of the contract law, the Court under Section 34 does not sit in appeal over the findings of the arbitrator.”

– Majority Decisions: The Court recognized the arbitrators’ expertise, especially in technical matters, suggesting that their majority decisions should not be interfered with unless manifestly erroneous or in conflict with the public policy of India.

The Court’s Rationale and Implications

Respect for Arbitral Wisdom

The Supreme Court’s judgment reinforces the principle that arbitral tribunals are best suited to interpret contractual terms and assess factual underpinnings in disputes. This deference is rooted in the expertise of arbitrators, particularly in complex commercial and technical matters.

Limited Grounds for Interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act

The Court clarified that interference under Section 34 Arbitration Act is limited to circumstances where the award is in contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law, justice, or morality. This is aligned with the broader legal philosophy that arbitration, as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, should remain largely autonomous and free from excessive judicial intervention.

Conclusion: Ensuring Arbitration Integrity and Efficiency 

The Supreme Court’s rulings on arbitration in National Highways Authority of India vs. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. serves as a crucial reminder of the arbitration process’s integrity and the specific roles delineated for judicial bodies in overseeing it. By limiting the scope of review under Section 34 Arbitration Act, the Court ensures that arbitration remains an efficient, reliable, and respected mechanism for resolving disputes, thereby enhancing India’s appeal as a pro-arbitration jurisdiction.

This judgment not only reaffirms the judiciary’s trust in arbitral decisions but also encourages parties to respect and adhere to the arbitral process, knowing that unwarranted judicial interventions will not disrupt the arbitral awards lightly.

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Introduction

In the previous article, we explored the scope and application of Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which empowers the court to grant interim measures in arbitration proceedings. In this article, we will delve into the interplay between Section 9 and Section 17 of the Act, which also deals with interim measures but from the perspective of the arbitral tribunal.

The Interplay of Section 9 and Section 17

Section 9 and Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are key provisions that deal with interim measures in arbitration. While Section 9 empowers the court to grant interim measures, Section 17 gives the arbitral tribunal the power to order interim measures. The types of interim reliefs that could be granted by the arbitral tribunal are the same as those which can be ordered by the court under Section 9.

The interplay between these two sections has been a subject of various case laws. In the case of Essar House Private Limited v. Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel India Limited, the Supreme Court held that once an Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, the court would not entertain an application for an interim measure, unless the remedy of applying to the arbitral tribunal for interim relief is inefficacious. However, this bar does not operate where already the application has been taken up for consideration and the court has applied its mind.

In another case, Gulmali Amrullah Babul v. Shabbir Salebhai Mahimwala, it was held that a party seeking enforcement of the order made under Section 17 would subsequently file a Section 9 petition for the same reliefs, on the basis of the order made by the arbitral tribunal.

Conclusion: Interplay of Section 9 and Section 17

In conclusion, the interplay between Section 9 and Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 plays a crucial role in the granting of interim measures in arbitration proceedings. While Section 9 empowers the court to grant such measures, Section 17 empowers the arbitral tribunal to do the same. Various case laws have clarified the application and interplay of these two sections. In the next article, we will explore the jurisdictional aspects of filing a Section 9 application

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The principle of minimal judicial intervention in arbitration proceedings represents one of the foundational pillars of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in India. This principle, enshrined in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, has been consistently reinforced through legislative amendments and judicial pronouncements. The Supreme Court’s decision in Sushma Shivkumar Daga & Anr. v. Madhurkumar Ramkrishnaji Bajaj & Ors. [1] stands as a significant contribution to this jurisprudential development, particularly in its application of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

This landmark judgment addresses crucial questions regarding the scope of judicial scrutiny in arbitration matters, the boundaries of court intervention, and the balance between ensuring justice and preserving the autonomy of arbitral proceedings. The case exemplifies the Supreme Court’s commitment to upholding the pro-arbitration stance that has emerged in Indian jurisprudence, particularly following the 2015 amendments to the Arbitration Act.

Background and Factual Matrix

Case Facts and Procedural History

The case of Sushma Shivkumar Daga & Anr. v. Madhurkumar Ramkrishnaji Bajaj & Ors. arose from a complex real estate development arrangement. M/s Emerald Acres Private Limited, incorporated on 18th April 2006 by Late Mr. Shivkumar Daga and his wife Mrs. Sushma Shivkumar Daga, was established to carry on the business of real estate development. The foundation of the dispute lay in two tripartite agreements dated 31st March 2007 and 25th July 2008, executed between Late Mr. Shivkumar Daga, Madhurkumar Ramkrishnaji Bajaj, and M/s Emerald Acres Private Limited [2].

These tripartite agreements were designed to facilitate the development, trading, and dealing with real estate properties, with provisions for acquiring additional properties as mutually agreed between the parties. Both agreements contained specific arbitration clauses providing that in case of any dispute, the parties would refer the matter to arbitration.

Following the demise of Late Mr. Shivkumar Daga on 8th May 2011, his assets were bequeathed to his wife, Sushma Shivkumar Daga (Appellant No. 1), and his son, Mr. Chandrashekhar Shivkumar Daga (Appellant No. 2), through a will dated 10th February 2011. During his lifetime, Late Mr. Shivkumar Daga had acquired rights in several properties through development rights and purchase agreements funded by Respondent No. 1, including a Deed of Conveyance dated 17th December 2019 executed through his registered Power of Attorney holder.

The Dispute and Legal Proceedings

In 2021, the appellants filed a civil suit seeking declaration that the Conveyance Deed dated 17th December 2019 be declared null and void, and that the registered Development Agreements dated 17th September 2007, 20th November 2007, 30th November 2007, 3rd December 2007, and 27th February 2008 be declared validly terminated. The appellants contended that their relationship with the respondents under the aforementioned agreements ceased to exist upon the demise of Late Mr. Shivkumar Daga [3].

The respondents moved an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking referral of the matter to arbitration. They argued that the Conveyance Deed and Development Agreements found their source in the two tripartite agreements, both of which contained arbitration clauses. The District Court, vide order dated 13th October 2021, allowed the Section 8 application and referred the dispute to arbitration.

Aggrieved by this order, the appellants filed Writ Petition No. 8836 of 2021 before the Bombay High Court, which was dismissed. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court, which ultimately dismissed the appeal, upholding the orders of both the trial court and the High Court.

Legal Framework and Statutory Provisions

Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Section 8 constitutes the heart of the referral mechanism in Indian arbitration law. The provision, as amended by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, mandates that a judicial authority shall refer parties to arbitration if a valid arbitration agreement exists, unless it finds prima facie that no valid arbitration agreement exists.

The amended Section 8(1) provides that “a judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists” [4].

This provision embodies the principle of minimal judicial intervention by limiting the court’s inquiry to a prima facie assessment of the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. The 2015 amendments significantly reduced the scope of judicial scrutiny at the referral stage, aligning Indian law with international best practices.

Section 5 – The Principle of Minimal Judicial Intervention

Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, serves as the cornerstone of the minimal intervention principle. The provision states: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part” [5].

This non-obstante clause creates a statutory bar against judicial intervention except in circumstances specifically provided for in the Act. The provision reflects the legislative intent to preserve the autonomy of arbitration proceedings and prevent unnecessary judicial interference that could delay or complicate the arbitral process.

The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted Section 5 as embodying the principle of minimal judicial intervention, which is essential for the efficacy and credibility of arbitration in India. In Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, the Court observed that judicial intervention in arbitration is strictly barred, except for circumstances specifically enumerated in the Act [6].

Section 16 – Competence of Arbitral Tribunal

Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, grants arbitral tribunals the power to rule on their own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. This provision, derived from Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, embodies the doctrine of “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” or “competence-competence” [7].

Section 16(1) provides that “the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, and for that purpose, (a) an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract; and (b) a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause” [8].

This provision serves dual purposes: it empowers arbitral tribunals to determine jurisdictional issues autonomously, and it prevents courts from deciding such issues before the tribunal has had the opportunity to rule on them. The doctrine of separability, enshrined in Section 16(1)(a), ensures that challenges to the validity of the main contract do not automatically invalidate the arbitration agreement.

The 2015 Amendments: Paradigm Shift Towards Minimal Intervention

Legislative Intent and Objectives

The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, represented a significant paradigm shift in Indian arbitration law. The amendments were designed to address the excessive judicial intervention that had characterized the Indian arbitration regime, often defeating the very purpose of arbitration as a speedy and cost-effective dispute resolution mechanism.

The 2015 amendments were primarily guided by the recommendations of the 246th Report of the Law Commission of India, which identified the need to reduce judicial intervention and align Indian arbitration law with international standards. The amendments sought to achieve several key objectives: facilitating speedy disposal of arbitration-related applications, limiting challenges to decisions made by appointing authorities, and reinforcing the “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” principle [9].

Key Changes Introduced

The 2015 amendments introduced several transformative changes to the arbitration landscape. The amendment to Section 8 restricted the court’s role to making only a prima facie assessment of the existence of an arbitration agreement, rather than conducting a detailed examination of its validity. This change significantly reduced the time required for courts to refer disputes to arbitration and gave primacy to the principle of competence-competence.

The amendments also introduced mandatory timelines for arbitral proceedings through Sections 29A and 29B, requiring completion of proceedings within 12 months (with a possible extension of 6 months) from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference. Section 29B allowed parties to agree on a fast-track procedure to dispose of proceedings within 6 months [10].

Another crucial change was the removal of automatic stay on execution of awards upon filing of objection petitions. Under the amended Section 36, courts were required to consider whether a stay on enforcement was warranted, usually granted only upon deposit of the award amount or a substantial portion thereof. This significantly reduced unnecessary challenges to awards and enhanced the authority of arbitral decisions.

Judicial Interpretation and Implementation

Indian courts have interpreted the 2015 amendments in the spirit intended by the legislature, bringing clarity to the objectives of minimal intervention. The Supreme Court has consistently held that while referring disputes to arbitration, courts are now required to make only a prima facie assessment of the existence of the arbitration clause, reducing the time and judicial resources required before disputes can proceed to arbitration.

The amendments have been successful in promoting the principle of competence-competence, with courts increasingly deferring jurisdictional questions to arbitral tribunals. This approach aligns with international best practices and ensures that arbitral proceedings are not unduly delayed by preliminary objections raised at the threshold.

Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Court’s Reasoning

In Sushma Shivkumar Daga, the Supreme Court addressed three primary contentions raised by the appellants. First, the appellants argued that the dispute could not be referred to arbitration because the Conveyance Deed dated 17th December 2019 and the Development Agreements contained no arbitration clauses. The Court rejected this contention, holding that these documents found their source in the tripartite agreements, which contained valid arbitration clauses.

The Court’s approach reflects the principle that arbitration clauses should be given a broad interpretation to promote the resolution of related disputes through arbitration. The Court recognized that where subsequent agreements flow from or are connected to agreements containing arbitration clauses, disputes arising from such subsequent agreements can be subject to arbitration even if they do not contain express arbitration clauses.

Action in Personam vs. Action in Rem

The second contention addressed the nature of the relief sought by the appellants. They argued that the suit was related to cancellation of documents concerning immovable property, constituting an action in rem rather than in personam, and therefore not arbitrable under the Arbitration Act.

The Supreme Court categorically held that “the cancellation of a deed is an action in personam and hence it is arbitrable” [11]. This pronouncement clarifies an important aspect of arbitrability, confirming that disputes relating to cancellation of deeds, even those concerning immovable property, fall within the scope of arbitrable disputes when they are actions in personam rather than in rem.

The distinction between actions in rem and in personam is crucial in determining arbitrability. Actions in rem, which affect rights in property as against the world at large, are generally considered non-arbitrable, while actions in personam, which affect rights as between specific parties, are arbitrable. The Court’s finding that deed cancellation disputes are actions in personam significantly expands the scope of arbitrable real estate disputes.

The Fraud Exception

The third contention raised by the appellants concerned allegations of fraud. The Court reiterated the well-established principle that mere allegations of fraud are not sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. The Court held that “a plea of fraud must be serious in nature in order to oust the jurisdiction of an arbitrator” [12].

This position aligns with the Supreme Court’s consistent jurisprudence that fraud allegations must be of such a serious nature that they go to the root of the matter and make the arbitration agreement itself invalid. Mere allegations without substantial prima facie evidence are insufficient to defeat the strong presumption in favor of arbitration established by the 2015 amendments.

Implications for Arbitration Practice

Enhanced Scope of Arbitrability

The decision in Sushma Shivkumar Daga significantly enhances the scope of arbitrability in real estate disputes. By holding that deed cancellation disputes constitute actions in personam, the Court has opened the door for a broader range of property-related disputes to be resolved through arbitration. This development is particularly significant given the prevalence of real estate disputes in Indian commercial litigation.

The Court’s approach to connected agreements also provides clarity for complex commercial arrangements where multiple agreements may be executed in furtherance of a single transaction. The principle that arbitration clauses in foundational agreements can extend to related agreements strengthens the utility of arbitration in comprehensive dispute resolution.

Reinforcement of Pro-Arbitration Stance

The judgment reinforces the Supreme Court’s consistently pro-arbitration stance that has emerged following the 2015 amendments. The Court’s willingness to give broad interpretation to arbitration clauses, its restrictive approach to fraud exceptions, and its emphasis on referring disputes to arbitration wherever possible all contribute to creating an arbitration-friendly environment.

This approach aligns with international best practices and enhances India’s attractiveness as a seat for international arbitration. The consistent judicial support for arbitration, combined with legislative reforms, positions India as a jurisdiction that respects party autonomy and promotes efficient dispute resolution.

Practical Considerations for Legal Practitioners

The decision provides important guidance for legal practitioners in drafting arbitration clauses and structuring commercial arrangements. The Court’s approach to connected agreements suggests that careful consideration should be given to the scope and coverage of arbitration clauses in multi-agreement transactions.

Practitioners should also note the Court’s restrictive approach to fraud exceptions, which requires substantial prima facie evidence rather than mere allegations. This standard places a higher burden on parties seeking to avoid arbitration on grounds of fraud, promoting the integrity of the arbitral process while preventing frivolous objections.

Comparative Analysis with International Practices

UNCITRAL Model Law Alignment

The decision in Sushma Shivkumar Daga demonstrates the successful alignment of Indian arbitration law with the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The Court’s emphasis on minimal judicial intervention, broad interpretation of arbitration clauses, and deference to arbitral tribunal jurisdiction all reflect principles embodied in the Model Law.

This alignment is crucial for India’s aspirations to become a preferred seat for international arbitration. The consistency between Indian law and internationally recognized standards provides confidence to foreign parties and investors regarding the predictability and reliability of Indian arbitration procedures.

Best Practices from Other Jurisdictions

The Supreme Court’s approach mirrors best practices from leading arbitration jurisdictions such as England, Singapore, and Hong Kong. The emphasis on prima facie assessment of arbitration agreements, restrictive interpretation of exceptions to arbitrability, and strong presumption in favor of arbitration all align with approaches adopted in these mature arbitration centers.

The Court’s treatment of connected agreements also reflects international practice, where courts have recognized that arbitration clauses can extend to related agreements even in the absence of express arbitration provisions. This approach promotes comprehensive dispute resolution and prevents fragmentation of related disputes across different forums.

Challenges and Future Directions

Balancing Intervention and Oversight

While the trend toward minimal judicial intervention is generally positive for arbitration, it raises questions about the appropriate balance between respecting arbitral autonomy and ensuring adequate judicial oversight. The Court’s restrictive approach to fraud exceptions, while promoting arbitration, must be balanced against the need to prevent abuse of the arbitral process.

Future developments may need to address the boundaries of minimal intervention, particularly in cases involving serious allegations of misconduct or procedural irregularities. The challenge lies in maintaining the efficiency of arbitration while preserving essential safeguards against abuse.

Institutional Arbitration and Infrastructure Development

The success of minimal judicial intervention depends significantly on the quality and capacity of arbitral institutions. As courts restrict their involvement in arbitral proceedings, the importance of well-functioning arbitral institutions becomes paramount. India’s efforts to develop robust arbitral institutions and infrastructure will be crucial for realizing the full benefits of the minimal intervention approach.

The establishment of the Arbitration Council of India and efforts to promote institutional arbitration represent important steps in this direction. However, continued investment in arbitral infrastructure, training of arbitrators, and development of institutional capacity will be essential for sustaining the momentum created by legislative and judicial reforms.

Impact on Commercial Dispute Resolution

Enhanced Efficiency and Speed

The decision contributes to enhanced efficiency in commercial dispute resolution by reducing the scope for preliminary objections and procedural delays. The Court’s approach to connected agreements and broad interpretation of arbitrability ensures that related disputes can be resolved comprehensively through arbitration, avoiding the fragmentation that can result from jurisdictional challenges.

The reinforcement of the prima facie standard for Section 8 applications also reduces the time and resources required for referral to arbitration. This efficiency gain is particularly significant for commercial parties seeking prompt resolution of their disputes.

Predictability and Certainty

The judgment enhances predictability and certainty in arbitration law by providing clear guidance on key issues such as the scope of arbitrability, treatment of connected agreements, and standards for fraud exceptions. This predictability is essential for commercial parties in planning their dispute resolution strategies and structuring their commercial arrangements.

The consistent pro-arbitration approach adopted by the Supreme Court also provides confidence to parties regarding the likely outcome of arbitration-related applications. This predictability encourages greater use of arbitration and reduces the likelihood of frivolous challenges to arbitral jurisdiction.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Sushma Shivkumar Daga & Anr. v. Madhurkumar Ramkrishnaji Bajaj & Ors. represents a significant contribution to the development of arbitration law in India. The judgment reinforces the principle of minimal judicial intervention while providing important clarification on the scope of arbitrability and the treatment of connected agreements.

The Court’s pro-arbitration stance, evident in its broad interpretation of arbitration clauses and restrictive approach to exceptions, aligns with the legislative intent behind the 2015 amendments and international best practices. The decision contributes to creating an arbitration-friendly environment that promotes efficient dispute resolution and enhances India’s attractiveness as an arbitration destination.

The judgment’s impact extends beyond the immediate parties to influence the broader landscape of commercial dispute resolution in India. By clarifying the boundaries of judicial intervention and expanding the scope of arbitrability, the decision promotes the use of arbitration as a preferred mechanism for resolving commercial disputes.

Looking forward, the success of the minimal intervention approach will depend on continued development of arbitral institutions, training of arbitrators, and refinement of procedural frameworks. The judicial commitment to supporting arbitration, combined with ongoing legislative reforms, positions India well for realizing its aspirations as a leading arbitration jurisdiction.

The decision serves as a reminder that the effectiveness of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism depends not only on legislative frameworks but also on consistent judicial support and interpretation. The Supreme Court’s unwavering commitment to the principles of minimal intervention and party autonomy provides a strong foundation for the continued growth and development of arbitration in India.

As India continues to integrate into the global economy, the importance of efficient and reliable dispute resolution mechanisms cannot be overstated. The decision in Sushma Shivkumar Daga contributes to this objective by strengthening the arbitration framework and promoting confidence in India’s dispute resolution capabilities. The judgment stands as a testament to the transformation of Indian arbitration law and its alignment with global standards and best practices.

References

[1] Sushma Shivkumar Daga & Anr. v. Madhurkumar Ramkrishnaji Bajaj & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1854 of 2023, decided on December 15, 2023, available at https://www.the-laws.com/encyclopedia/browse/case?caseId=003202422100&title=sushma-shivkumar-daga-vs-madhurkumar-ramkrishnaji-bajaj 

[2] Sushma Shivkumar Daga v. Madhurkumar Ramkrishnaji Bajaj, Supreme Court judgment analysis, available at https://theindianlawyer.in/supreme-court-holds-that-allegations-of-fraud-not-having-implications-in-public-domain-are-arbitrable/ 

[3] Case background and facts, available at https://legalvidhiya.com/sushama-shivkumar-daga-vs-madhurkumar-ramkrishnaji-bajaj/ 

[4] Section 8, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (as amended), available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1146817/ 

[5] Section 5, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, available at https://blog.ipleaders.in/section-5-of-arbitration-and-conciliation-act-1996/ 

[6] Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, minimal judicial intervention principle, available at https://lawbhoomi.com/extent-of-judicial-intervention-in-arbitration/ 

[7] Section 16, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, available at https://blog.ipleaders.in/section-16-of-the-arbitration-act/ 

[8] Section 16(1), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/675839/ 

[9] The 2015 Amendments to Arbitration Act, available at https://singhania.in/blog/judicial-interpretation-of-2015-amendments-to-indian-arbitration-conciliation-act 

[10] Sections 29A and 29B, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, available at https://www.mondaq.com/india/arbitration-dispute-resolution/757222/judicial-interpretation-of-2015-amendments-to-indian-arbitration-conciliation-act 

[11] Action in personam ruling, available at https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/current-affairs/action-in-personam 

[12] Fraud exception requirements, available at https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/sushma-shivkumar-daga-and-anr-v-madhurkumar-ramkrishnaji-bajaj-and-ors-2023-insc-1081-arbitrator-jurisdiction-fraud-1509921 

[13] Arbitrability of property disputes analysis, available at https://deepvaghela.com/?p=524 

[14] Judicial intervention principles, available at https://thelawcodes.com/article/section-5-minimum-judicial-intervention/ 

[15] Arbitration law developments, available at https://touchstonepartners.com/arbitration-recent-legislative-and-judicial-developments/ 

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The post Judicial Intervention in Arbitration: Boundaries Explored in Sushma Shivkumar Daga & Anr. v. Madhurkumar Ramkrishnaji Bajaj & Ors. – A Comprehensive Legal Analysis appeared first on Bhatt & Joshi Associates.

Introduction

Arbitration has emerged as one of the most preferred methods of alternative dispute resolution in India, offering parties a faster and more flexible approach to settling commercial disputes outside the traditional court system. Within this framework, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides various procedural safeguards to ensure that the arbitration process remains effective and that parties’ rights are protected throughout the proceedings. Among these provisions, Section 17 holds particular significance as it empowers arbitral tribunals to grant interim measures of protection during the pendency of arbitration proceedings. This provision serves as a crucial tool that prevents irreparable harm to parties and ensures that the ultimate arbitral award remains meaningful and enforceable.

The power to grant interim relief is fundamental to any adjudicatory process because disputes often require immediate intervention to preserve the status quo or prevent one party from taking actions that could render the final decision ineffective. Before the 2015 amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, there existed considerable ambiguity regarding the scope and enforceability of interim orders passed by arbitral tribunals. The amendments brought transformative changes to Section 17, aligning the powers of arbitral tribunals more closely with those of civil courts and significantly enhancing the tribunal’s ability to provide effective interim relief.

Understanding the Legal Framework of Section 17 of the Arbitration Act

Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 establishes the authority of arbitral tribunals to order interim measures of protection. The provision states that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, order a party to take such interim measure of protection as the arbitral tribunal may consider necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute [1]. This foundational principle recognizes that arbitral tribunals must possess adequate powers to manage proceedings effectively and ensure that justice is not frustrated by delaying tactics or actions that could prejudice the final outcome.

The scope of interim measures available under Section 17 is deliberately broad to accommodate various situations that may arise during arbitration proceedings. The tribunal may order interim measures for the preservation, interim custody, or sale of goods that form the subject matter of the dispute. It can also direct parties to take steps to secure the amount in dispute or ensure that evidence is preserved and not destroyed or tampered with. Furthermore, the tribunal has the authority to appoint a receiver or guardian for property in dispute, ensuring that assets are properly managed during the pendency of proceedings [2].

An important aspect of Section 17 is that it requires the arbitral tribunal to provide an opportunity for all parties to be heard before passing any interim order. This ensures procedural fairness and prevents arbitrary decision-making. Additionally, the tribunal may require a party seeking interim relief to provide appropriate security in connection with the measure ordered, balancing the need for protection with the potential prejudice to the other party if the measure proves to have been wrongly granted.

The Transformative 2015 Amendment

The Arbitration and Conciliation Amendment Act of 2015 brought about a paradigm shift in the powers and effectiveness of arbitral tribunals in India [3]. Prior to these amendments, interim orders passed by arbitral tribunals under Section 17 lacked the direct enforceability that court orders enjoyed. Parties often had to approach civil courts under Section 9 of the Act to seek enforcement of tribunal orders, which defeated the purpose of having a swift and autonomous arbitration process.

The 2015 amendments completely substituted Section 17, fundamentally enhancing the powers of arbitral tribunals. The amended provision explicitly states that an order issued by the arbitral tribunal under this section shall be deemed to be an order of the court for all purposes and shall be enforceable in the same manner as if it were an order of the court. This single change revolutionized the interim relief mechanism in arbitration by eliminating the need for parties to seek separate court intervention for enforcement. The tribunal’s orders now carry the same weight as judicial orders and can be enforced through the machinery available under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The amendment also expanded and clarified the types of interim measures that tribunals could grant. While the pre-amendment version contained general language about interim measures, the 2015 amendment specifically enumerated various forms of relief, bringing greater certainty to the process. These include measures for the preservation, interim custody, or sale of goods; securing the amount in dispute; detention, preservation, or inspection of property or documents; appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind; and any other interim measure that appears to the arbitral tribunal to be just and convenient.

Another significant change introduced by the 2015 amendment was the incorporation of subsection 2, which addresses the enforcement mechanism. This subsection states that the same court shall be competent to act upon the application of a party or the arbitral tribunal for enforcement of the interim measure as if it were an order of the court. This provision streamlined the enforcement process by designating a specific forum for enforcement applications, reducing jurisdictional confusion and delays.

Judicial Interpretation and Landmark Judgments

The application and interpretation of Section 17 have been shaped significantly by judicial pronouncements from various courts, particularly the Supreme Court of India. These decisions have clarified ambiguities, established principles for the grant of interim relief, and defined the boundaries of tribunal powers under this provision.

In the case of Srei Infrastructure Finance Limited versus Tuff Drilling Private Limited, the Supreme Court examined the balance between party autonomy and statutory compliance in arbitration proceedings [4]. While this case primarily dealt with the appointment and qualification of arbitrators, the court’s observations had broader implications for the functioning of arbitral tribunals, including their power to grant interim relief. The court emphasized that while the Arbitration Act provides certain flexibilities to parties in structuring their arbitration, the tribunal’s functioning must always remain in strict adherence to the statutory provisions. This principle applies equally to the exercise of powers under Section 17, meaning that tribunals must ensure their interim orders comply with the requirements and limitations set forth in the Act.

The case of Sundaram Finance Limited versus P. Sakthivel demonstrated the practical application of Section 17 powers in securing disputed property [5]. In this matter, the sole arbitrator passed an interim order attaching the property of the respondents after they failed to furnish security as previously directed by the tribunal. This case illustrated how arbitral tribunals can take graduated measures to ensure compliance with their directions, starting with an order to provide security and progressing to attachment when the party fails to comply. The case also highlighted the importance of such powers in ensuring that arbitration proceedings remain effective, particularly in disputes where one party may attempt to dissipate assets or render the arbitral award unenforceable.

Another instructive case is Excel Metal Processors Private Limited, which addressed the question of whether interim measures under Section 17 could affect third parties who are not parties to the arbitration agreement [6]. The court held that a perusal of Section 17 clearly indicates that while such interim measures can be applied only by a party to the arbitral tribunal, and the reliefs specified in the section are directed toward parties to the arbitration, these measures may in some cases have an incidental effect on third parties. For instance, an order for preservation of property or appointment of a receiver might affect third parties who have dealings with that property or entity. This judgment recognized the practical realities of commercial disputes while maintaining that the primary jurisdiction of the tribunal is over the parties to the arbitration agreement.

Relationship Between Section 9 and Section 17 of the Arbitration Act

Understanding Section 17 requires examining its relationship with Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which empowers civil courts to grant interim measures in support of arbitration. Before the constitution of an arbitral tribunal, parties must necessarily approach courts under Section 9 for interim relief, as there is no tribunal yet in existence to exercise powers under Section 17. However, once the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the interplay between these two provisions becomes more nuanced.

The 2015 amendments sought to make arbitral tribunals the primary forum for interim relief once they are constituted, thereby reducing judicial intervention in the arbitration process. Section 9 itself was amended to provide that once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the court shall not entertain an application for interim measures unless circumstances exist that render the remedy provided by Section 17 inefficacious. This creates a clear hierarchy: parties should first approach the tribunal for interim relief, and only in exceptional circumstances where the tribunal cannot provide effective relief should they resort to courts.

This framework respects the principle of party autonomy and the choice to arbitrate by ensuring that arbitrators, rather than judges, make decisions about the conduct and management of arbitration proceedings. It also recognizes that arbitral tribunals, being familiar with the substance of the dispute and the conduct of the parties, are better positioned to assess whether interim relief is necessary and appropriate. At the same time, the provision acknowledges that certain situations may require the coercive powers of a court, such as when urgent relief is needed before the tribunal can convene or when enforcement against third parties is necessary.

Procedural Aspects and Practical Considerations

When a party seeks interim relief under Section 17, several procedural requirements must be satisfied. The application for interim measures must be made to the arbitral tribunal, not to a court, assuming the tribunal has already been constituted. The applicant must demonstrate that the interim measure is necessary to protect the subject matter of the dispute or to prevent an action that could prejudice the arbitration proceedings or make the eventual award ineffective.

The arbitral tribunal must provide all parties with an opportunity to be heard before passing any interim order, ensuring natural justice is observed. This typically involves issuing notice to the other party, allowing them to file a response, and conducting a hearing where both sides can present their arguments. The tribunal must balance the interests of both parties, considering factors such as the prima facie strength of the applicant’s case, whether the applicant would suffer irreparable harm without the interim measure, the balance of convenience, and whether the measure sought would prejudice the other party.

One of the practical advantages of seeking interim relief from the arbitral tribunal rather than a court is speed. Arbitral tribunals can often schedule hearings and issue orders more quickly than courts, which face significant backlogs. Additionally, tribunals have greater flexibility in their procedures and can tailor the process to suit the specific needs of the case. The informality of arbitration compared to court proceedings can also make it easier for parties to present their cases and for the tribunal to understand the commercial context of the dispute.

However, parties should also be aware of certain limitations. While the 2015 amendments made tribunal orders enforceable as court orders, the actual enforcement still requires approaching a court if a party fails to comply voluntarily. This means that while the tribunal can issue the order, it cannot itself take coercive steps to enforce it. Additionally, the tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to parties to the arbitration agreement, so if relief is needed against a third party, a court application may be necessary.

Contemporary Relevance and Future Directions

The enhanced powers granted to arbitral tribunals under the amended Section 17 reflect a global trend toward strengthening arbitration as a viable alternative to litigation. International arbitration institutions and model laws, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on which the Indian Arbitration Act is based, have long recognized the importance of empowering arbitrators to grant effective interim relief. The 2015 amendments brought Indian law more in line with international best practices, making India a more attractive seat for both domestic and international arbitrations.

Despite these positive developments, certain challenges remain. The enforcement of tribunal orders still requires court involvement, which can introduce delays and uncertainties. There have been calls for further reforms to streamline the enforcement mechanism, perhaps by establishing specialized commercial courts or arbitration courts that can handle enforcement applications expeditiously. Additionally, questions about the precise scope of tribunal powers continue to arise, particularly in complex commercial disputes involving multiple parties or intricate corporate structures.

The role of courts in reviewing and setting aside interim orders passed by tribunals also requires careful consideration. While Section 37 of the Arbitration Act allows appeals against orders refusing to grant interim measures or orders granting or refusing to set aside interim measures, courts must strike a balance between providing necessary judicial oversight and respecting the autonomy of the arbitral process. Excessive judicial intervention could undermine the very purpose of the amendments, which was to empower tribunals and reduce court involvement.

Conclusion

Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 represents a critical component of India’s arbitration framework, providing arbitral tribunals with essential powers to grant interim measures that protect parties’ rights and ensure effective dispute resolution. The 2015 amendments marked a watershed moment in the evolution of this provision, transforming tribunal orders from mere recommendations into enforceable directions with the same force as court orders. This change has significantly enhanced the effectiveness and attractiveness of arbitration in India.

The judicial interpretation of Section 17 through various landmark cases has further refined our understanding of the provision’s scope and application. Courts have consistently recognized the importance of empowering arbitral tribunals while ensuring that their powers are exercised within the statutory framework and in accordance with principles of natural justice. The relationship between Section 17 and Section 9 has been clarified to establish tribunals as the primary forum for interim relief once constituted, with courts serving a supportive rather than supervisory role.

As India continues to position itself as a favorable jurisdiction for arbitration, the effective implementation of Section 17 will remain crucial. The provision exemplifies the balance that modern arbitration law must strike between party autonomy, procedural flexibility, and the need for effective remedies. While challenges remain in areas such as enforcement and scope, the trajectory of reform and judicial interpretation suggests continued strengthening of arbitral tribunals’ powers. For practitioners, understanding Section 17 and its practical application is essential to effectively representing clients in arbitration proceedings and ensuring that their rights are protected throughout the process.

References

[1] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 17, India Code (1996), https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1978 

[2] Ministry of Law and Justice, Legislative Department, The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A2015-03.pdf 

[3] Nishith Desai Associates, Arbitration and Conciliation Amendment Act 2015, https://www.nishithdesai.com/information/research-and-articles/nda-hotline/nda-hotline-single-view/article/arbitration-and-conciliation-amendment-act-2015.html 

[4] Srei Infrastructure Finance Ltd. v. Tuff Drilling Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 11 SCC 470, Supreme Court of India, https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2017/18954/18954_2017_Judgement_21-Aug-2018.pdf 

[5] Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. P. Sakthivel, Arbitration Application No. 252 of 2017, Madras High Court (2018), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/171737589/ 

[6] Excel Metal Processors Private Limited, Arbitration Petition No. 619 of 2017, Delhi High Court, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/140684303/ 

[7] Indian Council of Arbitration, Understanding Section 17 of Arbitration Act, https://icaindia.co.in/ 

[8] Supreme Court of India, Judgments Information System, https://main.sci.gov.in/ 

[9] Bar and Bench, Analysis of Arbitration and Conciliation Amendment Act 2015, https://www.barandbench.com/ 

Authorized and Published by Vishal Davda

The post Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: A Comprehensive Analysis of Interim Measures and Judicial Interpretation appeared first on Bhatt & Joshi Associates.

Introduction

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, represents a watershed moment in India’s approach to alternative dispute resolution. This legislation, which came into force to consolidate and amend the law relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration, and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, has fundamentally transformed how disputes are resolved outside traditional court systems in India. The Act draws its foundation from the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, reflecting India’s commitment to aligning its arbitration framework with international standards [1]. At the heart of this legislative framework lies the arbitral tribunal, an institution that serves as the adjudicatory body responsible for resolving disputes referred to arbitration. The constitution, functioning, and procedures governing the arbitral tribunal are meticulously detailed in the Act, ensuring that the arbitration process maintains its integrity, independence, and efficiency while providing parties with a fair and impartial forum for dispute resolution.

The significance of understanding the arbitral tribunal framework cannot be overstated, particularly in an era where commercial disputes have become increasingly complex and the need for expeditious resolution has become paramount. The tribunal’s composition, the appointment mechanisms, disclosure requirements, and challenge procedures collectively form the backbone of a robust arbitration system that has gained widespread acceptance among businesses and individuals seeking alternatives to lengthy litigation.

Constitutional Framework of the Arbitral Tribunal

Number and Appointment of Arbitrators

The fundamental structure of an arbitral tribunal is governed by Section 10 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which provides parties with considerable autonomy in determining how their disputes will be arbitrated. The legislative intent behind this provision is to respect party autonomy while establishing necessary safeguards to prevent deadlocks in the arbitration process. According to this provision, parties are free to determine the number of arbitrators, subject to one crucial limitation: the number shall not be an even number. This requirement serves a practical purpose, preventing situations where the tribunal might be equally divided on critical issues, thereby ensuring decisiveness in the arbitration process.

The rationale behind prohibiting an even number of arbitrators stems from the need to avoid potential stalemates in decision-making. When an arbitral tribunal comprises an even number of arbitrators, there exists a real possibility that the tribunal might split equally on substantive issues, rendering it impossible to arrive at a final decision. The Act addresses this concern by mandating an odd number of arbitrators, which guarantees that a majority decision can always be reached. In situations where parties fail to reach an agreement on the number of arbitrators, the Act provides a default mechanism: the arbitral tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator. This default provision ensures that the arbitration process can proceed even when parties cannot agree on this fundamental aspect of tribunal composition.

The appointment procedure outlined in Section 11 of the Act establishes a comprehensive mechanism for constituting the arbitral tribunal. When parties have agreed on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators, that procedure shall be followed. However, the Act recognizes that disputes may arise even at this preliminary stage, and therefore provides judicial intervention as a failsafe mechanism. The Supreme Court and High Courts are vested with the authority to appoint arbitrators when parties fail to agree or when the agreed procedure breaks down. This judicial role is not merely administrative but carries significant responsibility in ensuring that the appointed arbitrators possess the requisite qualifications, independence, and impartiality necessary for fair adjudication.

Judicial Intervention in Arbitrator Appointment

The role of courts in appointing arbitral tribunals has evolved significantly through judicial interpretation. The 2015 Amendment to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act introduced Section 11(6A), which sought to limit the scope of judicial examination at the appointment stage. This provision stipulates that the Supreme Court or the High Court, as the case may be, shall confine its examination to the existence of an arbitration agreement while considering applications for the appointment of arbitrators. The legislative intent was to minimize judicial intervention and expedite the arbitration process by preventing courts from delving into substantive aspects of the dispute at this preliminary stage.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd. [2] marked a significant development in the jurisprudence surrounding arbitrator appointments. The Court held that a person who has an interest in the outcome or decision of the dispute must not have the power to appoint a sole arbitrator. This ruling addressed a fundamental concern about the integrity of the arbitration process: the potential for bias when one party effectively controls the appointment of the sole arbitrator. The Court emphasized that such unilateral appointment powers, particularly in cases involving sole arbitrators, could create justifiable doubts about the arbitrator’s impartiality and independence, thereby undermining the very foundation of a fair arbitration process.

The Court in this case also clarified the scope of Section 11(6A), affirming that while courts should limit their examination to the existence of an arbitration agreement, this limitation does not prevent them from exercising their power to appoint independent and impartial arbitrators. The judgment recognized that the appointment of arbitrators is a critical stage that sets the tone for the entire arbitration proceedings, and therefore, courts must ensure that the appointed arbitrators meet the basic requirements of independence and impartiality, even while respecting the limited scope of their intervention under Section 11(6A).

Disclosure Obligations and Transparency Requirements

Mandatory Disclosure Under Section 12

Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act imposes a fundamental obligation on arbitrators to disclose any circumstances that are likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence. This disclosure requirement represents a cornerstone of the arbitration process, ensuring transparency and enabling parties to make informed decisions about whether to proceed with a particular arbitrator. The obligation is not limited to circumstances that definitively establish bias or conflict of interest; rather, it extends to any situation that might reasonably create doubts about the arbitrator’s ability to adjudicate impartially. This broad formulation reflects the principle that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done.

The scope of disclosure extends to various relationships and interests that an arbitrator might have. These include professional relationships with the parties or their counsel, financial interests in the outcome of the dispute, prior involvement in related matters, family connections with the parties, and any other circumstances that might affect the arbitrator’s independence. The obligation to disclose continues throughout the arbitral proceedings, meaning that if new circumstances arise during the course of the arbitration that might give rise to doubts about impartiality, the arbitrator must immediately disclose these developments to the parties.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Voestalpine Schienen GMBH v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. [3] provided crucial guidance on the practical implementation of disclosure requirements. The Court laid down specific guidelines that arbitrators must follow when making disclosures. First, the disclosure must be made at the earliest possible opportunity, preferably before accepting the appointment or immediately upon becoming aware of circumstances requiring disclosure. Timing is critical because delayed disclosure can create complications and undermine confidence in the arbitration process.

Second, the Court emphasized that disclosures must be made in writing and must be clear and specific. Vague or ambiguous disclosures defeat the purpose of the requirement, as they do not enable parties to make informed decisions. The arbitrator must clearly articulate the nature of the relationship or circumstance being disclosed, providing sufficient detail for parties to assess its potential impact on the arbitrator’s impartiality. Third, the disclosure should include any past or present relationship with any of the parties or their counsel. This encompasses not only direct professional relationships but also indirect connections that might influence the arbitrator’s judgment.

Fourth, arbitrators must disclose any financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration. Financial interests are particularly significant because they create direct incentives that might affect decision-making. Personal interests, while perhaps less tangible, can be equally influential and must therefore be disclosed. Fifth, the Court specified that disclosures should include any involvement in previous or pending cases related to the same dispute. Such involvement might create preconceived notions about the issues in dispute or the parties involved, thereby compromising the arbitrator’s ability to approach the current dispute with an open mind.

Consequences of Non-Disclosure

The failure to disclose relevant circumstances carries serious consequences within the arbitration framework. Non-disclosure can constitute grounds for challenging the arbitrator’s appointment under Section 13 of the Act, and in cases where such non-disclosure comes to light after the award has been passed, it can form the basis for setting aside the arbitral award under Section 34. The Act treats disclosure violations seriously because they strike at the heart of the arbitration process’s integrity. When an arbitrator fails to disclose material information, it undermines the parties’ trust in the process and calls into question the legitimacy of any resulting award.

The severity of consequences for non-disclosure reflects the fundamental principle that parties must have complete confidence in their arbitrators’ independence and impartiality. Without such confidence, the arbitration process loses its legitimacy and effectiveness as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Courts have consistently held that even if the undisclosed circumstance might not have actually influenced the arbitrator’s decision, the mere fact of non-disclosure is sufficient to warrant challenge or setting aside of the award, because the test is not actual bias but the appearance of bias or potential for bias [4].

Challenge Procedures and Grounds for Disqualification

Grounds for Challenging an Arbitrator

Section 13 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act establishes a comprehensive procedure for challenging arbitrators when circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts concerning their impartiality or independence, or when the arbitrator does not possess qualifications agreed upon by the parties. The challenge mechanism serves as a crucial safeguard, ensuring that parties are not compelled to participate in arbitration proceedings before a tribunal they reasonably believe to be biased or unqualified. The grounds for challenge are deliberately framed broadly to encompass various situations that might compromise the arbitrator’s ability to adjudicate fairly.

The concept of “justifiable doubts” is central to understanding when a challenge might succeed. The standard is objective rather than subjective, meaning that the doubts must be reasonable from the perspective of an informed observer, not merely based on one party’s unsubstantiated suspicions or strategic considerations. Courts have emphasized that the test is whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. This objective standard prevents parties from making frivolous challenges while ensuring genuine concerns about arbitrator impartiality are addressed.

The qualifications ground for challenge recognizes that parties may have agreed upon specific qualifications that their arbitrators must possess, such as expertise in a particular field, professional credentials, or experience in certain types of disputes. When an appointed arbitrator lacks these agreed qualifications, a party may challenge the appointment even if there are no concerns about the arbitrator’s impartiality. This provision respects party autonomy by ensuring that the arbitration proceeds according to the terms the parties originally agreed upon.

Procedural Requirements for Challenge

The procedure for challenging an arbitrator is carefully structured to balance the need for fairness with the importance of avoiding delays in the arbitration process. According to Section 13(2), a party intending to challenge an arbitrator must send a written statement of reasons for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal within fifteen days after becoming aware of the circumstances giving rise to the challenge, or after becoming aware of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. This time limit serves two purposes: it ensures that challenges are raised promptly, preventing parties from waiting strategically to see how the arbitration unfolds before deciding whether to challenge, and it provides certainty to the arbitration process by establishing clear deadlines.

The written statement of reasons must clearly articulate the grounds for challenge, providing sufficient detail to enable the arbitral tribunal and the other parties to understand and respond to the concerns raised. Vague or general allegations are insufficient; the challenging party must specify the circumstances that give rise to doubts about the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, or identify the lack of agreed qualifications. This requirement promotes transparency and prevents challenges based on mere speculation or strategic considerations.

Once a challenge has been properly raised, Section 13(3) provides that unless the challenged arbitrator withdraws from office or the other party agrees to the challenge, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on the challenge. This provision creates an interesting dynamic: the challenged arbitrator participates in deciding whether the challenge against them should succeed. While this might initially appear problematic, the Act includes safeguards. If the challenge is not successful at the tribunal level, the aggrieved party is not left without remedy. Section 13(4) provides that if a challenge under sub-section (3) is not successful, the challenging party may make an application for setting aside the arbitral award under Section 34 after the award is made.

The Seventh Schedule and Automatic Ineligibility

The 2015 Amendment to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act introduced Section 12(5), which works in conjunction with the Seventh Schedule to establish categories of automatic ineligibility for arbitrators [5]. This provision states that notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, any person whose relationship with the parties or counsel or subject-matter falls under the Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. The inclusion of this provision represents a significant shift toward greater regulation of arbitrator qualifications, moving beyond the disclosure-based approach to establish bright-line rules of ineligibility.

The Seventh Schedule categorizes ineligibility grounds based on the relationship between the arbitrator and the parties. It identifies situations where the relationship is so close or the conflict of interest so apparent that the arbitrator should be automatically disqualified, regardless of whether the parties had previously agreed to their appointment. This approach reflects the principle that certain conflicts are so fundamental that party autonomy cannot override the need for impartiality. The Schedule includes circumstances such as where the arbitrator is an employee, consultant, advisor, or has any other past or present business relationship with one of the parties. Such relationships create inherent conflicts because the arbitrator may have ongoing professional or financial ties that could influence their judgment.

Family relationships constitute another category of automatic ineligibility under the Seventh Schedule. When an arbitrator has a close family relationship with one of the parties or their counsel, the potential for bias is obvious and unacceptable. The Schedule recognizes that family ties create loyalties and obligations that cannot be overcome by professional detachment, no matter how scrupulously the arbitrator attempts to remain impartial. Financial interests in the outcome of the dispute also fall within the ineligibility criteria. An arbitrator who stands to gain or lose financially based on the outcome of the arbitration cannot be considered impartial, as their personal interests directly conflict with their duty to adjudicate fairly [6].

The Schedule further addresses situations where the proposed arbitrator has previously given legal advice or provided expert opinions on the dispute. Such prior involvement creates problems because the arbitrator has already formed views about the issues or may feel committed to positions they previously advocated. Similarly, previous involvement in the dispute in any capacity can compromise the arbitrator’s ability to approach the matter with fresh eyes and an open mind. These provisions collectively ensure that arbitrators come to their role without preconceptions or conflicts that might affect their judgment.

Termination of Arbitrator’s Mandate

Beyond challenges to an arbitrator’s appointment, the Act recognizes that circumstances may arise during the course of arbitration that necessitate the termination of an arbitrator’s mandate. Section 14 addresses situations where an arbitrator becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform their functions, or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay. The inability to perform functions might result from various causes, including serious illness, incapacity, or other circumstances that prevent the arbitrator from effectively discharging their duties. The distinction between de jure and de facto inability is significant: de jure inability refers to legal incapacity, such as death, while de facto inability encompasses practical impediments to performing the arbitrator’s role.

The requirement that arbitrators act without undue delay reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration should provide expeditious dispute resolution. When an arbitrator fails to move proceedings forward in a timely manner, whether due to excessive workload, lack of diligence, or other reasons, the parties’ right to efficient dispute resolution is compromised. The Act therefore provides mechanisms for terminating the mandate of arbitrators who fail to act with appropriate dispatch, ensuring that the arbitration process does not become mired in delays that defeat its purpose as an alternative to lengthy court proceedings [7].

Evolution Through Amendments and Judicial Interpretation

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act has undergone significant amendments since its enactment in 1996, with the 2015 Amendment marking a particularly important evolution in the law governing arbitral tribunals. The amendments were driven by recognition that certain aspects of the original Act required refinement to address practical challenges that had emerged in arbitration practice. The introduction of the Seventh Schedule and Section 12(5), establishing automatic ineligibility criteria, represented a major policy shift toward greater regulation of arbitrator qualifications. This change responded to concerns that the disclosure-based approach, while valuable, did not adequately address situations where conflicts of interest were so fundamental that arbitrators should be automatically disqualified.

Judicial interpretation has played a crucial role in shaping the practical application of provisions governing arbitral tribunal. Courts have consistently emphasized the importance of maintaining high standards of arbitrator independence and impartiality, recognizing that these qualities are essential to the legitimacy and effectiveness of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. The judiciary has also sought to balance competing considerations: respecting party autonomy and minimizing judicial intervention on one hand, while ensuring fairness and integrity in the arbitration process on the other [8].

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has established important principles that guide arbitration practice in India. Beyond the specific cases already discussed, courts have addressed numerous issues relating to arbitrator appointments, challenges, and disclosure requirements. This body of case law provides valuable guidance to practitioners, arbitrators, and parties engaged in arbitration, helping to clarify ambiguities in the statutory provisions and establish best practices for arbitration proceedings.

International Perspectives and Comparative Analysis

India’s arbitration framework exists within a broader international context. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act’s foundation in the UNCITRAL Model Law reflects a deliberate effort to harmonize Indian arbitration law with international standards, facilitating cross-border commercial arbitration and enhancing India’s attractiveness as a seat for international arbitration. The provisions governing arbitral tribunals largely align with international best practices, though with certain India-specific adaptations reflecting local legal culture and practical considerations.

International arbitration institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International Arbitration, and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre have developed detailed rules and guidelines governing arbitrator appointments, disclosures, and challenges. While these institutional rules differ in specifics, they share common principles with India’s statutory framework: emphasis on arbitrator independence and impartiality, robust disclosure requirements, and fair procedures for challenging arbitrators. The convergence of Indian law with these international standards has been beneficial, as it provides parties engaged in international commercial arbitration with familiar procedural frameworks regardless of whether they arbitrate under institutional rules or under Indian law [9].

Practical Implications for Parties and Practitioners

Understanding the legal framework governing arbitral tribunals has important practical implications for parties considering or engaged in arbitration. At the outset, when drafting arbitration agreements, parties should carefully consider provisions relating to arbitrator appointments. While the Act provides default mechanisms, parties can agree upon specific procedures tailored to their needs and concerns. Clear and well-drafted arbitration clauses can prevent disputes about tribunal constitution and ensure smooth proceedings.

When selecting arbitrators, parties should conduct thorough due diligence to identify potential conflicts of interest or circumstances that might give rise to challenges. This includes researching the proposed arbitrator’s professional background, past and current relationships with parties or counsel, and previous arbitration appointments. Investing effort at this stage can prevent complications later in the proceedings and ensure confidence in the tribunal’s impartiality.

For arbitrators themselves, the disclosure obligations impose significant responsibilities. Arbitrators must conduct thorough self-examination to identify all circumstances that might require disclosure, and must make these disclosures proactively and comprehensively. The guidance provided by the Supreme Court regarding the manner and timing of disclosures should be scrupulously followed. Arbitrators should maintain ongoing vigilance throughout the proceedings, as the obligation to disclose continues if new circumstances arise.

Legal practitioners advising clients in arbitration matters must be thoroughly familiar with the provisions governing arbitral tribunals, including the grounds and procedures for challenging arbitrators, the automatic ineligibility criteria in the Seventh Schedule, and the relevant case law interpreting these provisions. This knowledge enables them to protect their clients’ interests effectively, whether by identifying grounds for challenge when necessary or by advising on strategies to avoid or respond to challenges.

Conclusion

The legal framework governing arbitral tribunals under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, represents a carefully balanced system designed to ensure fair, efficient, and legitimate dispute resolution. The provisions relating to arbitrator appointments, disclosure requirements, challenge procedures, and grounds for ineligibility collectively establish a robust framework that protects the integrity of the arbitration process while respecting party autonomy. Through successive amendments and evolving judicial interpretation, this framework has matured into a sophisticated system that aligns with international best practices while addressing India-specific concerns and circumstances.

The emphasis on arbitrator independence and impartiality reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration’s legitimacy depends upon parties’ confidence in the fairness of the tribunal. The mandatory disclosure requirements, challenge procedures, and automatic ineligibility criteria serve this goal by ensuring transparency and providing mechanisms to address concerns about arbitrator partiality. As India continues to develop as a significant arbitration jurisdiction, the legal framework governing arbitral tribunal will undoubtedly continue to evolve through further amendments and judicial interpretation, responding to emerging challenges and incorporating lessons from international arbitration practice.

References

[1] Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice. “The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.” 

[2] Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd., (2020) 20 SCC 760, Supreme Court of India. 

[3] Voestalpine Schienen GMBH v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., (2017) 4 SCC 665, Supreme Court of India. 

[4] HRD Corporation (Marcus Oil and Chemical Division) v. GAIL (India) Ltd., (2018) 12 SCC 471, Supreme Court of India. 

[5] Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, Ministry of Law and Justice. 

[6] TRF Limited v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377, Supreme Court of India. 

[7] Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India. 

[8] PASL Wind Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. GE Power Conversion India Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 1, Supreme Court of India. 

[9] Born, Gary B. “International Commercial Arbitration.” Kluwer Law International, 2014. 

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