A Letters Patent Appeal is an appeal from one part of a High Court to another. It is an intra-court appeal: a Division Bench of the same High Court hears a challenge to a judgment delivered by a Single Judge of that Court. No superior forum is involved, and the Supreme Court has no role at that stage.

For litigants in Gujarat, the LPA is often the difference between an adverse Single Judge order becoming final and its being reopened. It is also one of the most frequently misjudged remedies in the Court, because it is not available against every order a Single Judge passes.

Where the jurisdiction comes from

The name is literal. The chartered High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were established under Letters Patent — instruments issued by the Crown. The Letters Patent that govern the Bombay High Court are those dated 28 December 1865, which replaced an earlier grant of 1862 made under the Indian High Courts Act, 1861. Clause 15 of that instrument provides for an appeal to the High Court from the judgment of a Judge of that Court.

Gujarat inherited this. The High Court of Gujarat was established on 1 May 1960 on the bifurcation of the former State of Bombay, and the Letters Patent that had applied to the parent High Court of Bombay continued to apply to the Gujarat High Court as its successor. Section 30 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 gives effect to that continuity by vesting in the new High Court the appellate jurisdiction that the Bombay High Court exercised under Clause 15, so that an intra-court appeal may be entertained by a Division Bench against the judgment of a Single Judge. The Gujarat High Court explained this position in Jaimin J. Desai v. Gujarat Chamber of Commerce & Industry (order dated 20 December 1999).

This is why an appeal from a Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court is still styled a Letters Patent Appeal, a century and a half after the instrument was issued.

What Clause 15 itself excludes

Clause 15 does not confer an unrestricted right of appeal. On its own terms it carves out categories, including a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court; an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction; and sentences and orders passed in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, subject to the conditions stated in the clause.

These exclusions are the first filter. An appellant should read the clause before assuming a right of appeal exists.

The second filter: is the order a “judgment”?

Clause 15 permits an appeal from a “judgment”. That word does not carry its ordinary meaning of a final decision disposing of a case, nor the technical meaning it carries in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The leading authority is Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786, decided by three Judges on 10 August 1981. The Supreme Court held that “judgment” in Clause 15 must receive a wider and more liberal interpretation, and that certain interlocutory orders qualify. The working test is whether the order affects the merits of the controversy between the parties by determining some right or liability. An order that finally determines a controversy forming the subject matter of the proceedings, or any part of it, or that decides a question of the court’s jurisdiction or of limitation, will normally constitute a judgment. So will an adjudication resting on a refusal to exercise discretion where the effect is to dispose of the matter so far as that adjudication is concerned.

The Court also held that Section 104 read with Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is not inconsistent with the Letters Patent but provides an additional remedy in respect of the miscellaneous orders listed there.

The practical consequence is that routine procedural directions — adjournments, orders regulating the conduct of a hearing, orders that decide nothing about anyone’s rights — are not judgments and do not carry an LPA.

The third filter: Article 226 or Article 227?

This is the filter that defeats the largest number of LPAs in Gujarat, and it turns on a distinction that does not appear on the face of most petitions.

Petitions in the Gujarat High Court are commonly filed as a Special Civil Application “under Articles 226 and 227” of the Constitution. But the two jurisdictions are distinct. Article 226 is the Court’s original writ jurisdiction; Article 227 is its power of superintendence over courts and tribunals within its territory. An order made by a Single Judge in the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 does not attract an intra-court appeal.

In Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji v. State of Gujarat, decided on 6 July 2015 by Dipak Misra and Adarsh Kumar Goel, JJ., the Supreme Court considered this question in the context of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent as applicable to the Gujarat High Court. Relying on the three-Judge decision in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423 — which held that Article 227 jurisdiction is distinct from Article 226 jurisdiction — the Court held that a Letters Patent or intra-court appeal does not lie before a Division Bench in respect of an order passed by a Single Judge dealing with an order arising out of a proceeding from a civil court.

The Court then addressed the harder question of when an LPA is maintainable, and declined to reduce it to a label. Maintainability depends on the pleadings in the writ petition, the nature and character of the order passed by the Single Judge, and the type of directions issued, viewed in their jurisdictional and constitutional context. Two related propositions from earlier authority informed this approach: Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai, 1986 Supp SCC 401, and the observation approved in Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement, (2008) 14 SCC 58, that a Single Judge cannot take away a party’s right of appeal merely by stating that the power of superintendence was being exercised, where the petition otherwise falls under Article 226.

The drafting lesson is direct. Where the grievance genuinely engages Article 226 — an authority acting without jurisdiction, a violation of natural justice, a challenge to executive or statutory action — the petition should plead it as such, and the relief sought should reflect it. A reflexive invocation of both Articles, followed by an order that reads as pure superintendence over a civil court, is what leaves an appellant without a remedy.

The statutory bar under Section 100A CPC

Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent or any instrument having the force of law, where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of that Single Judge.

Where Section 100A applies, no argument about Clause 15 assists. It is an express statutory override, and it must be checked before an LPA is contemplated in any matter arising from an appeal decided by a Single Judge.

Procedure and limitation

An LPA is filed in the Gujarat High Court against the judgment of a Single Judge and is placed before a Division Bench. The period of limitation and the requirements for filing are governed by the Limitation Act, 1963 and the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 as amended; because the applicable period varies with the nature of the proceeding, it should be verified against the current Rules and the Schedule to the Limitation Act rather than assumed. Where an appeal is filed beyond time, an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 must accompany it, supported by an explanation of the delay.

If no LPA lies, or if an LPA has been dismissed, the remedy against the order of the High Court is a petition for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

A checklist before filing

Four questions decide whether an LPA is worth filing. Does Clause 15 exclude this category of order? Is the order a “judgment” on the test in Shah Babulal Khimji? Did the Single Judge exercise jurisdiction under Article 226, or under Article 227 alone? And does Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 bar a further appeal? An LPA that survives all four is properly before the Division Bench. One that fails any of them will be dismissed on maintainability, whatever its merits.

Legal Information Disclaimer

This article is published for general legal information and educational purposes only. It reflects the position of Indian law as researched up to 10 August 2026 and may not account for subsequent amendments, notifications, rule changes or judicial developments. It is not legal advice, does not take into account any individual’s particular facts or circumstances, and no advocate-client relationship arises from reading it. Outcomes in litigation depend on the specific facts of each case and on procedural requirements in force at the relevant time. Readers dealing with an actual dispute should obtain independent professional advice from a qualified advocate of their own choosing before acting on any information contained here.

Sources / Authorities

• Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 28 December 1865, Clause 15 (as applicable to the High Court of Gujarat)
• Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, Section 30 — India Code, https://www.indiacode.nic.in
• Constitution of India, Articles 226, 227 and 136
• Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 100A, Section 104 and Order XLIII Rule 1
• Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 and the Schedule
• Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786, Supreme Court of India (Fazal Ali, Varadarajan and A.N. Sen, JJ.), decided 10 August 1981 — meaning of “judgment” under Clause 15 — https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1820934/
• Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji v. State of Gujarat, Supreme Court of India (Dipak Misra and Adarsh Kumar Goel, JJ.), decided 6 July 2015 — maintainability of an LPA and the Article 226 / Article 227 distinction — https://indiankanoon.org/doc/115253130/
• Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423, three-Judge Bench, decided 26 February 2015
• Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai, 1986 Supp SCC 401
• Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement, (2008) 14 SCC 58
• Jaimin J. Desai v. Gujarat Chamber of Commerce & Industry, High Court of Gujarat, order dated 20 December 1999 — continuity of Clause 15 jurisdiction after bifurcation — https://indiankanoon.org/doc/268088/
• The Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 (as amended) — https://gujarathighcourt.nic.in/rules

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