November 10, 2026

Partial Land Acquisition and the Severed Residue: When Can a Landowner Insist the Whole Be Acquired?

Partial Land Acquisition and the Severed Residue When Can a Landowner Insist the Whole Be Acquired

A partial land acquisition takes a strip and leaves the owner with what is left. Sometimes what is left is worth having. Often it is not — a landlocked triangle behind a new alignment, a ribbon too narrow to build on, the back half of a house whose front rooms have gone. Indian law has two quite different answers to that predicament, constantly confused with each other. One is a right to compel the acquiring body to take the whole. The other is a right to be paid for the damage done to what you keep. Knowing which remedy applies is essential when determining whether an owner can insist on whole-property acquisition or claim compensation for partial land acquisition.

Where only part of a house, manufactory or other building is acquired, section 49 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and section 94 of the RFCTLARR Act 2013 bar the acquisition unless the whole is taken, if the owner so desires. For bare land no such right exists.

Key Takeaways

  • The whole-land right is a right over buildings — “any house, manufactory or other building”. A farmer left with an unusable strip of field has no such right.
  • The desire must be expressed before the award. Express it in writing, early.
  • If the acquiring body disputes that the land forms part of the building, it must refer the question to the Court (1894 Act) or the Authority (2013 Act) and may not take possession meanwhile. The Collector cannot decide it himself.
  • Section 49(2) / section 94(3) is the Government’s option to take the whole where a severance claim is excessive. It is not the owner’s sword.
  • The right almost certainly does not apply to National Highways or Railways acquisitions, for a statutory reason set out below.
  • The residue claim usually fails on evidence, not doctrine. A before-and-after valuation is the minimum.

Partial Land Acquisition: Two Remedies, Routinely Confused

The first remedy is prohibitory. Section 49(1) of the 1894 Act provides that the Act “shall not be put in force for the purpose of acquiring a part only of any house, manufactory or other building, if the owner desire that the whole… shall be so acquired”. Section 94(1) of the RFCTLARR Act 2013 re-enacts that limb in materially identical words. It bars the exercise of the power; it is not a head of compensation.

The second remedy is compensatory. Section 28 of the 2013 Act — the successor to section 23(1) of the 1894 Act — requires the Collector to take into account, “thirdly”, the damage sustained “by reason of severing such land from his other land”, and “fourthly”, damage “by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable… or his earnings”. These are additional sums, payable on top of the market value of the strip taken.

In Walchandnagar Industries Ltd v. State of Maharashtra (Supreme Court, Civil Appeal Nos. 2671-2672 of 2016, decided 4 February 2022) the Court set out the taxonomy. Clause “thirdly” “relates only to land, as it speaks only about the severance of the acquired land from the unacquired land” (para 34); clause “fourthly” covers other property and earnings. The Court read clause “thirdly” together with section 49 (paras 33, 36-41) — the two are designed to work as a pair.

What Changed in the Law on Partial Land Acquisition in 2013

Section 94 is not a straight copy of section 49, and the differences matter.

Section 49, LA Act 1894Section 94, RFCTLARR 2013
Prohibitory limbs.49(1) — house, manufactory or other buildings.94(1) — identical scope
Owner may withdraw or modify the expressed desire before awardYes — first provisoDropped
Disputed question referred tothe Courtthe Authority (the LARR Authority)
Test on that referencewhether the land “is reasonably required for the full and unimpaired use” of the structure
Government’s counter-options.49(2) — triggered by a claim under s.23(1) “thirdly”s.94(3) — triggered by “any claim under this Act” (wider)
Fresh declaration needed if the whole is takenNo — s.49(3)No — s.94(4)

Section 28 also gained a clause the 1894 Act never had. “Seventhly” directs the Collector to take into account “any other ground which may be in the interest of equity, justice and beneficial to the affected families” — a residuary hook that has done real work, as the Kerala decision below shows.

The Timing Bar, and Who Decides

In State of Bihar v. Kundan Singh, AIR 1964 SC 350, the Supreme Court held that section 49(1) prescribes “a definite prohibition against putting in force any of the provisions of the Act for the purpose of acquiring a part only of any house”, and that an objection to the acquisition of part of a house “must be made before an award is made under s. 11”. Once the award is made, the right is gone.

The Court also settled who decides. Faced with the owner’s expressed desire, the Collector may accept it and acquire the whole; he “may decide to withdraw acquisition proceedings altogether”; or, if he disputes the claim, “the Collector is under an obligation to refer the matter to the Court”. He may not simply reject it and proceed. And a section 49 claim “cannot be mixed up with a claim which can be made in reference proceedings sent to the Court under s. 18”. An owner who buries the whole-land objection inside a reference for enhanced compensation has raised the wrong thing in the wrong place.

Kundan Singh was reproduced and applied in State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd, (2017) 10 SCC 713, where the Court said that had the intention been expressed, “it would have been incumbent to acquire the whole of the building” (para 17). That case also confirms the compensatory route: “[i]n case right is affected in land which is not acquired by severance, for that also compensation can be claimed” (para 63).

The Two Limits that Decide Most Cases

It is a Right over Buildings, not Land

This is the point most often overstated. Neither section 49(1) nor section 94(1) says anything about land as such; the prohibition attaches to “any house, manufactory or other building”. The owner of a field bisected by a canal, however unviable his residue, has no statutory right to insist the whole be taken. His claim lies in severance and injurious affection under section 28, and it lies on evidence.

Sub-Section (2) is the Government’s Option, not yours

Section 49(2) permits the appropriate Government, where it thinks a severance claim “unreasonable or excessive”, to order acquisition of the whole before the award. Section 94(3) does the same on a wider trigger. In Union of India v. Ramchandra (Supreme Court, Civil Appeal Nos. 5006-5010 of 2022 with Civil Appeal No. 5031 of 2022, decided 11 August 2022) the Court recorded that “there was an option with the appropriate Government to acquire the entire land… The Union has not exercised such option” (para 23). The distinction, drawn from Harsook Das v. Additional Collector, (1975) 2 SCC 256, is that sub-section (2) gives the option “to the Government only”, while “[t]he object of Section 49(1)… is to give to the owner the option”.

The Adverse Authority every Owner’s Counsel should Read First

Ramchandra is the hardest case against the residue claimant, and it cannot be distinguished on the statute, because it was decided under the 1894 Act itself. Only 0.244 hectares out of a 2.038-hectare holding had been taken for a railway line. The Court held that “compensation for the entire land owned by the Company is wholly unwarranted, illegal and unduly advantageous to the Company” (para 19). It accepted that land within 30 metres of the track centre was, under the Railways Way and Works Manual, so restricted as to be treated as acquired — but added that a restricted area “does not mean that the land cannot be utilized for any purpose”. Beyond that corridor it allowed severance on one side at half the acquired-land rate, expressly without solatium and without the additional amount under section 23(1-A); for the residue on the other side, nothing at all.

Set against that, the Kerala High Court in Sudheer Kumar V.V. v. National Highways Authority of India, 2024:KER:22089, took a markedly more owner-friendly route — while conceding the decisive point of principle. Holding that “[t]he land only falls waste”, the Court reasoned that section 28 “is intrinsically linked to Section 94” and that its third, fourth and seventh ingredients “are wide enough to include the rights available under Section 94”. It directed the authority either to consider acquiring the whole or to compensate the severance. But it also said: “There is, hence, no real compulsion on the State to acquire. However, there is a compulsion to compensate for the loss/damage caused.” That converts section 94 from a right to compel acquisition into a right to be paid for the residue.

Partial Land Acquisition under the National Highways and Railways Acts

The reason is statutory, not judicial, and it is often got wrong.

Sections 3A to 3J of the National Highways Act 1956 contain no equivalent of section 49 or section 94. The only comparable provision is section 3G(7), which requires the arbitrator to take into account severance, injurious affection to other immovable property or earnings, and the expenses of a compelled change of residence or place of business. Chapter IVA of the Railways Act 1989 — sections 20A to 20P — is the same: section 20F(8) lists market value, severance, injurious affection and relocation expenses, with a further sixty per cent under section 20F(9) for the compulsory nature of the acquisition. Neither carries a whole-land right, nor anything answering to section 28 “seventhly”.

Nor did the 2013 Act supply one. The RFCTLARR (Removal of Difficulties) Order 2015, S.O. 2368(E) dated 28 August 2015, made under section 113(1) and in force from 1 September 2015, extended to the thirteen Fourth Schedule enactments only the provisions relating to compensation under the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement under the Second, and infrastructure amenities under the Third. It extended the Schedules, not the body of the Act. Section 94 was not carried across. The Kerala High Court reached the same conclusion on purposive grounds, holding that applying the section 94 prohibition to a linear highway acquisition “will affect the object of the enactment and hence cannot be made applicable to the NH Act”.

For a highway or railway claimant, the right to compel whole-land acquisition is therefore unavailable. The claim for compensation in partial land acquisition must instead be built under section 3G(7) or section 20F(8), which contain narrower compensation provisions.

How Far Article 300A Helps

The constitutional argument has strengthened. In Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 INSC 435, the Supreme Court identified seven non-exhaustive sub-rights within Article 300A: notice, hearing, a reasoned decision, public purpose, restitution or fair compensation, an efficient process, and conclusion. Non-compliance “will amount to violation of the right, being without the authority of law”. In Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 569, the Court described property as continuing to be “a human right in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300 A”.

But the line cuts both ways, and Reliance Industries is squarely adverse: Article 300A, the Court there said, only interdicts the taking of property without compensating the owner, and “only the right which is capable of being acquired would be acquired”. Reliance is best cited for paras 17, 33 and 63 and left alone on Article 300A.

Proving it

These claims usually fail on evidence. Walchandnagar refused severance and injurious affection because “there was no evidence either to show any loss by reason of severance or to show that the remaining land was injuriously affected” (para 48). The checklist is short:

  1. Express the desire in writing, before the award, in unambiguous terms, and file it on the acquisition record.
  2. Ask for the reference if the acquiring body disputes that the land forms part of the building, and object to possession being taken until it is determined.
  3. Get a before-and-after valuation of the retained land from a competent valuer, with the layout showing the residue against the alignment and any statutory setback.
  4. Plead the heads separately — severance under “thirdly”, injurious affection under “fourthly”, and where the Act permits it, the equity clause. Do not fold them into a single enhanced rate.
  5. Keep the section 94 objection distinct from the reference for enhanced compensation. On Kundan Singh they are separate procedures.

What this means for you

If part of your building is being taken and the rest will be useless without it, you have a statutory right — but it expires at the award, so raise it now and raise it in writing. If it is your land that has been cut, you do not have that right, and you should stop looking for it; what you have is a compensation claim for severance and injurious affection, and it will be worth what your valuer can prove and nothing more. If the acquisition is for a national highway or a railway line, assume the whole-land right is unavailable and build the claim entirely on the compensation provisions of the special Act. In every case, the decision whether to accept the award or seek a reference should be taken with a valuation in hand, because these heads are almost never volunteered in an award.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can I force the government to take my whole property? Only where part of a house, manufactory or other building is being acquired. There is no equivalent right for bare land.

When must I say so? Before the award. Kundan Singh holds that the objection must be made before the award under section 11 of the 1894 Act; under the 2013 Act the equivalent stage is the award under section 23.

I am left with an unusable strip of field. What can I do? Claim severance and injurious affection under section 28, supported by a before-and-after valuation. That is the whole of the remedy.

Does this apply to highway and railway acquisitions? Almost certainly not. Neither special Act contains the right, and the 2015 Removal of Difficulties Order extended only the three Schedules of the 2013 Act, not section 94.

Who decides whether my land is part of the building? Not the Collector. The question goes to the Court under the 1894 Act, or the Authority under the 2013 Act, and possession may not be taken until it is answered.

Can the government acquire the whole against my wishes? Yes — section 49(2) and section 94(3) give it that option where it considers a severance claim excessive.

What compensation can an owner claim when only part of the land is acquired? The owner may claim compensation for severance of the acquired land from the remaining property and for injurious affection to other property or earnings. The claim must be supported by evidence showing the actual loss caused by the acquisition.

Glossary

Severance — the depreciation of the land an owner retains, caused by the acquisition cutting it off from the part taken. Injurious affection — harm to the owner’s other property or earnings caused by the acquisition or by the use made of the acquired land. Residue — the part of a holding left with the owner after a partial acquisition. Award — the Collector’s determination of compensation, under section 11 of the 1894 Act or section 23 of the 2013 Act. Removal of Difficulties Order — a subordinate instrument made under section 113 of the 2013 Act to resolve difficulties in giving the Act effect.

Read Next

Sources

  • Land Acquisition Act 1894, sections 11, 18, 23(1) and 49
  • Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013, sections 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 94 and 113, and the First, Second, Third and Fourth Schedules
  • National Highways Act 1956, sections 3A to 3J, in particular section 3G(7)
  • Railways Act 1989, Chapter IVA (sections 20A to 20P), in particular sections 20F(8) and 20F(9)
  • RFCTLARR (Removal of Difficulties) Order 2015, S.O. 2368(E) dated 28.08.2015, in force 01.09.2015
  • State of Bihar v. Kundan Singh, AIR 1964 SC 350
  • Harsook Das v. Additional Collector, (1975) 2 SCC 256
  • State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd, (2017) 10 SCC 713 (Civil Appeal No. 1699 of 2007, decided 15.09.2017)
  • Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 569 (decided 08.01.2020)
  • Walchandnagar Industries Ltd v. State of Maharashtra, Civil Appeal Nos. 2671-2672 of 2016, decided 04.02.2022
  • Union of India v. Ramchandra, Civil Appeal Nos. 5006-5010 of 2022 with Civil Appeal No. 5031 of 2022, decided 11.08.2022
  • Sudheer Kumar V.V. v. National Highways Authority of India, 2024:KER:22089; 2024 (2) KLT 864 (Kerala High Court, decided 21.03.2024)
  • Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 INSC 435; [2024] 5 SCR 831 (decided 16.05.2024)
By Advocate Aaditya Bhatt

Advocate Aaditya Bhatt

Senior Standing Counsel Income Tax Department, Advocate Gujarat High Court. Aaditya combines his technical and legal expertise to deliver strategic counsel in litigation, constitutional, and regulatory matters. He represents clients before High Courts and Tribunals with a technology-driven approach.

Prev