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		<title>Indexation on Inherited Property and Dissolved Firms: Whose Clock Counts?</title>
		<link>https://bhattandjoshiassociates.com/indexation-on-inherited-property-and-dissolved-firms-whose-clock-counts/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Advocate Aaditya Bhatt]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:02:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Income Tax]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assessment of Dissolved Firm]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Capital Gains Tax]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Income Tax Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Income Tax Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indexation of Inherited Property]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Inherited Property]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Section 189]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Section 48]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://bhattandjoshiassociates.com/?p=57515</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Consider two quite different taxpayers. The first is a woman who inherits a plot of land from her father, who bought it in 1998, and who sells it in 2012. She is told by the Assessing Officer that, because she herself &#8220;acquired&#8221; the plot only on her father&#8217;s death in 2009, the inflation adjustment on [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://bhattandjoshiassociates.com/indexation-on-inherited-property-and-dissolved-firms-whose-clock-counts/">Indexation on Inherited Property and Dissolved Firms: Whose Clock Counts?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://bhattandjoshiassociates.com">Bhatt &amp; Joshi Associates</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="summary"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="alignnone  wp-image-57519" src="https://bhattandjoshiassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Indexation-on-Inherited-Property-and-Dissolved-Firms-Whose-Clock-Counts-300x157.jpg" alt="Indexation on Inherited Property and Dissolved Firms Whose Clock Counts" width="1454" height="761" srcset="https://bhattandjoshiassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Indexation-on-Inherited-Property-and-Dissolved-Firms-Whose-Clock-Counts-300x157.jpg 300w, https://bhattandjoshiassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Indexation-on-Inherited-Property-and-Dissolved-Firms-Whose-Clock-Counts-1024x536.jpg 1024w, https://bhattandjoshiassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Indexation-on-Inherited-Property-and-Dissolved-Firms-Whose-Clock-Counts-768x402.jpg 768w, https://bhattandjoshiassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Indexation-on-Inherited-Property-and-Dissolved-Firms-Whose-Clock-Counts.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1454px) 100vw, 1454px" /></p>
<p>Consider two quite different taxpayers. The first is a woman who inherits a plot of land from her father, who bought it in 1998, and who sells it in 2012. She is told by the Assessing Officer that, because she herself &#8220;acquired&#8221; the plot only on her father&#8217;s death in 2009, the inflation adjustment on its cost must start from 2009 and not from 1998. The second is a partnership that stopped trading and was dissolved by its partners in 2010, which receives a notice in 2021 asking it to explain a deposit in its bank account in a later year. The firm says it no longer exists; the Revenue says that the law keeps it alive for the limited purpose of assessment. Both disputes turn on a question that sounds philosophical but is intensely practical: whose time counts, and for how long does a legal person, or a legal fiction, persist? This article takes the two questions in turn. The first part explains how indexation of inherited property is calculated, including the determination of its indexed cost of acquisition, and how the rules changed for transfers on and after 23 July 2024. The second part examines the assessment of a dissolved firm under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (and now the Income-tax Act, 2025), including the treatment of discontinued businesses and the limits of the statutory provisions.</p>
<h2><strong>Part I: Indexation On Inherited Property And The “First Year Held”</strong></h2>
<p>A capital gain is charged to tax under section 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in the year in which the capital asset is transferred. The gain is computed under section 48 by deducting from the sale consideration the expenditure on the transfer, the cost of acquisition of the asset and the cost of any improvement to it. The Supreme Court explained long ago that this computation is the machinery by which the charge is given effect, so that where the machinery cannot work because no cost can be conceived, the charge fails (CIT v. B.C. Srinivasa Setty, (1981) 128 ITR 294 (SC)). For a long-term asset, that is, an asset held for more than the prescribed period (the period for land and buildings has been shortened over the years) counted under section 2(42A), the second proviso to section 48 allowed the taxpayer to substitute for the cost its &#8220;indexed&#8221; cost. Indexation is simply an adjustment that raises the historical cost in proportion to a government-notified Cost Inflation Index (CII), so that a gain produced only by the fall in the value of money is not taxed as if it were real profit.</p>
<p>Explanation (iii) to section 48 supplies the formula: the indexed cost of acquisition is the cost multiplied by the ratio of the CII for the year of transfer to the CII for the first year in which the asset was held by the assessee, or for the year beginning on 1 April 2001, whichever is later (Income-tax Act, 1961, s.48, second proviso and Explanation (iii), as in force for transfers before 23 July 2024). Explanation (iv) applies the same ratio to the cost of improvement, using the CII of the year in which the improvement was made.</p>
<p>The words &#8220;first year in which the asset was held by the assessee&#8221; are the source of the dispute described at the start. Where an asset passes by gift, will or inheritance, section 49(1) directs that the cost of acquisition is the cost to the previous owner, and section 2(42A) directs that the previous owner&#8217;s period of holding is included in the assessee&#8217;s. The question is whether the same inclusion carries into the CII denominator. The Revenue&#8217;s position, as reported in some Tribunal decisions, is that the Explanation speaks only of the year in which the assessee held the asset and must be read literally, so that the clock starts at the date of devolution. The assessee&#8217;s position is that the cost is borrowed from the previous owner, so the inflation that the cost has already suffered must be borrowed with it; otherwise a taxpayer would be taxed on a notional gain created by the passing of time before the assessee ever owned the asset. The Bombay High Court accepted the second view, reading the Explanation together with section 2(42A) and holding that the indexed cost of an asset acquired by gift is computed by reference to the year in which the previous owner first held it (CIT v. Manjula J. Shah, (2011) 355 ITR 474 (Bom)). A non-jurisdictional High Court ruling is persuasive but not binding elsewhere, so the point should be argued, not assumed.</p>
<h2><strong>Consistency Between Co-Owners And The Limits Of The Principle</strong></h2>
<p data-pm-slice="1 1 []">A second recurring problem in indexation claims by co-owners arises when several co-owners sell the same property under one deed and one valuation, and the Department allows indexed cost to one but denies it to another. Taxpayers then invoke Supreme Court authority that the Revenue cannot accept a decision for one assessee and challenge it for another without just cause. In Union of India v. Kaumudini Narayan Dalal, (2001) 249 ITR 219 (SC), decided on 6 December 2000, the Court declined to entertain the Revenue&#8217;s appeal on a question that it had accepted as settled by a Gujarat High Court judgment in other cases, observing that it was not open to the Revenue to accept that judgment for some assessees and challenge it for others &#8220;without just cause&#8221;. In Berger Paints India Ltd. v. CIT, (2004) 266 ITR 99 (SC), decided on 17 February 2004, the Court applied the same discipline, where the Revenue had let High Court decisions on the same point stand unchallenged elsewhere.</p>
<p>A balanced reading must note what these cases do and do not say. They concern the conduct of the Revenue in litigation, in particular the decision whether to appeal against a ruling of a court; the passage relied on does not, as far as the reported text shows, lay down a constitutional rule of equal treatment of co-owners in every assessment. They leave room for the Revenue to show &#8220;just cause&#8221;, and because each assessee and year is a separate unit, the Revenue will argue that an earlier allowance to a co-owner does not bind it elsewhere. Parity is thus a supporting argument where the facts are truly identical, not a substitute for proving cost and holding period on the assessee&#8217;s own record.</p>
<h2><strong>What Changed On 23 July 2024</strong></h2>
<p>The legislative position on indexation on the sale of property has moved decisively in the last two years, and any article that describes indexation in the present tense is likely to mislead. The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024 confined the indexed cost under the second proviso to section 48 to transfers made before 23 July 2024, and reduced the rate on long-term capital gains under section 112 from 20 per cent to 12.5 per cent for transfers on or after that date. Recognising that holders of land and buildings bought many years ago would suffer, the Act added a relief to section 112: for a resident individual or Hindu undivided family transferring land or a building acquired before 23 July 2024, the excess of tax computed at 12.5 per cent without indexation over the tax computed at 20 per cent with indexation is to be ignored (Income-tax Act, 1961, ss.48 and 112, as amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024). The relief is a cap on tax and not a restoration of indexation: the gain is still computed without indexed cost, and the relief does not extend to non-residents, companies or firms. The Income-tax Act, 2025, in force from 1 April 2026, carries the scheme forward: section 72 prescribes the mode of computing capital gains and defines indexed cost by reference to the first year in which the asset was held &#8220;by the assessee&#8221;, and section 197 sets the 12.5 per cent rate and the same cap for land or buildings acquired before 23 July 2024. The new text of section 72, as consulted, does not address the previous-owner question expressly, which means that the reasoning in Manjula J. Shah will continue to matter for the large body of pre-July 2024 transfers still in assessment and appeal.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of transfer</th>
<th>Indexation of cost</th>
<th>Rate on long-term gain</th>
<th>Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 23 July 2024</td>
<td>Available (indexed cost of acquisition and improvement)</td>
<td>20% (resident individual/HUF)</td>
<td>Income-tax Act, 1961, s.48, second proviso; s.112 (pre-amendment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 July 2024 to 31 March 2026</td>
<td>Not available; tax capped for land/building acquired before 23 July 2024</td>
<td>12.5%, with the cap for such land/building</td>
<td>Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024; ss.48, 112 of the 1961 Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 1 April 2026</td>
<td>Not available for new transfers; s.72 retains the indexed-cost definition for the pre-23 July 2024 scheme; cap preserved</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>Income-tax Act, 2025, ss.72, 197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2><strong>Part II: Assessment of a Dissolved Firm Under the Income-tax Act</strong></h2>
<p>The second illustration raises a different question. A partnership is not a separate legal person under general law, but the Income-tax Act treats a firm as a distinct unit of assessment. What happens to that unit when the partners stop the business or dissolve the firm? Two provisions of the 1961 Act answer it. Section 176(3) requires any person discontinuing a business or profession to give notice of the discontinuance to the Assessing Officer within fifteen days. Section 189(1) provides that where a firm is discontinued or dissolved, the Assessing Officer shall make an assessment of the total income of the firm as if no such discontinuance or dissolution had taken place, and that all the provisions of the Act, including those on penalty, apply to the assessment. Sub-section (3) makes every person who was a partner at the time of discontinuance or dissolution, and the legal representative of a deceased partner, jointly and severally liable for the tax, penalty or other sum payable, and sub-section (4) allows proceedings begun before the event to be continued against those persons from the stage reached. The same scheme has been re-enacted in the Income-tax Act, 2025: section 320 deals with a discontinued business (including the fifteen-day notice), and section 330 deals with a firm dissolved or business discontinued, with substantially the same sub-sections, except that the saving in sub-section (5) now refers to section 302(4) (Income-tax Act, 2025, ss.320, 330; the texts were read from the Department&#8217;s website and summarised, not compared word for word with the 1961 provisions).</p>
<h2><strong>The Settled Core</strong></h2>
<p>The principle that a firm may be assessed after it has been dissolved is old. Under section 44 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the Supreme Court held that a partner of a firm whose business had been discontinued remained liable to assessment on the firm&#8217;s income, and that &#8220;assessment&#8221; was wide enough to take in penalty (C.A. Abraham v. ITO, Kottayam, 1961 AIR 609 (SC), decided 29 November 1960). In Nagarmal Baijnath v. CIT, (1993) 201 ITR 538 (SC), decided on 26 March 1993, the Court treated the question as settled by Abraham and a later decision on the same point, explaining that the statute treats the firm as continuing for the purposes of assessment so that the machinery of assessment is not defeated by discontinuance. The Court expressly noted that the case before it was one where dissolution had led to discontinuance of business and did not decide the separate case of dissolution without discontinuance. A majority of the Supreme Court reached a comparable result for the Bombay Sales Tax Acts (Murarilal Mahabir Prasad v. B.R. Vad, 1976 AIR 313 (SC), decided 5 September 1975). On this core, there is little room for argument: the fiction in section 189(1) exists so that a firm cannot escape tax on income it earned simply by closing its books.</p>
<h2><strong>Where The Argument Begins</strong></h2>
<p>The difficulty in proceedings involving the assessment of a dissolved firm lies in the boundaries of the statutory fiction.The Revenue&#8217;s argument is that section 189(1) says the assessment is to be made &#8220;as if no such discontinuance or dissolution had taken place&#8221;, that the fiction is not expressed to be limited to any particular year, and that a firm which never gave the notice required by section 176(3) cannot invoke its own default to claim that the Department had been told of its disappearance. On this view, dissolution is relevant to the liability of the partners but is not a defence to the assessment of the firm. The assessee&#8217;s answer is that the fiction operates upon a firm that earned income during its life; it keeps alive the assessment of that income and cannot be stretched to create a taxable entity for years in which, on the facts, no business was carried on by it at all, or to validate proceedings in the name of an entity that has ceased to exist after a merger or conversion. A recent Bombay High Court Division Bench decision, reported in secondary sources, accepted that argument on facts where a partnership had merged into a company and was thereafter named in a reassessment notice, holding that section 189 applies only to the taxation of income earned before dissolution and could not support proceedings for later years against a firm that no longer existed (J M Mhatre Infra Pvt Ltd v. Union of India, Writ Petition (L) No. 16514 of 2023, Bom, reported as 2026 LLBiz HC (Bom) 6). The decision proceeds on the broader Supreme Court holding that a notice issued to a non-existent amalgamated company is void (PCIT v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., (2019) 416 ITR 613 (SC)).</p>
<p>The two positions can partly be reconciled: a notice to a dissolved firm for a year in which it traded is authorised by section 189(1), whereas an entity merged into a company is a different case, because the successor is a distinct person. Between those poles lie questions that, on the authorities this article was able to verify, remain open. One is whether the fiction supports an assessment of a year after the dissolution date in respect of receipts routed through accounts that remained in the firm&#8217;s name. Another is the effect of the omission to give notice under section 176(3): the text of that sub-section, as consulted, states no express consequence for non-compliance, and whether the omission may be used against the firm in deciding if the business was in truth discontinued is a question of fact and inference rather than of statute. A third is the relationship between a dissolution deed and the statutory test of discontinuance, since section 189 speaks of both and Nagarmal Baijnath reserved the case of dissolution without discontinuance.</p>
<h2><strong>Conclusion</strong></h2>
<p data-pm-slice="1 1 []">For the individual, the &#8220;first year held&#8221; for indexation of inherited property is, on the best-reasoned authority, the year in which the previous owner first held the asset, though that point should be supported by proof of the previous owner&#8217;s cost and holding. For transfers on or after 23 July 2024, this principle is subject to the withdrawal of indexation and the capped-tax relief.</p>
<p>For the firm, the assessment of a dissolved firm remains permissible under the statutory scheme, but the High Courts are now drawing the outer boundary of that fiction more carefully, particularly where the entity has been succeeded by a company.</p>
<h2><strong>Frequently Asked Questions</strong></h2>
<div class="faq-item">
<p><strong>How is indexation of inherited property calculated?</strong></p>
<p data-pm-slice="1 1 []">For transfers before 23 July 2024, the indexed cost of acquisition of inherited property is generally computed with reference to the year in which the previous owner first held the asset, rather than the year in which the heir inherited it. In <em>CIT v. Manjula J. Shah</em>, (2011) 355 ITR 474 (Bom), the Bombay High Court held that the previous owner&#8217;s holding period must be considered when computing indexed cost under Section 48, read with Sections 49(1) and 2(42A). Although the judgment concerned a gifted asset, its reasoning is relevant to inherited property as well.</p>
</div>
<div class="faq-item">
<p data-pm-slice="1 1 []"><strong>Is indexation still available on the sale of property?</strong></p>
<p>For transfers made on or after 23 July 2024, indexation is generally not available. However, a resident individual or HUF selling land or a building acquired before that date is eligible for a tax cap that ignores the excess of tax calculated at 12.5 per cent without indexation over tax calculated at 20 per cent with indexation (Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024; Income-tax Act, 2025, Sections 72 and 197).</p>
</div>
<div class="faq-item">
<p><strong>Can the Revenue assess a firm after it has been dissolved?</strong></p>
<p>Yes, in principle: section 189(1) of the 1961 Act and section 330 of the 2025 Act direct assessment as if the dissolution had not occurred, and the Supreme Court has upheld the principle (C.A. Abraham v. ITO, 1961 AIR 609 (SC); Nagarmal Baijnath v. CIT, (1993) 201 ITR 538 (SC)). Whether it can do so for every year, and against an entity that has merged into a company, is contested, and the Bombay High Court has recently refused to extend the fiction to the latter case.</p>
</div>
<h2><strong>Sources &amp; Citations</strong></h2>
<ul>
<li>Income-tax Act, 1961, ss.2(42A), 45, 48 (second proviso and Explanations (iii)-(v)), 49(1), 112, 176(3), 189, as amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024 (Act 15 of 2024) &#8211; incometaxindia.gov.in</li>
<li>Income-tax Act, 2025, ss.72, 197, 320, 330 (in force 1 April 2026) &#8211; incometaxindia.gov.in</li>
<li>CIT v. B.C. Srinivasa Setty, (1981) 128 ITR 294 (SC)</li>
<li>CIT v. Manjula J. Shah, (2011) 355 ITR 474 (Bom)</li>
<li>Union of India v. Kaumudini Narayan Dalal, (2001) 249 ITR 219 (SC)</li>
<li>Berger Paints India Ltd. v. CIT, (2004) 266 ITR 99 (SC)</li>
<li>C.A. Abraham v. ITO, Kottayam, 1961 AIR 609, (1961) 2 SCR 765 (SC)</li>
<li>Nagarmal Baijnath v. CIT, (1993) 201 ITR 538 (SC)</li>
<li>Murarilal Mahabir Prasad v. B.R. Vad, 1976 AIR 313, (1976) 1 SCR 689 (SC)</li>
<li>PCIT v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., (2019) 416 ITR 613 (SC)</li>
<li>J M Mhatre Infra Pvt Ltd v. Union of India, WP(L) No. 16514 of 2023 (Bom), reported 2026 LLBiz HC (Bom) 6</li>
</ul>
<h2><strong>Related Reading</strong></h2>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.claudeusercontent.com/%7B%7BSITE_URL%7D%7D/insights/capital-gains-self-generated-intangibles-section-55-machinery/">Can Capital Gains Be Computed on Self-Generated Intangibles? The Section 55 Machinery Provision</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.claudeusercontent.com/%7B%7BSITE_URL%7D%7D/insights/reassessment-section-147-148-148a/">Reassessment under Sections 147, 148 and 148A: How the Law Reopens a Closed Year</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.claudeusercontent.com/%7B%7BSITE_URL%7D%7D/insights/section-254-2-rectification-vs-review-tribunal-recall/">Rectification under Section 254(2) and Review: What the Tribunal May and May Not Recall</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.claudeusercontent.com/%7B%7BSITE_URL%7D%7D/insights/search-assessments-153a-153c-incriminating-material/">Search Assessments under Sections 153A and 153C: The &#8220;Incriminating Material&#8221; Requirement</a></li>
</ul>
<p>The post <a href="https://bhattandjoshiassociates.com/indexation-on-inherited-property-and-dissolved-firms-whose-clock-counts/">Indexation on Inherited Property and Dissolved Firms: Whose Clock Counts?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://bhattandjoshiassociates.com">Bhatt &amp; Joshi Associates</a>.</p>
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