A supplier has a contract with a manufacturer containing an arbitration clause. Invoices worth several crores go unpaid. Before the supplier can even name an arbitrator, it learns that the manufacturer has agreed to sell its only substantial asset – a plot of industrial land – to a third party, and that the sale is to be completed within the month. If the sale goes through, the supplier may well win its arbitration in three years’ time and find nothing left to execute against.

What the supplier wants is an order stopping the sale, or requiring the price to be deposited in court, until the dispute is decided. It has, in principle, two doors: Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which allows a court to grant interim measures, and Section 17, which allows the arbitral tribunal to do the same. Together, these provisions govern interim relief in arbitration, including the preservation of assets and protection of disputed amounts pending the outcome of the proceedings. Which door is open, and when, and what the applicant must show to get through it, is the subject of this article. The answers are more contested than the tidy structure of the Act suggests.

The Architecture, And What The 2015 Amendment Changed

Section 9(1) permits a party to apply to a court before or during arbitral proceedings, or after the award is made but before it is enforced under section 36, for the appointment of a guardian, or for an interim measure in respect of the preservation, interim custody or sale of goods; securing the amount in dispute; the detention, preservation or inspection of property; an interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; and – the residual clause that does most of the work – “such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient”. The sub-section closes by providing that the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has in relation to proceedings before it. These powers form the statutory basis for seeking interim measures under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Before the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act 2015, which took effect from 23 October 2015, section 17 was a thin provision. It allowed the tribunal to order a party to take an interim measure in respect of the subject matter of the dispute and to require security – but it supplied no machinery for enforcement. A party that ignored a tribunal’s interim order faced, at most, a reference by the tribunal to the court for contempt under section 27(5), a route the Supreme Court confirmed was available in Alka Chandewar v. Shamshul Ishrar Khan (2017) 16 SCC 119 but which it also described as cumbersome. In practice the tribunal’s interim jurisdiction was close to unusable, and parties went to court.

The 2015 Amendment addressed both halves of the problem. It substituted section 17 so that the tribunal’s powers now mirror section 9(1) clause for clause, and it inserted section 17(2), which deems an order of the tribunal to be an order of the Court and makes it enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure as if it were one. It simultaneously inserted section 9(3): “Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the Court shall not entertain an application under sub-section (1), unless the Court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under section 17 efficacious.” Section 9(2) added a related discipline – where a court grants a pre-arbitral interim measure, the arbitration must be commenced within ninety days of that order or such further time as the court allows.

One asymmetry survives and is easily missed. The 2019 Amendment removed from section 17(1) the words permitting an application after the award is made but before enforcement. Post-award interim relief therefore now lies only under section 9. The two provisions are close to coextensive, but not quite.

Section 9(3) of the Arbitration Act: When Can Courts Grant Interim Relief?

Section 9(3) reads as an absolute bar with a narrow exception, and the question that immediately arose was what happens to a section 9 application filed before the tribunal was constituted but not yet decided when it was. The Supreme Court answered it in Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel (India) Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd. (2022) 1 SCC 712, decided on 14 September 2021, in an appeal that had travelled from Gujarat.

The Court held that “entertain” means to consider by application of mind to the issues raised – the Court entertains a case when it takes the matter up for consideration. Where the application has already been entertained and taken up, the bar in section 9(3) does not operate; there, the hearing had concluded and judgment had been reserved before the tribunal was constituted. The process of consideration continues until pronouncement, but the test is whether the Court applied its mind to some extent before the tribunal came into existence. And where the application has been so taken up, the question whether the section 17 remedy is efficacious does not arise at all. The Court also gave examples of inefficacy for cases where the bar does bite – arbitrators geographically dispersed, unavailable, or unable to act promptly.

The practical consequence is a race that the drafters probably did not intend. A party that files under section 9 and gets the application taken up before the tribunal is constituted keeps the court; a party that files and lets the matter sleep may find itself sent to the tribunal. The underlying point is that the courts have read section 9(3) as a rule allocating forum rather than as a bar going to jurisdiction.

Conditions for Granting Interim Relief under Section 9 Arbitration Act

The more difficult question is what an applicant must prove to obtain interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Take the supplier in the illustration who wants the manufacturer’s assets secured. Under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), attachment before judgment requires proof that the defendant is about to dispose of or remove property with the intention of obstructing or delaying execution of a decree. This is a demanding standard, deliberately so, because attachment before judgment in arbitration-related proceedings is a drastic remedy granted before anyone has been found liable.

Two decisions of the Supreme Court, delivered sixteen days apart in 2022 by co-ordinate Benches, pull in opposite directions. In Essar House (P.) Ltd. v. ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel India Ltd. (2022) 8 SCC 231, decided on 14 September 2022, the Court held that a court under section 9 is not strictly bound by the Code; that proof of actual attempts to dispose of property with a view to defeating an award is “not imperative”; and that relief should not be withheld on the mere technicality of absent Order XXXVIII Rule 5 pleadings. But the same judgment says, in terms, that the court “cannot ignore the basic principles of the CPC”. The decision is therefore narrower than it is often made to sound: it holds that the rigours of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 do not fetter section 9, not that a claim may be secured on assertion.

In Sanghi Industries Ltd. v. Ravin Cables Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 6908 of 2022, decided on 30 September 2022, a different Bench of two Judges held that interim relief securing the amount in dispute cannot be granted unless the conditions of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 are satisfied – a strong prima facie case together with cogent material showing dissipation of assets to defeat the award. The two decisions are difficult to reconcile. As matters stand there appears to be no reference to a larger Bench, and High Courts have gone both ways, some reading Essar House down to its “cannot ignore the basic principles” sentence.

Behind the conflict lies a genuine policy disagreement, and it is worth stating both sides fairly. The case for the Essar House approach is that arbitration is chosen for speed, that an award-holder who finds an empty shell has been given nothing, and that a code designed for civil suits should not be imported wholesale into a consensual process. The case for Sanghi is that securing a claim before liability is established is an extraordinary interference with a solvent party’s freedom to deal with its own property, that Order XXXVIII Rule 5 encodes a considered balance, and that a lower threshold in arbitration would give claimants leverage that has nothing to do with the merits.

What is clear is that section 9 has never been a jurisdiction at large. In Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P.) Ltd. (2007) 7 SCC 125 the Supreme Court held that it would not be correct to say that the power under section 9 is totally independent of the well-known principles governing interim injunctions, and that the legislature cannot be taken to have enacted a provision dehors those accepted principles. That decision is frequently cited for a wide and unfettered power; it holds close to the opposite.

Three Related Points

The first concerns who may apply for a Section 9 application under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja (2004) 3 SCC 155, the Supreme Court held that an application under Section 9 is not a suit, so that the bar in section 69(3) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, against proceedings by an unregistered firm did not defeat it. The right invoked is one arising from the arbitration agreement; the qualification for an applicant is party status coupled with a manifest intention to take the dispute to arbitration.

The second concerns emergency arbitrators. In Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd. (2022) 1 SCC 209 the Court held that in an India-seated arbitration under institutional rules providing for an emergency arbitrator, the emergency arbitrator is an arbitral tribunal for the purposes of section 17(1), so that the order is enforceable under section 17(2), and that no appeal lies from an enforcement order. The holding should be confined to India-seated arbitrations; it says nothing about enforcing the order of an emergency arbitrator in a foreign-seated arbitration.

The third concerns interim relief against third parties in arbitration. There is no Supreme Court authority. The Delhi High Court in Value Advisory Services v. ZTE Corporation, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1961, declined to lay down any absolute rule, holding that a blanket bar would hamper the efficacy of Section 9. The Kerala High Court has taken the contrary view that no relief lies against a stranger. The safest statement of the position is that a court will not bind a stranger by an order in aid of an award, but may pass directions affecting a third party who holds the subject matter or whose participation is necessary to make the relief effective. The question awaits authoritative settlement.

Appeals, And A Note On Numbering

An appeal lies under section 37(1)(b) from an order granting or refusing a measure under section 9, and under section 37(2)(b) from an order granting or refusing a measure under section 17. Section 37(3) bars a second appeal while expressly preserving the right to move the Supreme Court, and because the Act is a self-contained code a Letters Patent Appeal is excluded – the reasoning of Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd. (2011) 8 SCC 333, reinforced in Kandla Export Corporation v. OCI Corporation (2018) 14 SCC 715. Readers working with older judgments should note that before the 2015 Amendment the section 9 appeal lay under section 37(1)(a); the clauses were renumbered, and the proviso to section 2(2) – which extends sections 9, 27 and parts of section 37 to international commercial arbitrations seated outside India unless the parties agree otherwise – still cross-refers to the old numbering, an anomaly the courts have had to read purposively.

The following table summarises the allocation of the interim jurisdiction over time.

Where The Law Stands

On the architecture of interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the position is settled and coherent. The 2015 Amendment did what it set out to do: it made the tribunal the primary forum for interim relief once it exists, and it gave the tribunal’s orders teeth. Arcelor Mittal supplied the transitional rule. Amazon extended the scheme to emergency arbitrators in India-seated arbitrations. The Supreme Court’s decision in Home Care Retail Marts (P.) Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi, 2026 INSC 415, decided on 24 April 2026, has since confirmed that Section 9 speaks of “a party” without distinguishing the successful from the unsuccessful one, so that either may seek post-award interim measures, though relief of that kind will be granted sparingly so as not to undercut the finality of the award.

On the standard, the position is not settled, and it would be misleading to pretend otherwise. Essar House and Sanghi Industries are co-ordinate decisions pointing in different directions on the question that arises most often in practice – what an applicant must show before a court will secure the amount in dispute. Until that is resolved, the honest advice is to plead and prove the Order XXXVIII Rule 5 material if it exists, and to argue Essar House in the alternative where it does not. A practitioner who relies on Essar House alone, on the strength of its headline, is relying on a proposition the same judgment qualifies in its own text.

As to reform, the Expert Committee chaired by Dr. T.K. Viswanathan reported in February 2024 and the Department of Legal Affairs released a draft Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill for public consultation in October 2024, proposing among other things statutory recognition of the emergency arbitrator and codification of the concept of seat. As at August 2026 that draft has not been enacted, and the governing statute remains the 1996 Act as amended in 2015, 2019 and 2021.

Frequently Asked Questions

Once the tribunal is constituted, does a pending application for interim relief under Section 9 of arbitration act become automatically infructuous? No. Under Arcelor Mittal, if the court had already entertained the application — that is, taken it up and applied its mind to the issues before the tribunal was constituted — Section 9(3) does not operate. In such a case, the court need not examine whether the remedy under Section 17 would be efficacious. The statutory bar applies to applications that have not yet been taken up.

Must an applicant seeking security for its claim under Section 9 prove that the other side is dissipating its assets? This remains a contested question. Essar House holds that proof of actual attempts to dispose of property is not imperative and that the requirements of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC do not strictly fetter the court’s powers under Section 9, while recognising that the basic principles of the Code cannot be ignored. Sanghi Industries, decided sixteen days later by a co-ordinate Bench, holds that the conditions under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 must be satisfied. The conflict remains unresolved by a larger Bench.

Is an emergency arbitrator’s order enforceable in India? In an India-seated arbitration conducted under institutional rules that provide for emergency arbitration, yes. In Amazon v. Future Retail, the Supreme Court treated the emergency arbitrator as an arbitral tribunal for the purposes of Section 17(1), making the order enforceable under Section 17(2). No appeal lies from the enforcement order. However, the decision does not address emergency arbitrator orders in foreign-seated arbitrations, and statutory recognition of emergency arbitrators remains a proposal rather than enacted law.

Sources & Citations

• Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, s.9 (sub-sections (2) and (3) inserted by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act 2015, w.e.f. 23 October 2015); s.17 (substituted by the 2015 Amendment; post-award window removed by the 2019 Amendment, w.e.f. 30 August 2019); proviso to s.2(2); s.27(5); s.37(1)(b), s.37(2)(b) and s.37(3).
• Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja (2004) 3 SCC 155 (SC), decided 9 January 2004.
• Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P.) Ltd. (2007) 7 SCC 125 (SC), decided 10 July 2007.
• Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd. (2011) 8 SCC 333 (SC).
• Alka Chandewar v. Shamshul Ishrar Khan (2017) 16 SCC 119 (SC), decided 6 July 2017.
• Kandla Export Corporation v. OCI Corporation (2018) 14 SCC 715 (SC).
• Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel (India) Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd. (2022) 1 SCC 712 (SC), decided 14 September 2021.
• Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd. (2022) 1 SCC 209 (SC), decided 6 August 2021.
• Essar House (P.) Ltd. v. ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel India Ltd. (2022) 8 SCC 231 (SC), decided 14 September 2022.
• Sanghi Industries Ltd. v. Ravin Cables Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 6908 of 2022 (SC), decided 30 September 2022.
• Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd. v. ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel India Ltd., First Appeal No. 3040 of 2021 and connected appeals (Guj), decided February 2022; Kiritkumar Futarmal Jain v. Valencia Corporation (2019) 3 GLH 667 (Guj).
• Value Advisory Services v. ZTE Corporation, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1961 (Del).
• Home Care Retail Marts (P.) Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi, 2026 INSC 415 (SC), decided 24 April 2026.
• Report of the Expert Committee chaired by Dr. T.K. Viswanathan, February 2024; draft Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2024, released for public consultation in October 2024 (not enacted as at August 2026).

Related Reading

• Rescission of Share-Swaps and the Arbitrability of Company Disputes

(c) Bhatt & Joshi Associates. This article is general commentary on the law and is not legal advice; no reader should act on it without taking advice on the facts of the particular case.

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Introduction

In the previous articles, we explored the scope and application of Section 9 and Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, both of which deal with interim measures in arbitration proceedings. In this final article of the series, we will explore the jurisdictional aspects of filing a Section 9 application.

Pecuniary and Territorial Jurisdiction

The determination of whether a Section 9 application should be filed in a High Court or a District Court is not based on pecuniary jurisdiction. Instead, it depends on the nature of the arbitration (whether it’s domestic or international commercial arbitration) and the specifics of the arbitration agreement between the parties¹.

In terms of territorial jurisdiction, if the contract between the parties is silent on the Seat of Arbitration, Section 9 applications can be preferred in the territorial Jurisdiction of any Court where part cause of action had arisen. However, once a competent Court having jurisdiction has been approached, all subsequent applications are to be filed in the same Court.

If the contract between the parties designates a Seat of Arbitration, and there is cause of action in the place designated as the Seat of Arbitration, Section 9 applications can be preferred in the territorial Jurisdiction of any Court where part cause of action had arisen¹. However, once a competent Court having jurisdiction has been approached, all subsequent applications are to be filed in the same Court.

Case Laws and Application of Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court in the case of Executive Engineer, Road Development Division No.III, Panvel & Anr. v Atlanta Limited analyzed the definition of “Court” to determine which court would hear challenges to an arbitral award (or arbitral agreement, or arbitral proceeding) where jurisdiction lies with more than one court and the parties initiate proceedings in multiple courts simultaneously. The Court held that when a Section 34 petition is simultaneously filed in a District court and a High Court, the High Court having ordinary original civil side jurisdiction will have primacy to hear the petition².

In another case, Bgs Sgs Soma Jv vs Nhpc Ltd., the Supreme Court held that the designation of a seat confers exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of said seat; and a place of arbitration, regardless of its designation as a seat, venue or place, is the juridical seat of arbitration unless there is an indication to the contrary ³.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the jurisdictional aspects of filing a Section 9 application play a crucial role in the arbitration process. The determination of the appropriate court for filing a Section 9 application depends on the nature of the arbitration and the specifics of the arbitration agreement between the parties. Various case laws have clarified the application of these principles. This wraps up our series on interim measures under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Learn more

• 1.vertarilegal.com
• 2.mondaq.com
• 3.barandbench.com
• 4.taxguru.in

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Introduction

In the previous article, we explored the scope and application of Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which empowers the court to grant interim measures in arbitration proceedings. In this article, we will delve into the interplay between Section 9 and Section 17 of the Act, which also deals with interim measures but from the perspective of the arbitral tribunal.

The Interplay of Section 9 and Section 17

Section 9 and Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are key provisions that deal with interim measures in arbitration. While Section 9 empowers the court to grant interim measures, Section 17 gives the arbitral tribunal the power to order interim measures. The types of interim reliefs that could be granted by the arbitral tribunal are the same as those which can be ordered by the court under Section 9.

The interplay between these two sections has been a subject of various case laws. In the case of Essar House Private Limited v. Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel India Limited, the Supreme Court held that once an Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, the court would not entertain an application for an interim measure, unless the remedy of applying to the arbitral tribunal for interim relief is inefficacious. However, this bar does not operate where already the application has been taken up for consideration and the court has applied its mind.

In another case, Gulmali Amrullah Babul v. Shabbir Salebhai Mahimwala, it was held that a party seeking enforcement of the order made under Section 17 would subsequently file a Section 9 petition for the same reliefs, on the basis of the order made by the arbitral tribunal.

Conclusion: Interplay of Section 9 and Section 17

In conclusion, the interplay between Section 9 and Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 plays a crucial role in the granting of interim measures in arbitration proceedings. While Section 9 empowers the court to grant such measures, Section 17 empowers the arbitral tribunal to do the same. Various case laws have clarified the application and interplay of these two sections. In the next article, we will explore the jurisdictional aspects of filing a Section 9 application

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Introduction

Welcome to the first article in our series on interim measures under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This series aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the provisions and principles related to interim measures in arbitration proceedings in India. In this article, we will delve into the details of Section 9 of the Act, its scope, and its application in various judgments.

Understanding Section 9

Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a crucial provision that empowers the court to grant interim measures before or during the arbitral proceedings or after the passing of the arbitral award. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the parties to the dispute do not resort to self-help or take steps that could potentially harm the other party or frustrate the arbitration process.

The types of interim measures that can be granted under Section 9 include:

• The preservation, interim custody, or sale of any goods which are the subject matter of the arbitration agreement.
• Securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration.
• The detention, preservation, or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorizing for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorizing any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence.
• Interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver.
• Such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the court to be just and convenient.

Case Laws and Application of Section 9

The application of Section 9 has been clarified in various judgments. For instance, in the case of Firm Ashok Traders and Anr vs Gurumukh Das Saluja and Ors, the Supreme Court held that the power of the court to grant interim measures under Section 9 does not cease upon the passing of the arbitral award. This ensures that the award can be effectively and properly enforced.

In another landmark judgment, Sundaram Finance Ltd. vs NEPC India Ltd., the Supreme Court held that the court has the power to grant interim measures under Section 9 even before the commencement of the arbitration proceedings. This is crucial to prevent any irreparable harm that could be caused to the party seeking the interim relief.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 plays a pivotal role in the arbitration process by empowering the court to grant interim measures. It ensures that the arbitration process is not frustrated and that the parties do not resort to self-help. In the next article, we will delve into the interplay between Section 9 and Section 17 of the Act, which also deals with interim measures but from the perspective of the arbitral tribunal.

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