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Section 18 Land Acquisition Reference: Challenging a Collector’s Compensation Award in Court
The section 18 land acquisition reference is the oldest and still the most used route to more compensation in India, and the one most often lost on a technicality unrelated to the value of the land. The award the Collector hands you is not a judgment; it is an offer. You may refuse it and have a judicial forum fix the amount instead — but only if you refuse in writing, in time, and without having pocketed the money unconditionally first. Miss any of the three and the strongest valuation case in the district is worth nothing.
A section 18 reference is a written application to the Collector, by a person interested who has not accepted his award, requiring him to refer the matter to the court for determination. Under the RFCTLARR Act 2013 the equivalent application is made under section 64, and the reference goes to the LARR Authority.
Key Takeaways
- The Collector’s award is an offer, not a decree. The reference is an original proceeding in which the claimant stands in the position of a plaintiff.
- The application goes to the Collector, not to the court. Only he can make the reference.
- Six weeks if you were present when the award was made; otherwise six weeks from the notice or six months from the award, whichever first expires. Under the 1894 Act there is no power to condone delay.
- If you took the money without protest, you are statutorily barred. This is the single commonest way a good claim dies.
- Under the 2013 Act the forum is the LARR Authority, which the Supreme Court held in February 2026 to be the first judicial forum in the scheme, deemed a civil court, whose award partakes of the character of a decree.
- The first appeal now lies under section 74, not section 54, wherever the award was passed after the 2013 Act commenced — and delay in that appeal can be condoned.
An Award Is an Offer, Not a Decree: Nature of a Section 18 Reference
Everything here follows from one proposition, settled in Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona, (1988) 3 SCC 751. A reference is not an appeal against the award. The award is merely an offer made by the Collector on behalf of the State, and the reference is an original proceeding in which the claimant stands as a plaintiff and must prove the market value he asserts. The Collector’s figure is not a starting point from which the court works upwards; it is one party’s opening bid, which the court may accept, exceed, or ignore.
Two consequences follow. The burden of leading evidence of market value falls substantially on the claimant, however unfair that may feel to someone whose land has been taken. And a claimant who leads no evidence does not get a modest enhancement as a consolation; he gets nothing, because there is nothing on which a finding can rest.
The section 18 Land Acquisition Reference under the 1894 Act
Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 allows “any person interested who has not accepted the award” to require, by written application to the Collector, that the matter be referred for determination by the court. The grounds are exhaustively listed: the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment among them. An objection that the acquisition itself was bad is not a reference ground; that is writ territory. Section 26 makes the court’s award a deemed decree and the statement of grounds a judgment within the Code of Civil Procedure — which is what makes the section 54 appeal possible.
Limitation Period for a Section 18 Land Acquisition Reference
The proviso to section 18(2) fixes two periods:
- if the applicant was present or represented before the Collector when he made the award — six weeks from the date of the award;
- in other cases — six weeks of receipt of the notice under section 12(2), or six months from the date of the award, whichever period shall first expire.
The Central Act confers no power on the Collector to condone delay, and that is not an oversight courts have worked around. In Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah Manilal Chandulal, (1996) 9 SCC 414, the Supreme Court held that the Collector performs a statutory function and is not a “court” — the Act itself distinguishes “Collector” from “Court” — so section 5 of the Limitation Act is unavailable to him. That was approved again in Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. M/s S.V. Global Mill Limited, 2026 INSC 138 (9 February 2026).
The one genuine escape is knowledge. In State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604, where no section 12(2) notice had been given and the claimant was absent, the Court held that the six-month period runs from knowledge, and that “knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award.” A real protection for an absent landowner, and not a general excuse for delay.
The Protest Rule
The second proviso to section 31(2) is short and fatal: “no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under section 18”. The further proviso to section 77(2) of the 2013 Act is in materially the same terms, barring an application under section 64(1). The protest must accompany or precede receipt. Endorsing the receipt “under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount”, in writing, costs nothing and preserves everything; taking the money first and objecting afterwards does not.
Section 64 Reference under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013
The 1894 Act was repealed by section 114 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013, subject to the saving in section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 and the transitional scheme in section 24. Section 64 re-enacts the reference machinery with four improvements.
An added ground. Section 64(1) carries the same four grounds and adds a fifth — “the rights of Rehabilitation and Resettlement under Chapters V and VI”, a subject on which the 1894 Act created no rights at all.
A deadline on the Collector. The first proviso to section 64(1) requires the reference to be made within thirty days of the application. The second proviso is more useful still: where he fails, the applicant may apply to the Authority to direct him to refer within thirty days. Under the 1894 Act a Collector who sat on an application could only be moved by mandamus.
A condonation power. The further proviso to section 64(2) permits the Collector to entertain a late application “within a further period of one year”, on sufficient cause. Note whose power it is: the Collector’s, not the Authority’s, and self-contained — Shah Manilal Chandulal still means section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot take you beyond it.
A different forum. Section 63 ousts every civil court from any land-acquisition dispute the Collector or the Authority is empowered to determine, saving only the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 and the Supreme Court. The reference goes not to the District Judge but to the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority under section 51.
In S.V. Global Mill the Supreme Court characterised that body carefully: the Authority “is the first judicial forum in the scheme of the 2013 Act”; its proceedings are deemed judicial proceedings and it is deemed a civil court under section 61; its award “partakes the character of a decree”. Section 60 gives it a civil court’s powers over summoning, discovery, affidavits and commissions, a power of review, and six months to dispose of the reference.
An honest caveat about the Authority
Section 51 requires the appropriate Government to establish one or more Authorities by notification, and section 51(2) fixes their territorial jurisdiction the same way. The forum therefore exists only to the extent it has been notified in your State. Functioning Authorities are evidenced in some States and not obviously in others, and we have not found a reliable published count. Before drafting anything, check your State’s section 51 notification. Do not assume, in either direction.
Section 18 vs Section 64: Land Acquisition Reference under the 1894 and 2013 Acts
| s.18, LA Act 1894 | s.64, RFCTLARR 2013 | |
|---|---|---|
| Application to | The Collector | The Collector |
| Reference decided by | The Court (principal civil court of original jurisdiction) | The LARR Authority (s.51) |
| Grounds | Measurement, amount, persons entitled, apportionment | The same four, plus rights of rehabilitation and resettlement |
| Time if present at the award | Six weeks from the award | Six weeks from the award |
| Time otherwise | Six weeks from notice, or six months from the award, whichever first expires | Same |
| Condonation | None | A further one year by the Collector, on sufficient cause |
| If the Collector does not refer | Writ of mandamus | Apply to the Authority under the second proviso to s.64(1) |
| Bar on unprotested receipt | s.31(2), second proviso | s.77(2), proviso |
| Solatium | 30% (s.23(2)) | 100% (s.30(1)) |
| Interest on excess | 9%, rising to 15% after one year (s.28) | 9%, rising to 15% after one year (s.72) |
| Appeal | To the High Court under s.54 | To the High Court under s.74, within 60 + 60 days |
What Actually wins a Reference
Almost every reference turns on one argument: the Collector adopted the State’s guideline or “jantri” rate, and the claimant says that rate has nothing to do with what land in the locality actually fetches. Four authorities do most of the work. Jawajee Nagnatham v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Adilabad, (1994) 4 SCC 595 — the Basic Valuation Register has no statutory foundation and cannot found a determination of market value. Mehrawal Khewaji Trust v. State of Punjab, (2012) 5 SCC 432 — where several bona fide sale instances exist the highest is taken, and averaging is impermissible. Lal Chand v. Union of India, (2009) 15 SCC 769, supplies the deduction for development: a substantial discount is applied where small-plot exemplars are used to value a large undeveloped block, though the percentages given are illustrative and not a tariff. And MP Road Development Corporation v. Vincent Daniel, 2025 INSC 408 — a single sale transaction supplies no reliable valuation data.
Both sides of the jantri argument
Under the 1894 Act the guideline register was an administrative document with no statutory footing, which is why Jawajee Nagnatham could dismiss it. That is no longer wholly true. Section 26(1)(a) of the 2013 Act expressly makes the market value specified in the Indian Stamp Act 1899 for the area one of three competing criteria, the highest of which prevails — the others being the average sale price for similar land in the vicinity and, for private or public-private acquisitions, the consented amount. The correct submission under the 2013 Act is therefore not that the jantri rate is irrelevant, but that it is a floor among three and never a ceiling. A claimant who argues the older way, on the newer statute, concedes the point he most needs.
Note also that Mehrawal Khewaji and the statute pull in different directions. The case says the highest bona fide sale instance is taken and that averaging is impermissible. Explanation 2 to section 26(1) of the 2013 Act, by contrast, requires an average — of “one-half of the total number of sale deeds… in which the highest sale price has been mentioned”, that is, the top half of the instances. Under the 2013 Act the statute prevails; under the 1894 Act the case does.
Can the Forum Award Less? Or More than you Claimed?
Under the 1894 Act, section 25 as substituted in 1984 provides that the amount awarded by the court “shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11 of that Act” — a floor. The pre-1984 version also contained a ceiling, the amount claimed in response to the section 9 notice, and that ceiling was deleted.
The 2013 Act contains no equivalent of section 25 at all. Section 69(1) directs the Authority to consider whether the Collector followed sections 26 to 30 and Chapter V; section 69(2) adds twelve per cent per annum on the market value from the preliminary notification under section 11 of the 2013 Act to the award or possession, whichever is earlier, excluding stay periods; and section 69(3) adds solatium of one hundred per cent. Interest on the excess follows under section 72 at nine per cent, rising to fifteen on so much of it as remains unpaid one year after possession.
The Appeal, and What Changed in February 2026
Where the acquisition began under the 1894 Act but the award came after the 2013 Act commenced, the appeal route was until recently a source of confusion. S.V. Global Mill resolved it. Section 24(1)(a) applies to all cases where the award is passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act; for such an award “the provisions of the 2013 Act alone will have to be followed, except for the rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements”; and the first appeals “should be treated as ones under Section 74 of the 2013 Act and not under Section 54 of the 1894 Act.” Where the award was passed under the 1894 Act, section 24(1)(b) keeps those proceedings alive and “any challenge thereto would be under the 1894 Act.”
The second holding is the one to diarise. Section 74 gives sixty days, with a proviso allowing a further sixty on sufficient cause, and many High Courts had treated that as a complete code excluding the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court disagreed: “we do not find any express exclusion contained in Section 74 of the 2013 Act”. Read with section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963 and section 103 of the 2013 Act, section 5 applies and delay beyond the 60 plus 60 days may be condoned — High Courts being told to “avoid a pedantic approach as against a pragmatic one”.
Do not blur the contrast with the reference stage. Before the Collector — who is not a court — section 5 is unavailable, and only the express one-year power in section 64(2) exists. Before the High Court on a section 74 appeal, section 5 applies in full.
If you Missed the Reference Entirely
There is a second chance, and it is underused. Section 28A of the 1894 Act (and section 73 of the 2013 Act) allows a person interested in other land covered by the same notification, who did not apply under section 18, to apply to the Collector for re-determination within three months of a court award enhancing compensation.
In Banwari v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation, 2024 INSC 951, the Supreme Court held that a High Court’s enhancement, and not only a reference court’s award, can found a section 28A application, following Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736, which described section 28A as beneficent and aimed at “inarticulate and poor people”. In fairness: Banwari declined to follow a contrary three-Judge decision, Ramsingbhai Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 16 SCC 445, on the footing that it had not noticed Pradeep Kumari. Disclose that when you rely on it.
What this means for you
- Attend the award, or make sure someone does. If you are present, your clock is six weeks — short, but at least it starts on a date you know.
- Write “received under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount” on every receipt. One line. It is the difference between having a remedy and not having one.
- File the reference application in writing, with grounds, on the Collector — not on the court or the Authority — and take a dated acknowledgment.
- If he does not refer within thirty days, use the second proviso to section 64(1) under the 2013 Act, or move a writ under the 1894 Act. Do not simply wait.
- Collect your evidence before the award, not after. Registered sale deeds of comparable land from the three years preceding the notification, the layout and access of the land, and a valuer’s report.
- Check whether your State has notified an Authority under section 51, and its territorial jurisdiction, before you draft.
- If your neighbour succeeded and you did not apply, look at section 28A or section 73 — three months from that award.
Glossary
- Reference — the Collector’s act of sending a claimant’s objection to the court or Authority for determination. Only he can make it.
- Person interested — anyone claiming an interest in compensation, including a tenant or mortgagee, not only the recorded owner.
- Solatium — a statutory addition compensating for the compulsory nature of the acquisition: 30% of market value under section 23(2) of the 1894 Act, and 100% of the compensation amount under section 30(1) of the 2013 Act.
- Exemplar / sale instance — a registered sale of comparable land relied on as evidence of market value.
- Deduction for development — the discount applied when a small developed plot is used as an exemplar for a large undeveloped block.
- LARR Authority — the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority constituted under section 51 of the 2013 Act; a one-member forum deemed to be a civil court.
Frequently Asked Questions
The Collector’s compensation award is too low. Do I go straight to the High Court?
No. The application goes to the Collector — under section 18 of the 1894 Act or section 64 of the 2013 Act — and he refers it on. Section 63 of the 2013 Act bars the ordinary civil court, saving only Articles 226 and 227 and the Supreme Court.
What is the limitation period for a Section 18 land acquisition reference?
Six weeks if you were present or represented when the award was made; otherwise six weeks from the notice of the award or six months from the award, whichever expires first. Under the 2013 Act the Collector may condone a further one year on sufficient cause.
I never received notice of the award. Has my time already run out?
Not necessarily. Qaisar Jehan Begum holds that time runs from knowledge of the essential contents of the award, not from the mere fact that one was made.
I have already taken the compensation. Can I still ask for more?
Only if you took it under protest. Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act and section 77(2) of the 2013 Act bar a reference by anyone who received the amount otherwise than under protest.
Can the Collector condone delay in a section 18 application?
Under the 1894 Act, no — Shah Manilal Chandulal holds he is not a court and section 5 of the Limitation Act does not reach him. Under the 2013 Act he has an express one-year power under section 64(2), and nothing beyond it.
Can the reference court award me less than the Collector did?
Under the 1894 Act, no: section 25 sets a floor. The pre-1984 ceiling limiting the award to the amount claimed was deleted, so there is no cap. The 2013 Act has no equivalent provision either way.
Read next
- Land Acquisition Compensation in India: the LARR Act, the National Highways Act and the Railways Act — the cluster pillar, and where the heads of compensation are built up.
- Arbitration under the National Highways Act — why a highway acquisition bypasses this route entirely.
- Partial land acquisition and the severed residue — severance, injurious affection, and when the whole must be taken.
- The Removal of Difficulties Order 2015 — how the 2013 Act’s benefits reached the Fourth Schedule enactments.
Sources
- Land Acquisition Act 1894, sections 11, 12(2), 18, 23(1-A), 23(2), 25, 26, 28, 28A, 31(2) and 54 — India Code.
- Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013, sections 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 51, 60, 61, 63, 64, 69, 72, 73, 74, 77, 103 and 114.
- Limitation Act 1963, sections 5 and 29(2); General Clauses Act 1897, section 6.
- Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona, (1988) 3 SCC 751.
- State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604.
- Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah Manilal Chandulal, (1996) 9 SCC 414.
- Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. M/s S.V. Global Mill Limited, 2026 INSC 138 (9 February 2026).
- Banwari v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation, 2024 INSC 951; Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736; Ramsingbhai Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 16 SCC 445.
- Jawajee Nagnatham v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Adilabad, (1994) 4 SCC 595.
- Mehrawal Khewaji Trust v. State of Punjab, (2012) 5 SCC 432.
- Lal Chand v. Union of India, (2009) 15 SCC 769.
- MP Road Development Corporation v. Vincent Daniel, 2025 INSC 408.
Advocate Aaditya Bhatt
Senior Standing Counsel Income Tax Department, Advocate Gujarat High Court. Aaditya combines his technical and legal expertise to deliver strategic counsel in litigation, constitutional, and regulatory matters. He represents clients before High Courts and Tribunals with a technology-driven approach.
