On February 3, 2026, the Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark judgment in Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick & Ors. [1], which affirmed that a single insolvency petition under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 can be maintained against multiple corporate entities when they are intrinsically linked in project execution and marketing. By expressly recognizing the permissibility of joint insolvency proceedings under the IBC, the Court provided crucial clarity on proceedings against separate corporate debtors whose operations and obligations to creditors are deeply intertwined, particularly in real estate developments where multiple entities often collaborate. The ruling underscores that corporate structures cannot be used to fragment unified business operations and thereby defeat the core objectives of insolvency resolution.

The Supreme Court Judgment

The case involved 141 allottees of the Grand Venezia Commercial Tower project in Greater Noida who filed a petition against M/s. Grand Venezia Commercial Towers Private Limited and M/s. Bhasin Infotech and Infrastructure Private Limited [1]. The allottees sought initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against both companies jointly, claiming they had not received possession despite making substantial payments. The appellants challenged admissibility of a single petition against two distinct entities, arguing that segregating allottees by company would reduce numbers below the statutory threshold of 100 allottees required under Section 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

The Supreme Court bench of Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran rejected these arguments, upholding the National Company Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal orders [1]. The Court observed that Bhasin Infotech originally undertook the project and later granted marketing rights to Grand Venezia. Both entities functioned as a unified commercial operation, being jointly answerable to allottees. The Supreme Court concluded that the corporate debtors were intrinsically linked and a joint insolvency process would maximize asset realization [1].

Legislative Framework Under IBC

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was enacted to consolidate laws relating to reorganization and insolvency resolution of corporate persons in a time-bound manner for maximization of value of assets [2]. Section 7 provides that a financial creditor may file an application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor when default has occurred [2]. This provision forms the foundation for creditor-initiated proceedings and has been extensively invoked by financial creditors, including homebuyers recognized as financial creditors following amendments.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020 introduced specific thresholds for real estate allottees through the second proviso to Section 7(1), mandating that allottees file applications jointly with not less than one hundred creditors or not less than ten percent of total creditors, whichever is less [3]. This threshold was upheld in Manish Kumar v. Union of India [3], where the Supreme Court held that the amendment prevented frivolous petitions and protected interests of other allottees who might have different views on insolvency proceedings.

Threshold Requirements and Their Application

In Manish Kumar v. Union of India (2021), the Supreme Court examined constitutional validity of threshold requirements for real estate allottees [3]. The Court held that classification was based on intelligible differentia, including numerosity, heterogeneity, and individuality in decision-making among allottees in large real estate projects. The Court reasoned that allowing a single allottee to initiate proceedings could jeopardize interests of hundreds or thousands of other allottees who might prefer different remedies or have faith in the developer.

The Supreme Court clarified that required numbers must be reckoned at the time of filing the application, not at admission stage [3]. This principle was directly applied in the Satinder Singh Bhasin case, where 103 allottees filed the petition, satisfying the threshold. The Court rejected contentions that thresholds should be calculated separately for each corporate entity, holding that where entities are intrinsically linked to the same project, allottees should be counted collectively.

Group Insolvency Principle: The Edelweiss Precedent

The Supreme Court’s decision drew heavily from the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal’s ruling in Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited v. Sachet Infrastructure Private Limited [4], which established that group insolvency proceedings can be initiated when multiple corporate entities are jointly involved in collaborative development projects. The case involved five corporate guarantors who were co-borrowers in a township development project in Palwal, Haryana.

The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal held that these corporate debtors were co-borrowers and corporate guarantors, and resolution would not succeed if the entire township was not developed comprehensively [4]. The Tribunal found it was a joint consortium requiring group insolvency to develop the township on corporate debtors’ land along with Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against Adel Landmarks Limited, the principal borrower. The Tribunal directed group Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against five corporate debtors apart from ongoing proceedings against the principal borrower [4].

The Edelweiss judgment recognized that when multiple corporate entities jointly participate in a project with inseparable business operations, conducting fragmented insolvency proceedings would jeopardize project completion and adversely affect allottees [4]. The Tribunal emphasized recognizing interconnected roles of corporate guarantors in land development projects, reasoning that their insolvency could not be addressed in isolation without impacting overall project viability. Group insolvency resolution was therefore warranted to create a cohesive plan for project completion.

Determining When Entities Are Intrinsically Linked

The Supreme Court in Satinder Singh Bhasin provided guidance on determining when corporate entities should be considered intrinsically linked for joint insolvency proceedings under the IBC [1]. The test is not merely existence of separate legal personalities, but practical reality of how entities function in relation to the project and their obligations to creditors. Several factors are relevant in this determination.

First, the nature of collaboration in project development and marketing is examined. Where one entity undertakes development while another handles marketing, but both are jointly answerable to allottees, this demonstrates functional integration. Second, operational intertwining is assessed. When business operations cannot be segregated and entities function as a unified commercial operation, this indicates intrinsic linkage. Third, the Court considers whether keeping entities as going concerns requires a consolidated approach. Where separate proceedings would diminish resolution prospects and reduce asset realization, joint proceedings become appropriate [1].

Protection of Homebuyers’ Rights

Recognition of homebuyers and real estate allottees as financial creditors under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code represents a significant shift in Indian insolvency law. Prior to 2018 amendments, homebuyers were classified as operational creditors, placing them in a subordinate position. Amendment to Section 5(8) to include amounts raised from allottees under real estate projects as financial debt fundamentally altered real estate insolvency dynamics.

This reclassification empowers homebuyers by giving them rights to initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process proceedings against defaulting developers and provides representation in the Committee of Creditors, where they participate in critical decisions regarding resolution plans. While 2020 amendment threshold requirements impose limitations on individual action, they actually strengthen collective bargaining positions by requiring coordinated action.

The Satinder Singh Bhasin decision further enhances homebuyer protection by ensuring developers cannot escape liability by fragmenting operations across multiple corporate entities [1]. The judgment recognizes that in many real estate projects, developers use multiple special purpose vehicles for different project aspects, and allowing them to avoid joint insolvency would prejudice allottees who dealt with the project as a unified whole.

Maximization of Asset Value through Joint Insolvency Proceedings under IBC

A fundamental objective of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code is maximizing value of corporate debtor assets. Section 1(1) explicitly states it is enacted for reorganization and insolvency resolution in a time-bound manner for maximization of value of assets [2]. The Supreme Court’s endorsement of joint insolvency proceedings for intrinsically linked entities directly serves this objective by addressing inefficiencies that arise when functionally integrated entities are subjected to separate insolvency proceedings under the IBC.

When corporate entities are functionally integrated but subjected to separate insolvency proceedings, several inefficiencies arise. There may be duplication of costs with separate resolution professionals and administrative expenses for each entity. Resolution applicants face difficulties formulating viable plans when they cannot acquire the integrated business as a whole. Potential exists for conflicting decisions by different Committees of Creditors, leading to suboptimal outcomes.

Joint insolvency proceedings address these concerns by enabling consolidated approaches to resolution. A single resolution professional can be appointed for related entities, reducing costs and ensuring coordinated decision-making. Resolution applicants can submit plans treating the integrated business as a whole, increasing likelihood of successful resolution. The Committee of Creditors can make informed decisions considering the complete picture of assets and liabilities across related entities. These efficiencies ultimately benefit all stakeholders, including creditors, employees, and corporate debtors [1].

Implications for the Real Estate Sector

The real estate sector in India has been characterized by use of multiple corporate entities for different phases or components of integrated projects. Developers commonly establish separate special purpose vehicles for land holding, development, marketing, and facilities management. While these structures serve legitimate business purposes, they can also fragment liabilities and complicate creditor recovery.

The Supreme Court’s judgment sends a clear message to the real estate industry that corporate structures cannot be used to defeat legitimate creditor claims. Where entities are intrinsically linked in project execution and marketing, they will be treated as jointly liable for insolvency purposes [1]. This has several important implications for how real estate projects are structured and managed.

Developers will need to carefully consider insolvency implications when establishing corporate structures for projects. If entities within a group are functionally integrated and jointly answerable to creditors, they should anticipate possibility of joint insolvency proceedings. This may influence decisions about corporate governance, financial management, and risk allocation within project structures. Additionally, the judgment provides greater certainty to homebuyers and financial creditors, who can pursue joint proceedings against related entities without fear that technical arguments about separate legal personality will defeat their claims.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick & Ors. represents a significant development in Indian insolvency jurisprudence by affirming that single insolvency petitions can be maintained against multiple corporate entities when they are intrinsically linked in their operations and obligations [1]. This principle ensures that objectives of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, particularly maximization of asset value and efficient resolution, are not frustrated by corporate structures that fragment integrated business operations.

The judgment provides crucial protection to homebuyers and financial creditors in real estate projects by recognizing that developers cannot escape liability through use of multiple corporate entities for different aspects of unified projects. It builds on the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal’s precedent in the Edelweiss case [4] and applies principles consistent with the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Manish Kumar v. Union of India [3] regarding threshold requirements for real estate allottees.

The decision strengthens India’s insolvency framework by prioritizing substance over form and ensuring that the Code serves its fundamental purpose of facilitating effective resolution while protecting the interests of all stakeholders. As insolvency law continues to evolve in India, allowing joint insolvency proceedings under the IBC for intrinsically linked entities will remain an important tool for achieving efficient and equitable outcomes in complex corporate insolvency cases.

References

[1] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick & Ors., 2026 INSC 104 (Supreme Court of India, February 3, 2026)

[2] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Preamble and Section 7

[3] Manish Kumar v. Union of India, (2021) 5 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India)

[4] Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited v. Sachet Infrastructure Private Limited, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 377 of 2019 (National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, September 20, 2019)

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Introduction

The insolvency of corporate groups—constellations of legally distinct entities functioning as integrated economic units—presents distinctive challenges that test the boundaries of traditional entity-based insolvency frameworks. India’s Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), while transformative in its approach to individual corporate insolvency, adheres to the fundamental principle of separate legal personality, addressing each entity’s insolvency in isolation despite potential interconnections within corporate groups. This entity-centric approach has created significant practical challenges in resolving the insolvency of complex corporate structures, where isolated entity-level proceedings may fragment business value, complicate coordinated resolution, and enable strategic behaviors that potentially undermine creditor interests. The absence of a comprehensive group insolvency framework has compelled courts to develop case-specific solutions through innovative interpretations of existing provisions. These judicial interventions, while addressing immediate concerns, have created a patchwork jurisprudence lacking the coherence and predictability essential for effective insolvency administration. Simultaneously, the Insolvency Law Committee has recognized these challenges, recommending a phased implementation of group insolvency mechanisms through its 2019 report. As legislative deliberation continues, the fundamental question emerges: does implementing a comprehensive group insolvency framework in India represent a necessary evolution of India’s insolvency regime, or would it constitute legislative overreach that compromises foundational principles of corporate law? This article examines the evolving jurisprudence on group insolvency in India, analyzing landmark judicial decisions, evaluating proposed legislative frameworks, assessing international approaches, and examining the tension between entity separateness and economic integration in modern corporate structures. Through this analysis, the article aims to provide clarity on whether a distinct group insolvency framework in India represents legal necessity or unwarranted legislative expansion in India’s evolving insolvency ecosystem.

The Current Statutory Framework: Entity-Centric Approach and Limitations

Separate Legal Personality: The Foundational Doctrine

The IBC, in its current form, does not contain specific provisions addressing group insolvency scenarios in India. This omission reflects the legislation’s adherence to the foundational company law doctrine of separate legal personality, which treats each company as a distinct legal entity regardless of common ownership, control, or operational integration. This principle, established in the seminal case of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1896] UKHL 1 and consistently upheld in Indian jurisprudence, forms the bedrock of corporate law globally.

In Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the sanctity of this principle in the Indian context, observing:

“The separate legal personality of companies enables entrepreneurs to separate their business functions into different corporate entities within a corporate group. This often creates genuine legal relationships by a complex web of transactions with real legal, taxation, and business effects. The doctrine of separate legal personality has served the commercial world well, enabling fragmentation of businesses into separate corporate entities for legitimate business purposes.”

This doctrinal foundation manifests in the IBC’s entity-centric insolvency approach, where each company’s insolvency is addressed in isolation, without specific mechanisms for coordinated proceedings involving related entities.

Existing Provisions with Limited Group Applicability 

While lacking a comprehensive group framework, certain IBC provisions offer limited applicability to group scenarios:

1. Section 60(3): Enables the NCLT to transfer proceedings involving a corporate debtor’s guarantors or other related parties to itself, potentially facilitating limited procedural coordination. 
2. Section 18(f): Requires resolution professionals to take control of assets owned by the corporate debtor but held by third parties, which may address certain intra-group asset issues. 
3. Section 29A: Restricts certain categories of persons, including those connected to other defaulting companies, from submitting resolution plans, indirectly recognizing group relationships. 

In State Bank of India v. Videocon Industries Ltd. (2019 SCC OnLine NCLT 745), the Mumbai Bench of the NCLT examined these provisions, noting:

“The existing provisions, while not creating a comprehensive group insolvency framework in India, do provide limited tools for addressing certain group-related issues. Section 60(3), in particular, offers a jurisdictional nexus for related proceedings, though it addresses procedural rather than substantive consolidation concerns. These provisions represent the legislature’s recognition of potential group issues without abandoning the fundamental entity-separateness principle.”

Practical Challenges in Group insolvency Scenarios in India

The entity-centric approach has created significant practical challenges in group insolvency scenarios in India, as highlighted by the Insolvency Law Committee in its 2019 report:

1. Value Fragmentation: Group businesses often function as integrated economic units with interdependent operations, shared assets, and centralized management. Entity-level proceedings can fragment this integrated value, potentially reducing overall recovery. 
2. Coordination Problems: Separate proceedings for related entities may involve different jurisdictions, adjudicating authorities, timelines, and professionals, creating coordination difficulties that impede efficient resolution. 
3. Strategic Behavior: Corporate groups may structure operations to segregate assets and liabilities across entities, potentially enabling strategic manipulation through selective insolvency filings. 
4. Cross-Collateralization Complexity: Intra-group guarantees, shared collateral, and cross-default provisions create complex creditor rights that may be inadequately addressed through isolated proceedings. 
5. Information Asymmetries: Entity-specific proceedings may suffer from information fragmentation, with each resolution professional having only partial visibility into the group’s overall financial and operational structure. 

In Punjab National Bank v. Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd. (2019 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1177), the NCLAT acknowledged these practical challenges:

“The current entity-by-entity approach to insolvency resolution creates substantial practical difficulties in corporate group scenarios. The intricate web of inter-company transactions, guarantees, and operational dependencies means that isolated resolution processes may fail to maximize value or properly address creditor rights across the group structure. These practical realities create tension with the strict legal separation principle, necessitating judicial innovation in the absence of specific legislative provisions.”

Judicial Evolution of Group Insolvency Consolidation Principles

Videocon Industries Case: Procedural Consolidation Innovation

The landmark case of State Bank of India v. Videocon Industries Ltd. (2019 SCC OnLine NCLT 745) represented a watershed moment in India’s group insolvency jurisprudence in India. The Mumbai Bench of the NCLT addressed the insolvency of multiple Videocon group companies with substantial operational integration, shared financial guarantees, and common lenders.

The NCLT, recognizing the practical complexities, ordered the consolidation of insolvency proceedings for 13 group entities, noting:

“The corporate debtors form part of Videocon group and their businesses are interlinked. The registered office of the corporate debtors and corporate guarantors are located in the same complex. There are cross-guarantees and securities among these companies. The intricate relationships, the existence of shared financing arrangements, interdependent operations, and consolidating the CIRPs would maximize the value of assets and be in the interest of all stakeholders.”

The tribunal’s innovative approach, subsequently upheld by the NCLAT, relied on a purposive interpretation of IBC provisions rather than explicit group insolvency mechanisms in India:

“While the Code does not explicitly provide for consolidation of proceedings, Section 60(5) confers wide powers on the Adjudicating Authority to make such orders as it may deem fit for carrying out the provisions of the Code. This residuary power, combined with the overarching objective of value maximization, provides sufficient basis for procedural consolidation where group integration justifies such an approach.”

This decision established several important principles:

1. The recognition that corporate groups with substantial operational and financial integration may require coordinated insolvency treatment despite formal legal separation 
2. The distinction between procedural consolidation (coordinated administration) and substantive consolidation (pooling of assets and liabilities) 
3. The identification of specific factors justifying consolidation, including common control, interdependent operations, shared financing, and potential value maximization 

Lavasa Corporation Case: Refining the Consolidation Criteria

Building on the Videocon precedent, the Mumbai Bench of the NCLT further refined the consolidation criteria in Axis Bank Ltd. v. Lavasa Corporation Ltd. (2020 SCC OnLine NCLT 407). The case involved the insolvency of multiple companies within the Lavasa group, a large township development project with integrated operations across legally distinct entities.

The NCLT granted procedural consolidation based on a more structured analytical framework:

“Consolidation should not be granted merely because companies belong to the same group or have common directors. Specific factors must establish sufficient integration to justify deviation from the separate entity principle. In this case, we find such justification in the following: (1) the township development inherently requiring integrated management; (2) shared project approvals and financing arrangements; (3) interdependent contractual obligations; (4) common financial creditors with cross-guarantees; and (5) the potential for improved value realization through coordinated resolution.”

The tribunal introduced an important limitation:

“Consolidation must not prejudice any creditor who would receive better recovery in standalone proceedings. Where consolidated proceedings would diminish a specific creditor’s recovery prospects, the consolidation order must include appropriate safeguards or exemptions to prevent such prejudice.”

This decision represented significant jurisprudential development by:

1. Establishing a more rigorous analytical framework for evaluating consolidation requests 
2. Introducing the “no creditor worse off” principle as a limitation on consolidation powers 
3. Recognizing the need for case-specific evaluation rather than presumptive consolidation for all group entities 

Educomp Case: Limitations and Boundaries

Not all group consolidation requests have been granted, as demonstrated in State Bank of India v. Educomp Infrastructure & School Management Ltd. (2020 SCC OnLine NCLT Del 1733). The Delhi Bench of the NCLT denied procedural consolidation for the Educomp group companies, establishing important limitations to the emerging consolidation doctrine.

The tribunal reasoned:

“Mere common control, shared administrative functions, or the potential convenience of coordinated proceedings does not justify consolidation. The applicants have failed to demonstrate substantial operational integration, shared assets, or commingling of finances that would render separate proceedings ineffective. Each entity in this group maintains distinct operational functions, serves different markets, has separate financing arrangements, and maintains proper entity-level accounting and governance. In such circumstances, consolidation would inappropriately disregard corporate separateness without corresponding value maximization benefits.”

The decision articulated a crucial principle:

“Consolidation remains an exceptional measure justified only where entity separation has become effectively artificial due to substantial integration. It cannot become a routine approach to group insolvency merely for administrative convenience or to address challenges inherent in any group resolution. The fundamental principle remains entity-based proceedings, with consolidation permitted only upon demonstration of exceptional circumstances justifying deviation from this principle.”

This decision provided important boundaries by:

1. Reinforcing entity separateness as the default principle with consolidation as the exception requiring specific justification 
2. Distinguishing between genuine operational integration and mere administrative convenience 
3. Requiring evidence that consolidation would meaningfully enhance value maximization rather than simply procedural efficiency 

Jaypee Infratech Case: Cross-Entity Resolution Innovation

Beyond consolidation questions, courts have developed other innovative approaches to group issues. In Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association & Ors. v. NBCC (India) Ltd. & Ors. (2020) 18 SCC 397, the Supreme Court addressed a unique group resolution challenge involving Jaypee Infratech Ltd. (JIL) and its parent company Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. (JAL).

The case involved complex inter-company land transactions, guarantees, and the rights of homebuyers across the corporate structure. The Court upheld a resolution plan that included settlement of certain inter-company claims and liability transfers between JIL and JAL, effectively addressing group relationships without formal consolidation.

Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, writing for the Court, observed:

“While each entity’s insolvency must be addressed within its own process, the resolution plan may properly account for complex inter-company relationships where they materially affect the corporate debtor’s resolution. This approach respects entity boundaries while pragmatically addressing group realities that cannot be ignored for effective resolution. The Code’s value maximization objective permits resolution plans to include arrangements addressing essential group relationships without requiring formal consolidation proceedings.”

This decision represented an important development by:

1. Recognizing that resolution plans may appropriately address certain cross-entity issues without requiring formal group mechanisms 
2. Establishing that the commercial wisdom of the CoC may extend to approving resolution plans with group-related provisions 
3. Demonstrating judicial pragmatism in balancing entity separation with economic realities 

The Insolvency Law Committee Report: Framework Proposals

Recommended Phased Framework for Group Insolvency

Recognizing the challenges in group insolvency scenarios in India, the Insolvency Law Committee released a comprehensive report in 2019 recommending a phased implementation of group insolvency mechanisms in India. The report drew from international best practices while proposing an approach tailored to Indian corporate and insolvency contexts.

The report’s key recommendations included:

1. Phase 1 – Procedural Coordination Mechanisms: 
   • Enabling joint application for insolvency proceedings against multiple group entities
   • Facilitating coordination through common insolvency professionals
   • Creating communication and cooperation protocols between proceedings
   • Establishing procedural coordination without affecting substantive rights
2. Phase 2 – Substantive Elements and Framework Expansion: 
   • Rules for treatment of intra-group financing and guarantees
   • Mechanisms for subordination of intra-group claims in appropriate cases
   • Framework for limited substantive consolidation in exceptional cases
   • Provisions addressing group-wide resolution plans
3. Phase 3 – Cross-Border Group Insolvency in India: 
   • Extending the framework to international group scenarios
   • Aligning with UNCITRAL Model Law principles for cross-border coordination
   • Creating protocols for cooperation with foreign proceedings

The Committee emphasized that implementation should proceed cautiously, with each phase evaluated before proceeding to more complex mechanisms:

“The recommended framework adopts the principle of entity separateness as the foundation, with specific mechanisms enabling coordination or consolidation only where justified by defined criteria. This balanced approach aims to address practical challenges without undermining fundamental corporate law principles or creating moral hazard through easy consolidation.”

Definition and Identification Framework for Group Insolvency

A central element of the Committee’s recommendations was a structured framework for defining “corporate groups” for insolvency purposes. The proposed approach included:

1. Primary Criteria Based on Control: 
   • Majority equity ownership (more than 50% voting rights)
   • Control over board composition
   • De facto control through special contractual rights
2. Secondary Economic Integration Factors: 
   • Significant interdependence of operations
   • Centralized treasury functions or cash pooling
   • Cross-guarantees or security arrangements
   • Shared administrative and management functions

The Committee emphasized that mere affiliation within a group would not automatically trigger special treatment:

“Group membership alone would not justify procedural coordination or substantive consolidation. The framework would require demonstration of meaningful operational or financial integration that would make isolated proceedings inefficient or potentially value-destructive. This ensures that coordination mechanisms are applied selectively where genuinely warranted rather than presumptively based on formal group structure.”

Procedural Coordination vs. Substantive Consolidation

The Committee made a crucial distinction between procedural coordination and substantive consolidation, recommending different standards and safeguards for each:

1. Procedural Coordination: Proposed as a relatively accessible mechanism requiring demonstration of administrative efficiencies, cost reduction, or information-sharing benefits. Key elements included: 
   • Joint administration without affecting substantive rights
   • Coordinated timelines and procedural milestones
   • Common or communicating insolvency professionals
   • Group coordination proceedings
2. Substantive Consolidation: Recommended as an exceptional remedy requiring demonstration of substantial integration rendering entity separation artificial. Proposed criteria included: 
   • Extensive asset commingling making separation impossible or prohibitively expensive
   • Demonstrable fraud or abuse of corporate form
   • Substantial operational integration with centralized control
   • Proof that consolidation would benefit all creditor classes

The Committee emphasized the exceptional nature of substantive consolidation:

“Substantive consolidation represents a significant intrusion into entity separateness that should be permitted only in exceptional circumstances where the benefits substantially outweigh the costs of disregarding corporate boundaries. The framework should establish a strong presumption against substantive consolidation, placing the burden of proof on those seeking this extraordinary remedy.”

International Approaches and Comparative Perspective

UNCITRAL Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency in India

The UNCITRAL Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency (2019) represents the most comprehensive international framework addressing group insolvency challenges. Key elements include:

1. Coordination Mechanisms: Provisions for appointment of group representatives, recognition of foreign proceedings, and establishment of coordination protocols. 
2. Group Solutions Facilitation: Framework for developing and implementing group-wide solutions while respecting entity separateness. 
3. Relief Provisions: Mechanisms for coordinated relief to protect group-wide value and prevent asset dissipation. 
4. Balancing Mechanisms: Protections ensuring coordination does not prejudice creditors of individual group members. 

In Jet Airways (India) Ltd. v. State Bank of India (2021 SCC OnLine NCLAT 43), the NCLAT referenced the UNCITRAL Model Law principles while addressing international aspects of the Jet Airways insolvency:

“The UNCITRAL framework provides valuable guidance on international coordination in group insolvency scenarios in India. While India has not formally adopted this framework, its principles of cooperation, communication, and coordination represent universal best practices that may inform judicial approaches to complex cross-border group insolvencies even within existing statutory constraints.”

The Model Law’s influence on emerging Indian jurisprudence demonstrates the recognition of universal challenges in group insolvency despite varying national approaches.

European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings

The European Union’s approach through Regulation 2015/848 on Insolvency Proceedings provides another comparative reference point with several distinctive features:

1. Coordination Mechanisms: Provisions for group coordination proceedings with appointed coordinators while maintaining separate legal proceedings. 
2. Opt-In Framework: A flexible approach allowing group members to opt into coordination rather than mandating participation. 
3. Communication Requirements: Mandatory cooperation and communication between insolvency practitioners and courts in different member states. 
4. No Substantive Consolidation: Preservation of entity separateness with coordination focused on procedural aspects rather than asset/liability pooling. 

In Committee of Creditors of Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Venugopal Dhoot (2020 SCC OnLine NCLAT 755), the NCLAT noted:

“The EU’s approach represents a balanced framework preserving entity separation while enabling meaningful coordination. Unlike some jurisdictions that permit substantive consolidation in exceptional circumstances, the EU model maintains stricter adherence to entity boundaries while focusing on practical coordination mechanisms. This approach demonstrates that effective group insolvency frameworks need not necessarily embrace substantive consolidation to achieve coordination benefits.”

United States: Substantive Consolidation Doctrine

The United States has developed perhaps the most expansive approach to group insolvency through its judicially-created substantive consolidation doctrine. Key elements include:

1. Court-Created Remedy: Developed through case law rather than explicit statutory provisions, demonstrating the flexibility of judicial approaches to group challenges. 
2. Balancing Tests: Various circuit-specific tests evaluating whether consolidation benefits outweigh harms to objecting creditors. 
3. Expansive Application: Applied in cases involving fraud, operational integration, creditor reliance on group status, or prohibitive accounting complexity. 
4. Significant Judicial Discretion: Substantial flexibility in application based on case-specific equitable considerations. 

In Punjab National Bank International Ltd. v. Ravi Srinivasan (2022 SCC OnLine NCLT 425), the NCLT Chennai compared the emerging Indian approach with the American doctrine:

“The substantive consolidation doctrine in the United States represents the most interventionist approach to group insolvency globally. While Indian jurisprudence has begun recognizing limited consolidation in exceptional circumstances, it has generally adopted a more restrained approach than American courts, requiring stronger evidence of integration or entity abuse to justify consolidation. This reflects India’s stronger adherence to traditional corporate separation principles, though practical considerations are increasingly recognized.”

The Debate: Necessity vs. Overreach

Arguments in Favor of a Comprehensive Group Insolvency Framework

Proponents of a comprehensive group insolvency framework advance several compelling arguments:

1. Economic Reality Recognition: Modern corporate groups often function as economically integrated units despite legal separation. In Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. v. Sachet Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (2019 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1179), the NCLAT observed:
   
   “Corporate groups increasingly operate with integrated management, centralized treasury functions, shared services, and interdependent operations that create economic reality at variance with legal formalism. An insolvency framework ignoring these realities risks artificial outcomes that neither maximize value nor reflect commercial expectations. Legislative recognition of group dynamics would align insolvency processes with business reality rather than legal fiction.” 
2. Value Maximization Enhancement: Coordinated resolution may preserve going-concern value that would be lost through fragmented proceedings. In Videocon Industries, the NCLT emphasized:
   
   “Fragmented proceedings for integrated businesses risk destroying synergistic value through disjointed asset sales, operational disruption, and failure to recognize interdependencies. A group framework enables holistic resolution approaches that preserve operational integrity where commercially beneficial, potentially enhancing overall creditor recovery compared to isolated entity proceedings.” 
3. International Harmonization: Adoption of group mechanisms would align India with emerging international standards. In Export-Import Bank of India v. Resolution Professional of JEKPL Pvt. Ltd. (2021 SCC OnLine NCLT 166), the NCLT Mumbai noted:
   
   “As Indian businesses increasingly engage in global operations, alignment with international best practices in insolvency becomes increasingly important. A structured group insolvency framework would facilitate cross-border coordination and encourage foreign investment by providing familiar and predictable mechanisms for addressing complex group failures consistent with emerging global standards.” 
4. Legal Certainty Enhancement: Statutory provisions would provide greater predictability than case-by-case judicial innovation. The Insolvency Law Committee report emphasized:
   
   “While courts have developed creative solutions to group challenges, this case-by-case approach creates unpredictability for stakeholders and risks inconsistent treatment of similar situations. A comprehensive legislative framework would establish clear criteria, procedures, and safeguards, enhancing certainty for creditors, debtors, and investors without requiring repeated judicial innovation.” 

Arguments Against a Comprehensive Framework

Opponents of a comprehensive framework raise several significant concerns:

1. Fundamental Corporate Law Principles: A group framework risks undermining the foundational separate legal personality doctrine. In Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Union of India (2020 SCC OnLine SC 609), the Supreme Court cautioned:
   
   “The separate legal personality doctrine represents a foundational principle of corporate law, enabling limited liability, asset partitioning, and defined creditor rights. Legislative mechanisms that too readily disregard corporate boundaries risk undermining this essential principle, potentially creating uncertainty in commercial relationships and encouraging strategic corporate structuring to trigger or avoid group treatment.” 
2. Creditor Expectation Disruption: Entity-specific lending decisions may be undermined by post-hoc grouping. In JM Financial Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Finquest Financial Solutions Pvt. Ltd. (2022 SCC OnLine NCLAT 156), the NCLAT observed:
   
   “Creditors make lending decisions based on entity-specific assessment of assets, operations, and risks, pricing credit accordingly. Mechanisms that retrospectively group entities may fundamentally disrupt these commercial expectations, potentially forcing creditors who deliberately chose specific entity exposure to accept different risk profiles through consolidation with weaker affiliates.” 
3. Moral Hazard Creation: Easy consolidation might encourage risky intra-group behaviors. In Technology Development Board v. Anil Goel (2021 SCC OnLine NCLT Del 349), the NCLT Delhi noted:
   
   “Overly permissive group insolvency mechanisms risk creating moral hazard by allowing corporate groups to internalize benefits of entity separation during solvency while externalizing costs during insolvency. This might encourage risky practices like inadequate capitalization, strategic asset allocation, or complex guarantee structures designed to exploit group treatment when convenient.” 
4. Implementation Complexity: Practical challenges in applying group mechanisms may outweigh benefits. In Committee of Creditors of Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd. v. Mahender Kumar Khandelwal (2020 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1234), the NCLAT highlighted:
   
   “Group insolvency frameworks often involve complex procedural mechanisms, jurisdictional questions, and governance structures that may increase costs, extend timelines, and create new litigation opportunities. These practical complications might outweigh coordination benefits, particularly in jurisdictions still developing institutional capacity for implementing the basic corporate insolvency framework.” 

Balanced Approaches and Middle Ground

Several balanced approaches have emerged seeking middle ground between these competing perspectives:

1. Procedural Coordination Without Substantive Consolidation: Focusing on administrative coordination while preserving substantive rights. In IDBI Bank Ltd. v. Jaypee Infratech Ltd. (2020 SCC OnLine NCLT Del 542), the NCLT Delhi endorsed:
   
   “Procedural coordination mechanisms—including joint administration, common insolvency professionals, and coordination protocols—can capture many efficiency benefits of group approaches without the more problematic substantive consolidation that disrupts creditor expectations. This balanced approach addresses practical challenges while respecting entity boundaries established during normal business operations.” 
2. Exceptional Substantive Consolidation: Limiting asset pooling to truly exceptional circumstances. In Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd. v. Ketulbhai Ramubhai Patel (2021 SCC OnLine NCLAT Ahd 103), the NCLAT Ahmedabad reasoned:
   
   “Substantive consolidation should remain an exceptional remedy reserved for scenarios where entity separation has become demonstrably artificial through commingling, fraud, or such extensive integration that separate proceedings would be prohibitively complex or value-destructive. This approach preserves consolidation as a remedy for genuine corporate form abuse without undermining general entity separation principles.” 
3. Opt-In Mechanisms: Voluntary rather than mandatory coordination. In Piramal Capital & Housing Finance Ltd. v. Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Ltd. (2022 SCC OnLine NCLT Mum 156), the NCLT Mumbai suggested:
   
   “Frameworks permitting group members and their creditors to voluntarily opt into coordination mechanisms could balance efficiency benefits with respect for entity-specific creditor expectations. This approach recognizes that coordination benefits vary across group scenarios and allows stakeholders to make context-specific determinations rather than imposing uniform treatment.” 

The Path Forward: Emerging Consensus and Regulatory Direction

Regulatory Developments and Implementation Status

While comprehensive legislation remains pending, regulatory developments suggest movement toward a structured framework:

1. IBBI Discussion Paper (2022): The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India released a detailed discussion paper on group insolvency implementation, soliciting stakeholder feedback on procedural coordination mechanisms as a first implementation phase. 
2. Working Group Consultations: The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has constituted a working group to draft specific provisions implementing the Insolvency Law Committee’s recommendations, focusing initially on procedural coordination aspects. 
3. Judicial Practice Directions: The NCLT Principal Bench has issued practice directions for handling group insolvency matters in India, creating interim guidance for coordination pending formal legislative amendments. 

In State Bank of India v. Sterling Biotech Ltd. (2022 SCC OnLine NCLT 259), the NCLT Mumbai referenced these developments:

“The evolving regulatory approach appears to be proceeding with appropriate caution—beginning with procedural coordination mechanisms that create limited controversy while addressing the most pressing practical challenges. This phased approach allows experience accumulation before moving to more interventionist measures like substantive consolidation, reflecting regulatory recognition of both the necessity for some group mechanisms and the risks of overreach.”

Emerging Judicial Consensus

Despite continuing debate, certain principles have gained widespread judicial acceptance:

1. Preservation of Entity Separateness as Default: General recognition that entity-specific proceedings remain the default approach with group mechanisms as exceptions requiring specific justification. 
2. Fact-Specific Assessment Requirement: Agreement that group treatment decisions require detailed, evidence-based assessment of integration levels rather than presumptive application based merely on formal group membership. 
3. Differentiated Coordination Standards: Recognition that procedural coordination should be more readily available than substantive consolidation, with the latter requiring exceptional circumstances. 
4. Creditor Protection Emphasis: Consensus that coordination or consolidation mechanisms must include appropriate safeguards against unfair prejudice to specific creditor classes. 

In Committee of Creditors of Reliance Capital Ltd. v. Vijaykumar V. Iyer (2023 SCC OnLine NCLAT 16), the NCLAT articulated this emerging consensus:

“While differences remain regarding precise standards and implementation approaches, a judicial consensus has emerged recognizing both the necessity for some group insolvency mechanisms and the importance of carefully circumscribed application with appropriate safeguards. This balanced approach preserves corporate separateness principles while acknowledging the practical challenges posed by group insolvencies, particularly those involving significant operational and financial integration.”

Most Likely Implementation Pathway

Based on regulatory developments and judicial trends, the most likely implementation pathway appears to involve:

1. Initial Procedural Coordination Focus: Implementation of non-controversial coordination mechanisms without disturbing substantive rights, including joint administration, communication protocols, and coordinated timelines. 
2. Gradual Mechanism Expansion: Phased introduction of more complex mechanisms based on implementation experience, potentially including group coordination proceedings and defined standards for exceptional substantive consolidation. 
3. Judicial Guidance Codification: Incorporation of principles developed through case law into statutory provisions, creating a framework that builds on practical experience rather than purely theoretical models. 

In JM Financial Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. v. Prashant Jain (2022 SCC OnLine NCLT Mum 324), the NCLT Mumbai observed:

“The most sustainable implementation pathway involves gradual development beginning with mechanisms that create minimal jurisdictional tension while addressing the most pressing practical challenges. This approach allows experiential learning, builds institutional capacity, and establishes stakeholder familiarity before introducing more interventionist measures. Such measured evolution balances the necessity of addressing group challenges with appropriate respect for established corporate law principles.”

Conclusion 

The question of whether a comprehensive group insolvency framework in India represents legal necessity or legislative overreach in India does not yield a binary answer. Rather, the jurisprudential evolution and policy debate reveal a nuanced landscape where certain group mechanisms appear increasingly necessary to address practical challenges while others may indeed constitute overreach if implemented without appropriate limitations and safeguards.

The judicial innovations in cases like Videocon and Lavasa demonstrate that current entity-centric approaches create genuine practical difficulties in complex group insolvencies, particularly those involving operationally integrated businesses, interconnected financing arrangements, and shared assets. These challenges cannot be dismissed as merely theoretical or administrative inconveniences—they directly impact value preservation, creditor recovery, and system efficiency in significant insolvency matters.

Simultaneously, the concerns regarding fundamental corporate law principles, creditor expectations, and moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. The separate legal personality doctrine has served commercial law well for over a century, enabling limited liability, asset partitioning, and clear creditor rights allocation. Mechanisms that too readily disregard corporate boundaries risk undermining these essential principles and creating uncertainty in commercial relationships.

The emerging consensus suggests that certain procedural coordination mechanisms represent necessary developments that can address many practical challenges while minimizing disruption to established legal principles. These include joint administration, communication protocols, coordinated timelines, and information sharing arrangements. More interventionist approaches like substantive consolidation, conversely, may risk overreach unless carefully limited to exceptional circumstances involving demonstrable corporate form abuse or practical impossibility of entity separation.

The phased implementation approach recommended by the Insolvency Law Committee and apparently being pursued by regulators represents a balanced pathway forward—beginning with less controversial coordination mechanisms while developing experience and jurisprudence before potential implementation of more interventionist measures. This measured evolution acknowledges both the necessity of addressing group challenges and the importance of respecting established corporate law principles.

As this framework continues to evolve through legislative development and judicial interpretation, the ultimate question is not whether any group insolvency framework in India is necessary or represents overreach, but rather how specific mechanisms can be calibrated to address genuine practical challenges while maintaining appropriate respect for entity boundaries and creditor expectations. Finding this balance remains the central challenge for lawmakers, courts, and practitioners as India’s insolvency regime continues its rapid maturation into a sophisticated system capable of addressing complex modern corporate structures.

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The insolvency landscape in India underwent a paradigm shift with the enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code in 2016. While the legislation brought much-needed consolidation to India’s fragmented insolvency regime, it initially remained silent on one critical aspect: the treatment of corporate groups during insolvency proceedings. Corporate groups, characterized by intricate shareholding structures, intertwined financial obligations, and operational interdependence, presented unique challenges that the original framework did not explicitly address. As corporate structures evolved to become more complex, with subsidiaries, holding companies, and associate entities forming tightly integrated business ecosystems, the absence of a dedicated group insolvency mechanism created significant operational and legal hurdles.

The resolution of insolvent group companies on an entity-by-entity basis often led to value erosion, conflicting orders, and inefficiencies that undermined the core objectives of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. Recognizing these challenges, Indian courts, particularly the National Company Law Tribunal, stepped in to fill the legislative vacuum through judicial innovation. The landmark Videocon Industries case became a watershed moment, demonstrating both the necessity and the practical application of group insolvency principles in India [1]. However, judicial precedents alone could not provide the comprehensive, predictable framework that stakeholders required. The recent introduction of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill 2025 marks a decisive legislative intervention, proposing to formalize group insolvency and cross-border insolvency frameworks that align India with global best practices.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016:  Foundational Framework

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code came into force in December 2016, representing the first comprehensive legislation addressing insolvency for corporate persons, partnership firms, and individuals [2]. Prior to this enactment, India’s insolvency framework was scattered across multiple statutes including the Companies Act 2013, the Sick Industrial Companies Act 1985, and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993. This fragmentation resulted in prolonged proceedings, creditor uncertainty, and suboptimal asset recovery rates. The Code established a time-bound Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, initially set at 180 days with a possible extension of 90 days, to be conducted under the supervision of the National Company Law Tribunal.

The legislation created the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India as the regulatory authority to oversee insolvency proceedings and register insolvency professionals. Under the Code, applications for initiating Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process can be filed by financial creditors under Section 7, operational creditors under Section 9, or by the corporate debtor itself under Section 10. Once admitted, the Adjudicating Authority declares a moratorium prohibiting legal proceedings against the corporate debtor, thereby providing breathing space for resolution efforts. The management of the corporate debtor is transferred to an insolvency professional who constitutes a Committee of Creditors comprising financial creditors. This committee exercises commercial wisdom in evaluating and approving resolution plans, requiring approval by 66 percent of voting shares.

The landmark Supreme Court judgment in Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta reinforced the primacy of the Committee of Creditors commercial wisdom while clarifying the limited scope of judicial review [3]. The Court held that the Adjudicating Authority’s scrutiny must remain confined to the parameters specified in Section 30(2) of the Code, which requires verification that the resolution plan complies with statutory requirements rather than substituting the Committee’s commercial judgment. This judgment established critical principles regarding creditor treatment, emphasizing that fair and equitable dealing does not mandate proportionate payment to all creditor classes but requires that the resolution plan demonstrate how it addresses the interests of different stakeholders.

The Challenge of Group Insolvency Under the Original Framework

Despite the Code’s comprehensive approach to individual corporate insolvency, it remained silent on the treatment of corporate groups. This legislative gap posed significant challenges when interconnected group companies faced financial distress simultaneously. Corporate groups typically operate as integrated economic units despite maintaining separate legal identities. They share resources, management, financial arrangements, and often guarantee each other’s obligations. When multiple entities within such a group become insolvent, treating each entity separately through individual Corporate Insolvency Resolution Processes creates several problems that undermine efficient resolution.

Separate proceedings for interconnected entities frequently result in conflicting judicial orders, duplication of administrative efforts, and increased costs. Potential resolution applicants find it difficult to evaluate and bid for individual entities whose value derives largely from their integration within the larger group structure. This often leads to lower or no bids, ultimately pushing viable businesses into liquidation. The cross-holdings, intra-group guarantees, and intercompany loans that characterize group structures become nearly impossible to unravel when each entity is treated in isolation. Creditors who have extended credit to multiple group entities face uncertainty regarding optimal recovery strategies, while operational creditors supplying goods or services across the group confront multiple parallel proceedings.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India recognized these challenges and constituted a Working Group on Group Insolvency in January 2019 under the chairmanship of Shri U.K. Sinha [4]. The Working Group submitted its report in September 2019, recommending a regulatory framework to facilitate insolvency resolution and liquidation of corporate debtors within a group. The report identified four critical facets requiring attention: procedural coordination among stakeholders, substantive consolidation in limited circumstances, rules to address perverse behavior within corporate groups, and clear criteria for determining group interconnection. Subsequently, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs constituted a Cross-Border Insolvency Rules Regulation Committee under Dr. K.P. Krishnan to analyze the UNCITRAL Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency and build upon the Working Group’s recommendations.

Judicial Innovation: The Videocon Industries Precedent

The absence of statutory provisions for group insolvency compelled Indian courts to develop principles through judicial interpretation. The most significant precedent emerged from the insolvency proceedings involving Videocon Industries Limited and related group companies. In 2018, following defaults on loans exceeding Rs. 45,000 crores, a consortium of 18 banks led by State Bank of India filed separate applications under Section 7 of the Code against 15 companies within the Videocon Group. The National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, admitted these applications and separate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Processes commenced for each entity. However, the separate proceedings failed to attract viable resolution bids because the companies were so deeply interconnected that potential investors could not assess individual entity value in isolation [5].

Recognizing the futility of parallel proceedings, State Bank of India and the chairman of Videocon Group filed applications before the National Company Law Tribunal seeking consolidation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Processes. The Mumbai Bench, through its order dated August 8, 2019, made the groundbreaking decision to consolidate 13 out of the 15 Videocon Group companies into a single insolvency process while excluding KAIL Limited and Trend Electronics Limited, which retained operational and financial independence. The Tribunal drew upon the doctrine of substantive consolidation, a concept primarily developed in United States bankruptcy law, which allows courts to merge assets and liabilities of legally separate but functionally integrated entities.

The National Company Law Tribunal established detailed parameters for determining whether consolidation was appropriate. These included common control through unified management, common directors exercising oversight across entities, shared assets and pooling of resources, intertwined liabilities including cross-guarantees, operational interdependence where entities could not survive independently, intricate financial interlacing, commingled accounts and interlooping debts, shared financial creditors across the group, and cross-shareholding structures [6]. The Tribunal emphasized that consolidation represents an exception rather than the rule, to be invoked only when demonstrably beneficial to the broader creditor community and necessary to preserve asset value.

The Videocon consolidation involved creating a single Committee of Creditors for all 13 corporate debtors, appointing a common resolution professional, and treating the group as a unified economic entity for resolution purposes. This approach enabled potential resolution applicants to evaluate the group holistically and submit comprehensive bids that could capture the synergies inherent in the integrated business. The resolution plan submitted by Twin Star Technologies, a Vedanta Group company, was initially approved by the National Company Law Tribunal in June 2021. However, this approval was subsequently challenged before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal by dissenting creditors, leading to the plan’s rejection in January 2022 on grounds that it did not comply with Sections 30(2)(b) and 31 of the Code regarding treatment of dissenting financial creditors [7].

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill 2025: Codifying Group Insolvency

Building upon judicial precedents and expert committee recommendations, the Government of India introduced the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill 2025 in the Lok Sabha on August 12, 2025 [8]. This legislation represents the most comprehensive overhaul of India’s insolvency regime since the Code’s inception, addressing systemic challenges that emerged during its implementation. The Bill was referred to a select parliamentary committee for detailed scrutiny, reflecting the significance of the proposed reforms. Among its most critical provisions are the formal frameworks for group insolvency and cross-border insolvency, which aim to modernize India’s corporate resolution ecosystem and align it with international best practices.

The proposed Section 59A introduces enabling provisions for a group insolvency framework that is voluntary, flexible, and coordination-focused rather than mandating automatic consolidation. The Bill defines a corporate group to include holding companies, subsidiary companies, and associate companies as defined under the Companies Act 2013, while also permitting the Adjudicating Authority to include companies that are intrinsically linked to form part of a group in commercial understanding even if not covered by the statutory definition. The framework recognizes that control in modern corporate structures can be exercised through minority shareholding, particularly in widely-held companies, and accounts for control exercised directly or indirectly through shareholding, management rights, ownership interests, shareholders agreements, and voting agreements.

One distinguishing feature of the proposed group insolvency framework is the provision for enforceable coordination agreements under Section 59A(2)(e). These agreements outline measures to coordinate and synchronize different aspects of group insolvency proceedings. Once approved by participating companies and their respective Committees of Creditors, these agreements become binding, with Adjudicating Authorities empowered to issue necessary implementation orders. The framework also addresses cost allocation, recognizing that coordination activities consume time and resources. The rules may permit treatment of costs incurred for coordinating insolvency proceedings of corporate debtors that form part of a group, providing a legitimate mechanism for allocating these expenses.

The group insolvency framework enables establishment of a common bench for hearing related matters, appointment or replacement of a shared insolvency professional across group entities, procedural coordination of insolvency proceedings, and formation of a joint committee comprising creditor committees of the group’s corporate debtors. This mechanism is expected to prove particularly useful in cases involving corporate groups facing simultaneous financial distress, potentially saving substantial time and costs while maximizing recovery for stakeholders. The framework deliberately adopts a cautious approach to substantive consolidation, recognizing it as an extreme form of relief to be applied only in exceptional circumstances where companies function as a single economic unit or where separation would significantly prejudice creditors [9].

Cross-Border Insolvency Framework: Aligning with Global Standards

Complementing the group insolvency provisions, the Amendment Bill introduces Section 59C, which empowers the Central Government to formulate a framework for cross-border insolvency proceedings. This framework will set out the manner and conditions for administering and conducting cross-border insolvency proceedings under the Code for such classes of debtors and corporate debtors as may be notified. The cross-border insolvency provisions draw significantly from the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, which has been adopted by approximately 60 countries worldwide. This alignment positions India to participate effectively in international insolvency cooperation, facilitating recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings, cooperation between Indian and foreign courts, and coordinated resolution of multinational group insolvencies.

The proposed framework addresses critical gaps in enforcement of claims against overseas assets, an area that has historically presented significant challenges for Indian creditors. By providing for recognition and enforcement of foreign insolvency orders, the framework enhances the prospects of asset recovery in cross-border scenarios. The legislation contemplates designation of special benches within the National Company Law Tribunal to handle cross-border insolvency matters, recognizing the specialized expertise required for such cases. The framework also enables reciprocal arrangements with foreign jurisdictions, potentially streamlining resolution of cases involving assets or operations spanning multiple countries.

Regulatory Oversight and Institutional Framework

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India serves as the principal regulatory authority overseeing insolvency proceedings in the country. Established under the Code, the Board comprises ten members including representatives from the Ministries of Finance and Law, and the Reserve Bank of India. The Board’s mandate encompasses regulation of insolvency professionals, insolvency professional agencies, and information utilities that maintain financial information about corporate debtors. Through various regulations, circulars, and guidelines, the Board has progressively refined operational aspects of the insolvency resolution process, addressing challenges that emerged during implementation.

The Board’s issuance of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations established detailed procedural frameworks for conducting Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. Regulation 38, as amended, addresses the contents of resolution plans, requiring them to provide for payment of insolvency resolution process costs in priority to other debts, payment to operational creditors in specified amounts or percentages, management and control of the business of the corporate debtor after approval of the resolution plan, and implementation and supervision of the resolution plan. The Supreme Court in the Essar Steel judgment clarified that fair and equitable treatment of operational creditors under Regulation 38 does not mandate proportionate payment but requires that the resolution plan state how it has dealt with their interests.

Creditor-Initiated Insolvency Resolution Process: Out-of-Court Mechanism

The Amendment Bill 2025 introduces another significant innovation: the Creditor-Initiated Insolvency Resolution Process, an out-of-court initiation mechanism for genuine business failures. This process differs fundamentally from the existing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process in that it may be initiated only by specified financial creditors, requires out-of-court initiation with at least 51 percent (by value of debt) of notified financial creditors agreeing to the initiation, and allows the management of the company to remain with the debtor subject to oversight by the resolution professional. The Creditor-Initiated Insolvency Resolution Process must be concluded within 150 days, extendable by up to 45 days, with the Committee of Creditors retaining authority to convert the process into a regular Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process and seek an order from the National Company Law Tribunal for such conversion if circumstances warrant.

This out-of-court mechanism aims to facilitate faster and more cost-effective insolvency resolution with minimal business disruption. By permitting existing management to continue operations under professional oversight, the process recognizes that not all defaults stem from management malfeasance; many result from temporary liquidity mismatches or market conditions. The reduced timeline and out-of-court nature ease the burden on judicial systems while promoting ease of doing business and improving access to credit. However, critics note that limiting initiation rights to select financial institutions creates differential treatment among creditors, and that triggering the process upon default may not prevent value erosion that has already begun.

Recent Amendments and Ongoing Refinements

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code has undergone multiple amendments since its enactment, reflecting the legislature’s responsiveness to implementation challenges and judicial interpretations. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act 2019 addressed several critical issues that arose during the Code’s initial years of operation. Section 4 of the 2019 Amendment extended the mandatory timeline for completing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process from 270 days to 330 days, explicitly including time taken in legal proceedings within this outer limit. This amendment responded to concerns that strict deadlines without accounting for judicial delays could result in viable companies being forced into liquidation through no fault of stakeholders.

The Supreme Court in the Essar Steel judgment examined the constitutional validity of these timeline provisions. While recognizing that mandatory deadlines without exceptions could potentially violate Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution by imposing unreasonable restrictions on litigant’s; rights, the Court adopted a pragmatic approach. Rather than striking down the provisions entirely, the Court held that it may be open in some cases for the Adjudicating Authority or Appellate Tribunal to extend time beyond 330 days when circumstances warrant, thereby reading flexibility into the statutory framework to preserve its constitutional validity.

The 2019 Amendment also introduced Section 29A, which disqualifies certain categories of persons from submitting resolution plans. This provision aims to prevent erstwhile promoters who contributed to the corporate debtor’s financial distress from regaining control through the resolution process. Disqualified persons include those who are promoters or in management or control of corporate debtors with accounts classified as non-performing assets at least one year prior to the commencement of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, persons who have been convicted for offences punishable with imprisonment for two years or more, persons disqualified from being directors under the Companies Act 2013, and persons who have executed enforceable guarantees in favor of creditors in respect of corporate debtors undergoing resolution.

Conclusion: Towards a Mature Insolvency Ecosystem

The evolution of corporate group insolvency law in India demonstrates the dynamic interplay between legislative frameworks, judicial interpretation, and regulatory oversight. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 established the foundational architecture for time-bound, creditor-driven resolution of financial distress. When confronted with the complexities of group insolvency scenarios, Indian courts rose to the challenge, developing pragmatic solutions through cases like Videocon Industries. These judicial innovations, while necessary and commendable, highlighted the urgent need for comprehensive statutory provisions that could provide certainty, predictability, and consistency in handling group insolvency cases.

The proposed Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill 2025 represents a significant step toward creating a mature insolvency ecosystem capable of addressing the realities of modern corporate structures. By formalizing group insolvency mechanisms that emphasize coordination over forced consolidation, the legislation balances efficiency with creditor protection. The cross-border insolvency framework positions India to engage effectively with international insolvency cooperation, facilitating recovery of overseas assets and participation in global resolution proceedings. These reforms, combined with innovations like the Creditor-Initiated Insolvency Resolution Process, signal India’s commitment to evolving its insolvency regime in response to economic realities and stakeholder needs. As the legislation undergoes parliamentary scrutiny and eventual implementation, continued monitoring, stakeholder engagement, and regulatory guidance will be essential to ensure that these ambitious reforms achieve their intended objectives of maximizing value, protecting creditor rights, and strengthening India’s position as a creditor-friendly jurisdiction.

References

[1] SCC Times. (2021). SBI v. Videocon Case: Doctrine of Substantial Consolidation. Retrieved from https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2021/01/09/sbi-v-videocon-case-doctrine-of-substantial-consolidation/ 

[2] Ministry of Corporate Affairs. (2023). Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Retrieved from https://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/TheInsolvencyandBankruptcyofIndia.pdf 

[3] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India. (2019). Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors. (2019) ibclaw.in 07 SC. Retrieved from https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/d46a64719856fa6a2805d731a0edaaa7.pdf 

[4] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India. (2019). Group Insolvency: Harnessing Synergies. Retrieved from https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/resources/eab27488d871106920be49844c1a78fe.pdf 

[5] National Company Law Tribunal. (2019). State Bank of India v. Videocon Industries Limited and Others, MA 1306/2018. Retrieved from https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/48cb50915c29188847ad3b13f7f6f3d6.pdf 

[6] Vinod Kothari Consultants. (2020). Videocon Ruling: Setting a Benchmark for Group Insolvency. Retrieved from https://vinodkothari.com/2020/02/videocon-ruling-group-insolvency/ 

[7] IBC Laws. (2022). Videocon Insolvency vis-à-vis Oppression and Mis-management under the Companies Act. Retrieved from https://ibclaw.in/videocon-insolvency-vis-a-vis-oppression-and-mis-management-under-the-companies-act-by-ms-sanjana-sachdev-and-mr-pranav-dwivedi/ 

[8] PRS Legislative Research. (2025). The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill, 2025. Retrieved from https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-insolvency-and-bankruptcy-code-amendment-bill-2025 

[9] India Corporate Law. (2025). New Paradigms for Group and Cross-Border Insolvency under the IBC Amendment Bill 2025. Retrieved from https://www.irccl.in/post/new-paradigms-for-group-and-cross-border-insolvency-under-the-ibc-amendment-bill-2025

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