Section 35(1)(ii): Weighted Deduction for Research Donations and the Withdrawal of Approval

Take a medium-sized engineering company in the financial year 2012-13. Its finance head receives a brochure from a research foundation in another State. The foundation holds a notification of the Central Government under section 35(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and is recognised by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. The company donates fifty lakh rupees by cheque, receives a receipt and a copy of the notification, and claims a deduction of eighty-seven and a half lakh under section 35(1)(ii) in its return – because, at that time, the statute allowed one and three-quarter times the sum paid. Four years later the Central Board of Direct Taxes rescinds the foundation’s notification, with effect from a date years before the donation, after the Investigation Wing reports that the foundation was returning donations in cash, less a commission. The company’s assessment is reopened and the entire deduction is disallowed.
Two questions immediately arise, and they pull in different directions. Can the State withdraw, retrospectively, an approval on which a donor relied in good faith? And if the donation was never a real donation at all, does the approval matter? This article examines both, together with a third and logically prior question that arises at the other end of the process: on what conditions does an institution obtain approval in the first place? It closes with the position under the Income-tax Act, 2025, which came into force on 1 April 2026.
Section 35(1)(ii) Deduction: Why It Was Weighted
“Scientific research” is defined in section 43(4) of the 1961 Act to mean, broadly, activities for the extension of knowledge in the fields of natural or applied science. Section 35 encourages such research in two ways: by allowing a business to deduct what it spends on its own research, and – in clause (ii) of sub-section (1) – by allowing a deduction for any sum paid to a research association which has as its object the undertaking of scientific research, or to a university, college or other institution to be used for scientific research. The payee must, in the words of the clause, be “for the time being approved” in accordance with prescribed guidelines and specified by notification by the Central Government. The deduction therefore rests on a public act of the State – approval and notification – rather than on any enquiry by the donor into what the payee actually does with the money.
The deduction under section 35(1)(ii) was for many years “weighted”: the donor deducted more than it paid. The multiplier was introduced at one and one-fourth times (125 per cent) by the Finance Act, 1999, with effect from assessment year 2000-01; raised to one and three-fourth times (175 per cent) by the Finance Act, 2010, from assessment year 2011-12; reduced to one and one-half times (150 per cent) by the Finance Act, 2016, with effect from 1 April 2018 (that is, assessment years 2018-19 to 2020-21); and reduced to the sum actually paid (100 per cent) for assessment year 2021-22 onwards by a proviso inserted by the same Act. The weighting is what made the clause valuable, and – as the Revenue would point out – what made it attractive to abuse. A donor who received most of its cheque back in cash, while deducting 175 per cent of the cheque, stood to gain considerably more than the “donation” cost.
Two further features of the scheme matter. First, section 35(3), in the form substituted by the Finance Act, 1999, provides that where a question arises whether, and to what extent, an activity constitutes scientific research, the Board shall refer the question to the Central Government in cases under clauses (ii) and (iii), and its decision “shall be final”. Second, the corporate concessional regimes exclude the deduction entirely: section 115BAA(2) (for domestic companies opting for the 22 per cent rate) and section 115BAC (the individual new regime) require income to be computed without any deduction under section 35(1)(ii). The exclusion covers the whole clause, not just the weighting.
Obtaining Approval: “Sole Object” And “By Itself”
The conditions for approval were long found not in the Act but in the Income-tax Rules, 1962. Rule 5C prescribed the guidelines, form (Form 3CF) and procedure, and Rule 5D the conditions subject to which approval was granted. Two of those conditions have been the principal battleground. Rule 5D(1) provided that “the sole object of the applicant scientific research association shall be to undertake scientific research”; Rule 5D(2) that it “shall carry on the scientific research activity by itself”. A companion provision in Rule 5C required that no order treating an application as invalid, rejecting it, or withdrawing an approval be passed without a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The “sole object” test is where most refusals originate. An institution that runs teaching programmes, consultancy or other fee-earning activities alongside research may find that its memorandum lists several objects, of which research is only one. The applicant’s natural argument is that the court should look at what the institution actually does, and not at the drafting of its constitution. That argument has respectable support. In Vanita Vishram Trust v. Chief Commissioner of Income-tax (2010) 327 ITR 121 (Bom), decided under the analogous words “solely for educational purposes” in section 10(23C)(vi), the Bombay High Court held that a trust which had for eighty years done nothing but conduct educational institutions existed solely for education, notwithstanding varied objects in its memorandum. And in Manipal Academy of Higher Education v. Union of India [2019] 105 taxmann.com 101 (Del), the Delhi High Court held that approval could not be refused on the ground that the research lacked commercial success or had not produced a patentable result, and that research carried out through faculty and students as part of the curriculum did not offend the rule that the approved body must itself conduct the research.
The Revenue’s reading draws strength from New Noble Educational Society v. Chief Commissioner of Income-tax (2022) 448 ITR 594 (SC), 2022 INSC 1109, a decision of three judges. Construing “solely” in section 10(23C), the Supreme Court held that an institution must be concerned only with education or education-related activity, and declared erroneous the earlier “predominant object” reading in American Hotel and Lodging Association and Queen’s Educational Society. Two cautions are needed before that reasoning is transplanted to section 35. First, New Noble construed a different provision; it is persuasive on the meaning of “solely”, not binding on the construction of Rule 5D. Second, the Court directed that the law it declared should operate prospectively, to give affected institutions time to adjust. What can fairly be said is that, after New Noble, the argument that a multi-object institution satisfies a “sole object” condition because research is its dominant activity has become considerably harder to make; the argument from Vanita Vishram – that a body which in fact does only the qualifying activity satisfies the test whatever its memorandum says – survives, but on its own facts.
An applicant refused approval has no statutory appeal, and its remedy is a writ petition under Article 226. The High Court in such a case reviews the decision-making process – jurisdiction, fairness of hearing, relevance of the considerations taken into account – rather than sitting in appeal over the merits: Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651. The practical consequence is that applicants tend to frame their challenges as questions of jurisdiction (was the order passed by the prescribed authority?) or natural justice (was the hearing real?), and the Revenue as questions of fact on which the authority’s assessment should stand.
Withdrawal: The Protection The Statute Gives The Donor
The more commercially significant disputes concern not refusal but withdrawal. Here the donor is not the institution but a taxpayer who paid money in reliance on a notification that was valid on the day of payment.
Parliament addressed the point directly. The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2006, inserted, with effect from 1 April 2006, an Explanation to section 35(1)(ii) providing that the deduction to which the assessee is entitled “shall not be denied merely on the ground that, subsequent to the payment of such sum by the assessee, the approval granted to the association … has been withdrawn”. Parallel Explanations were inserted in sections 35(2AA), 35AC, 35CCA and 80GGA. The policy is plain: the donor cannot audit the donee, and should not bear the consequences of the donee’s later default.
The Supreme Court had anticipated the principle under section 35CCA. In CIT v. Chotatingrai Tea (2002) 258 ITR 529 (SC), the approval of a rural development society had been withdrawn retrospectively and the Revenue alleged that donations had come back to the donors. The Tribunal found, as a fact, no evidence of any return of money; the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s view that a donor who fulfilled the statutory conditions was under no obligation to see that the donee applied the money as intended. A different line of reasoning, drawn from Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (Gwalior) M.P. Ltd. v. CIT (2018) 403 ITR 1 (SC), has also been deployed: that a quasi-judicial approval cannot be cancelled in the absence of an express statutory power, and that section 21 of the General Clauses Act does not supply one where rights have accrued. That decision was given under section 12A, and its transposition to a notification under section 35(1)(ii) is contestable; but the Tribunal has relied on it.
The issue came to a head after September 2016, when the Board rescinded the notifications of certain Kolkata-based institutions – among them Herbicure Healthcare Bio-Herbal Research Foundation and the School of Human Genetics and Population Health – with retrospective effect, following survey findings that donations had been returned in cash through intermediaries. Thousands of donors across the country faced reassessment. The Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal, in DCIT v. Maco Corporation (India) Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 16/Kol/2017, order dated 14 March 2018, AY 2013-14), upheld the deletion of the disallowance, relying on the Explanation and on Industrial Infrastructure. The Revenue’s appeal to the Calcutta High Court (ITAT No. 42 of 2020) on the question whether the Tribunal’s order was perverse for ignoring the non-genuineness of the donation was dismissed: the High Court, relying on Chotatingrai Tea, noted the concurrent finding that there was nothing on record to show that the assessee had connived in the scheme, and held the Tribunal’s view not perverse. Benches elsewhere have followed that line – for example, the Nagpur Bench in C-Det Explosive Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (ITA Nos. 310-312/NAG/2019, order dated 30 October 2023), which deleted disallowances of donations to the same foundation because the Revenue had produced no evidence that the particular assessee’s donation had come back in cash.
The Revenue’s Answer: Genuineness, Not Approval
It would be a mistake to read these decisions as holding that a notification is a complete answer to any disallowance. The Explanation protects a deduction from being denied “merely” on the ground of later withdrawal. It says nothing about a claim that fails for a different reason – that there was no “sum paid” at all, because the payment was a circular transaction in which the money returned to the payer. A payment that is not a real payment is not rescued by the payee’s approval, whether that approval is later withdrawn or not.
The Revenue’s case is therefore properly framed as a case on genuineness, and the ordinary principles of evidence in tax matters apply. The Supreme Court in Sumati Dayal v. CIT (1995) 214 ITR 801 (SC) held that the apparent must be tested against the real, and that the authorities may apply the test of human probabilities and surrounding circumstances rather than accept documents at face value. Where there is assessee-specific material – a donor’s own admission, a trustee’s statement identifying the donor, a cash trail – Tribunals have sustained disallowances notwithstanding a valid approval on the date of payment. A 2026 Mumbai Tribunal decision under section 80GGA, concerning a donation to an institution approved under section 35AC, is illustrative: the disallowance was upheld not because the approval had been withdrawn but because a trustee admitted, on search, that cheque donations had been returned in cash, and the assessee offered nothing beyond the cheque and the certificate to rebut it.
The assessee’s counter is equally grounded in principle. Material gathered from third parties – statements of brokers, entry operators or the donee’s trustees – cannot be used against an assessee without disclosure and, where the statement is the foundation of the addition, an opportunity to cross-examine: Andaman Timber Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise (2015) 281 CTR 241 (SC). General findings that an institution ran a donation racket do not establish that every donor was a participant, and suspicion, however strong, is not proof. That is precisely the distinction the Calcutta High Court drew. The result is that these cases are won and lost on the record: a generic Investigation Wing report and a rescinded notification rarely suffice; a donor-specific admission or money trail usually does.
The Post-2020 Architecture
The Finance Act, 2020, as re-enacted by the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 with effect from 1 April 2021, remodelled the approval system. Existing notifications were deemed withdrawn unless the institution filed an intimation within the prescribed time (extended several times by Board circulars), after which approval ran for five assessment years; new approvals are also time-limited. Applications moved to Forms 10A and 10AB under the substituted Rules. More consequentially for donors, section 35(1A) now requires the donee to file a statement of donations (Form 10BD) and to furnish the donor with a certificate (Form 10BE), from financial year 2021-22, with a fee for delay under section 234G and a penalty under section 271K. The donor’s deduction under section 35(1)(ii) is linked to that reporting. The effect is to replace much of the after-the-event investigation of the 2016 period with contemporaneous, matched reporting – and to shift part of the donor’s risk from withdrawal of approval to non-compliance by the donee.
The Position By Period
| Period | Position |
|---|---|
| Up to AY 1999-2000 | Deduction equal to the sum paid to an approved and notified research association, university, college or institution. |
| AY 2000-01 to AY 2010-11 | Weighted deduction at 125 per cent (Finance Act, 1999). From 1 April 2006, the Explanation protects the donor against later withdrawal of approval (Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2006). |
| AY 2011-12 to AY 2017-18 | Weighted deduction at 175 per cent (Finance Act, 2010). The period of the 2016 retrospective rescissions and most of the reported litigation. |
| AY 2018-19 to AY 2020-21 | Weighted deduction at 150 per cent (Finance Act, 2016). Not available to companies opting for section 115BAA (from AY 2020-21). |
| AY 2021-22 to AY 2025-26 | Deduction limited to the sum paid. Time-limited approvals and re-intimation (FA 2020 / TOLA 2020); donee statement (Form 10BD) and donor certificate (Form 10BE) under section 35(1A) from FY 2021-22. |
| Tax year 2026-27 onwards | Income-tax Act, 2025: section 45(3)(a) and 45(4) re-enact the deduction for sums paid to approved and notified research entities; section 45(5) retains the protection against subsequent withdrawal; section 45(9) retains the reference to the Central Government. |
Under The Income-tax Act, 2025
The 2025 Act re-enacts the scheme in section 45. Sums paid to an approved research association, university, college or other institution for scientific research, or for research in social science or statistical research, are deductible under section 45(3)(a), subject to section 45(4)(b), which retains the requirement that the entity be “for the time being approved” and specified by notification of the Central Government. There is no multiplier. Section 45(5) carries forward, in substantially the same words, the rule that the deduction “shall not be denied merely on the ground” that approval was withdrawn after the payment. The conditions of former Rule 5D now appear in Rule 33 of the new Rules. The re-enactment is a consolidation rather than a change of policy, and the reasoning of Chotatingrai Tea and the Calcutta line should apply with equal force to the new provision – as should the Revenue’s point that the protection is against withdrawal “merely”, and not against a finding that no genuine payment was made.
Frequently Asked Questions
If a research institution’s approval is withdrawn with retrospective effect, does the donor automatically lose the deduction? No. Since 1 April 2006 the Explanation to section 35(1)(ii) – now section 45(5) of the 2025 Act – provides that the deduction shall not be denied merely because the approval was later withdrawn, and courts have applied the principle of Chotatingrai Tea (2002) 258 ITR 529 (SC) in the donor’s favour.
Can the deduction still be denied if the donation was a sham? Yes. The protection is against withdrawal of approval alone. If the Revenue proves, on assessee-specific evidence, that the money came back to the donor, the claim fails because there was no genuine sum paid. The assessee is entitled to the adverse material and, where it is the basis of the addition, to cross-examine its makers.
Is the weighted deduction under Section 35(1)(ii) still available? No. The multiplier was withdrawn from assessment year 2021-22; the deduction is now limited to the sum paid, subject to the donee’s filing of Form 10BD and issue of Form 10BE, and it is unavailable altogether under the concessional regimes in sections 115BAA and 115BAC.
Sources & Citations
- Income-tax Act, 1961: sections 35(1)(ii) and its Explanation (inserted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2006, w.e.f. 1 April 2006), 35(1A), 35(3) (as substituted by the Finance Act, 1999, w.e.f. 1 April 2000), 43(4), 115BAA(2), 115BAC, 234G, 271K.
- Finance Act, 1999 (125 per cent, w.e.f. AY 2000-01); Finance Act, 2010 (175 per cent, from AY 2011-12); Finance Act, 2016 (150 per cent w.e.f. 1 April 2018; 100 per cent from AY 2021-22).
- Finance Act, 2020 and Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (approval re-intimation, time-limited approvals, section 35(1A)); CBDT Notification No. 19/2021 dated 26 March 2021 (Forms 10A, 10AB, 10BD, 10BE); CBDT Circular No. 7/2024 (extension of time for Forms 10A/10AB).
- Income-tax Rules, 1962: Rules 5C and 5D (Form 3CF; “sole object” and “by itself” conditions; opportunity of hearing).
- Income-tax Act, 2025: section 45, in particular sections 45(3)(a), 45(4), 45(5) and 45(9); Income-tax Rules, 2026: Rule 33.
- CIT v. Chotatingrai Tea (2002) 258 ITR 529 (SC).
- Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (Gwalior) M.P. Ltd. v. CIT (2018) 403 ITR 1 (SC).
- New Noble Educational Society v. Chief Commissioner of Income-tax (2022) 448 ITR 594 (SC), 2022 INSC 1109.
- Sumati Dayal v. CIT (1995) 214 ITR 801 (SC).
- Andaman Timber Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise (2015) 281 CTR 241 (SC).
- Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651.
- Vanita Vishram Trust v. Chief Commissioner of Income-tax (2010) 327 ITR 121 (Bom).
- Manipal Academy of Higher Education v. Union of India [2019] 105 taxmann.com 101 (Del).
- PCIT v. Maco Corporation (India) Pvt. Ltd., ITAT No. 42 of 2020 (Cal), arising from DCIT v. Maco Corporation (India) Pvt. Ltd., ITA No. 16/Kol/2017 (ITAT Kolkata), order dated 14 March 2018.
- C-Det Explosive Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT, ITA Nos. 310-312/NAG/2019 (ITAT Nagpur), order dated 30 October 2023.
Related Reading
- Developer or Works Contractor? Section 80-IA(4) and the Line the Explanation Draws
- “Derived From” and the Apportionment of Overheads in a Tax-Holiday Unit
- Section 80P(2)(d): Co-operative Societies and Interest from Co-operative Banks
© Bhatt & Joshi Associates. This article is for general information and does not constitute legal advice.
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