Bail under The Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 (UAPA)

Since terrorism is a very heinous crime, UAPA has some special provisions to decide cases with respect to terrorism. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) is the central law enforcement agency tasked to deal with instances of terrorism in India.

Introduction

The Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967 stands as one of India’s most formidable legislative instruments designed to combat terrorism and unlawful activities threatening the nation’s sovereignty and integrity. Originally enacted to address secessionist movements and anti-national activities following the Naxalbari peasants’ uprising, the legislation has evolved through multiple amendments to become India’s primary counter-terrorism framework. The Act underwent transformative amendments in 2004, 2008, 2013, and 2019, each progressively strengthening the state’s powers while simultaneously raising concerns about civil liberties and due process. Among the most contentious provisions of UAPA is the stringent bail condition codified in Section 43D(5), which fundamentally alters the traditional criminal jurisprudence principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception. This provision has become a flashpoint in the ongoing tension between national security imperatives and constitutional guarantees of personal liberty, spawning extensive judicial interpretation and academic debate.

The amendments to the UAPA, particularly the 2008 amendment introduced in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks, marked a watershed moment in India’s counter-terrorism legal architecture. The introduction of Section 43D(5) established unprecedented restrictions on bail, requiring courts to deny bail if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true. This reversal of the conventional burden of proof has resulted in prolonged pre-trial detention for numerous individuals, many of whom are ultimately acquitted or found innocent. The National Crime Records Bureau data reveals that of all persons arrested under the UAPA, only approximately 2.2 percent result in convictions, highlighting the discrepancy between the severity of detention and actual culpability. This article examines the intricate framework governing bail under the UAPA, analyzing the statutory provisions, regulatory mechanisms, judicial precedents, and the evolving jurisprudence that attempts to balance national security concerns with fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India.

Understanding the Legislative Framework

The UAPA operates through a structured framework divided into several chapters, with Chapters IV and VI containing provisions relating to punishment for terrorist activities and related offences. Section 43D of the Act, titled “Modified application of certain provisions of the Code,” fundamentally alters the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to offences under the UAPA. The provision declares every offence punishable under the Act as cognizable, enabling police officers to arrest without warrant and commence investigation without magisterial authorization. Section 167 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which governs the period of detention during investigation, is modified to permit extended custody periods. The references to fifteen days, ninety days, and sixty days in the original provision are construed as thirty days, ninety days, and ninety days respectively under the UAPA framework.

Section 43D(5) of the UAPA contains the most stringent bail provisions. The section states that “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release: Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.” [1] This provision establishes a dual-tier test where the public prosecutor must first be heard, and subsequently, the court must be satisfied that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accusation is prima facie true. The provision represents a significant departure from ordinary criminal law where the burden lies on the prosecution to establish grounds for denying bail rather than on the accused to disprove the prima facie case.

The Act further provides in Section 43D(6) that the restrictions on granting bail specified in sub-section five are in addition to restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force. An even more stringent provision exists in Section 43D(7), which states that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections five and six, no bail shall be granted to a person accused of an offence punishable under the Act if he is not an Indian citizen and has entered the country unauthorizedly or illegally, except in very exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing. These provisions collectively create a formidable barrier to securing pre-trial liberty for individuals accused under the UAPA, fundamentally altering the constitutional presumption of innocence until proven guilty.

Regulatory Mechanisms and Investigation Procedures

The regulatory framework governing UAPA investigations is administered primarily by the National Investigation Agency, established through the National Investigation Agency Act of 2008. The NIA functions as the central agency for terrorism law enforcement in India, possessing jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute offences under the UAPA across state boundaries. The agency operates with substantial autonomy, capable of taking up investigations without requiring state government consent, which has raised federalism concerns given that police and public order are state subjects under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The NIA’s investigation procedures follow modified versions of the Criminal Procedure Code provisions, with extended timelines and enhanced powers reflecting the perceived gravity and complexity of terrorism-related cases.

Investigation under the UAPA is subject to specific procedural safeguards intended to balance investigative efficiency with due process. Officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police or above are empowered to investigate cases under the Act, ensuring a threshold level of seniority and expertise. The investigating officer is required to file an affidavit stating reasons and explaining any delay when requesting police custody from judicial custody of any person. However, the Act permits extended periods of detention without chargesheet. While ordinary criminal procedure requires that a chargesheet be filed within sixty or ninety days depending on the severity of the offence, the UAPA permits detention for up to ninety days initially, with courts empowered to extend this period to one hundred and eighty days if satisfied with the public prosecutor’s report indicating the progress of investigation and specific reasons for continued detention. This six-month window for completing investigation, while intended to accommodate the complexity of terrorism cases, has resulted in extended pre-trial incarceration for numerous individuals who may ultimately be acquitted.

The Act also contains provisions regarding witness protection that significantly impact bail considerations. Section 44 of the UAPA empowers the court to keep the identity of protected witnesses confidential, permitting the admission of redacted statements under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This provision was upheld in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, where the Supreme Court allowed the trial court’s order permitting redaction of witness statements to protect witness identity. [2] While witness protection serves legitimate security interests, it creates challenges for accused persons seeking bail, as they are unable to effectively challenge the credibility of anonymous witnesses whose statements form the basis for establishing a prima facie case. This procedural asymmetry compounds the difficulties inherent in satisfying the stringent requirements of Section 43D(5).

Landmark Judicial Precedents

The Watali Doctrine: Restrictive Interpretation

The Supreme Court’s decision in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali delivered in 2019 established the foundational interpretive framework for Section 43D(5). [2] The case involved Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, a businessman accused of being part of a larger conspiracy to cause secession of Jammu and Kashmir from the Union of India by acting as a conduit for transfer of funds received from terrorist Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence to Hurriyat leaders and secessionists. The Delhi High Court had granted him bail, but the Supreme Court reversed this decision, setting aside the High Court order and restoring the Special Court’s denial of bail. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, writing for the bench, held that at the stage of considering bail under special enactments like the UAPA, courts are not expected to elaborately examine or dissect evidence but to record findings on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused.

The Court in Watali established that the degree of satisfaction required for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing the accusation is prima facie true is lighter than the degree of satisfaction required for considering discharge applications or framing of charges. The judgment emphasized that the materials and evidence collected by the investigating agency must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, must reveal the complicity of the accused. The Court held that if bail is being sought after filing of the chargesheet, it becomes an arduous task for the accused to satisfy the court that despite the framing of charge and the materials presented along with the chargesheet, they do not make out reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true. This interpretation effectively shifted the burden onto the accused to disprove the prima facie case established by the prosecution, contrary to the ordinary presumption of innocence.

The Watali judgment had profound implications for bail jurisprudence under the UAPA. It established what has been characterized as an “eyes wide shut” approach, where courts are discouraged from examining the quality or probative value of prosecution evidence at the bail stage. The judgment stated that detailed evidentiary scrutiny would be premature and could prejudice the trial. However, this approach created a situation where even weak or questionable evidence contained in the chargesheet could suffice to deny bail, as courts felt constrained from assessing whether the evidence actually supported the serious allegations made. The decision led to a proliferation of bail denials in UAPA cases across various High Courts and trial courts, with Watali being cited as binding precedent requiring courts to accept the prosecution’s version at face value during bail proceedings.

K.A. Najeeb: Constitutional Rights Trump Statutory Restrictions

The Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb delivered on February 1, 2021, represented a significant counterweight to the Watali doctrine. [3] K.A. Najeeb was an active member of the Popular Front of India, accused of facilitating an attack on Professor T.J. Joseph in Thodupuzha, Kerala in 2010. A group had attacked the Professor, chopping off his right palm with weapons and hurling country-made bombs, believing a question he had set in an examination was blasphemous. Najeeb absconded for five years before being arrested by the National Investigation Agency in 2015. He filed bail applications six times between 2015 and 2019, all rejected on grounds that he had prima facie knowledge of the attack and had assisted and facilitated it. The Kerala High Court finally granted him bail in 2019 after he had spent nearly four years in custody without trial commencing.

The Supreme Court bench comprising Justices N.V. Ramana, Surya Kant, and Aniruddha Bose upheld the High Court’s bail order, holding that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43D(5) of the UAPA per se does not oust the ability of constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. The Court observed that owing to the practicalities of real life, where securing an effective trial and ameliorating risk to society requires deciding whether an individual ought to be released pending trial, once it becomes obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period, courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail. The judgment noted that the constitutionality of harsh conditions for bail in special enactments has been primarily justified on the touchstone of speedy trials to ensure protection of innocent civilians.

The Najeeb decision established that gross delay in trial completion violates the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, and this violation can be a ground for granting bail notwithstanding Section 43D(5). The Court took note of Najeeb’s five years and five months in judicial custody without trial even commencing, and the fact that over two hundred witnesses remained to be examined. Of the thirteen co-accused who had been convicted, none received a sentence exceeding eight years’ rigorous imprisonment, suggesting that even if found guilty, Najeeb would have already served a substantial portion of any likely sentence. The judgment represented a crucial reaffirmation that constitutional rights cannot be indefinitely suspended by statutory provisions, and that extended pre-trial detention without trial violates the essence of Article 21. However, the decision was carefully circumscribed to cases involving prolonged delay and substantial incarceration.

Vernon Gonsalves: Requiring Evidential Analysis

In Vernon v. State of Maharashtra decided on July 28, 2023, a two-judge bench comprising Justices Aniruddha Bose and Sudhanshu Dhulia granted bail to Vernon Gonsalves and Arun Ferreira, both accused in the Bhima Koregaon-Elgar Parishad case and lodged in jail since August 2018. [4] They were charged with conspiracy to commit violence at Bhima Koregaon, allegedly having links with the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist), and with offences under Sections 121, 121A, 124A, 153A of the Indian Penal Code and various provisions of the UAPA. The National Investigation Agency relied on letters purportedly recovered from other co-accused persons’ electronic devices, witness statements, and possession of literature allegedly propagating violence or promoting overthrow of the democratically elected government. The Bombay High Court had denied them bail, but the Supreme Court reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court in Vernon held that it would not satisfy the prima facie test unless there is at least surface-level analysis of the probative value of the evidence at the stage of examining the question of granting bail, and the quality or probative value satisfies the court of its worth. This represented a significant departure from Watali’s restrictive approach. The Court held that bail cannot be denied when the prosecution’s evidence is of low quality or low probative value, and courts must engage in analysis of evidence to determine this. The judgment examined the letters relied upon by the prosecution and found them insufficient to establish the accused persons’ involvement in terrorist activities. The Court noted that mere possession of literature or participation in legal activities could not establish terrorism offences, and that allegations must be particularized and supported by evidence of quality.

The Vernon judgment established three critical principles for bail under the UAPA. First, definitional clauses of the UAPA must be given strict and narrow construction. Second, allegations in the chargesheet must be individualized, factual, and particularistic, with gaps between what an individual is accused of and actual events not being filled by inferences or speculation. Third, bail cannot be denied when prosecution evidence is of low quality or low probative value, and courts must engage in evidential analysis to determine this. The decision was welcomed as recovering the basics of constitutional jurisprudence and due process, providing a vital safeguard against detention based on weak or speculative evidence. However, its precedential impact remains contested, with some subsequent decisions continuing to follow Watali’s restrictive approach.

Gurwinder Singh: Reaffirming “Jail as Rule”

The Supreme Court’s decision in Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab delivered on February 7, 2024, marked a concerning regression from the progressive jurisprudence developed in Najeeb and Vernon. [5] Gurwinder Singh was accused of being part of an alleged Khalistan module, charged with raising funds for terrorist acts, conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, and concealing persons knowing them to be terrorists under Sections 17, 18, and 19 of the UAPA. The prosecution alleged he had received funds through illegal hawala channels from members of the banned organization Sikhs for Justice, and had attempted to procure weapons for terrorist activities. The trial court and High Court of Punjab and Haryana denied him bail, and the Supreme Court bench comprising Justices M.M. Sundresh and Aravind Kumar upheld these orders, rejecting his appeal.

The Court in Gurwinder Singh explicitly stated that the conventional idea in bail jurisprudence that discretion of courts must tilt in favor of the oft-quoted phrase ‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under the UAPA. The form of words used in the proviso to Section 43D(5) – ‘shall not be released’ in contrast with Section 437(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code – ‘may be released’ – suggests the legislative intention to make bail the exception and jail the rule. The Court laid down a two-pronged test for bail applications: first, whether the test for rejection of bail is satisfied based on prima facie materials, and second, if not satisfied, whether the accused passes the tripod test of flight risk, influencing witnesses, or tampering with evidence.

The Gurwinder Singh judgment significantly narrowed the circumstances in which bail could be granted under the UAPA. The Court held that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences cannot be used as a ground to grant bail, distinguishing the case from K.A. Najeeb on facts. The Court noted that in Najeeb, the trial had been separated from other co-accused who had already been tried and convicted, whereas in Gurwinder Singh’s case, the trial was ongoing with twenty-two witnesses already examined. However, this distinction failed to address the fundamental Article 21 concern about prolonged pre-trial detention. The judgment privileged statutory provisions over constitutional rights, stating that once materials on record prima facie indicate complicity in conspiracy for knowingly facilitating preparatory acts toward commission of terrorist acts, bail must be rejected as a rule. This pronouncement effectively reinstated the Watali approach and created tension with the Vernon precedent decided just months earlier.

Balancing National Security and Individual Liberty

The tension between national security imperatives and individual liberty rights forms the philosophical core of UAPA bail jurisprudence. The state’s argument for stringent bail provisions rests on several premises. Terrorism poses unique threats to national security, public safety, and the constitutional order that justify exceptional measures beyond ordinary criminal law. Individuals accused of terrorism may pose continuing dangers if released on bail, potentially influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence, or even committing further terrorist acts. The complexity of terrorism investigations, often involving international linkages, encrypted communications, and clandestine networks, necessitates extended investigation periods and restricted bail. The argument draws support from international practice, as many democratic nations maintain specialized anti-terrorism laws with provisions more restrictive than ordinary criminal procedure.

However, civil liberties advocates and constitutional scholars articulate compelling counter-arguments. The presumption of innocence, a cornerstone of criminal jurisprudence recognized in Article 21 of the Constitution, is fundamentally undermined when individuals can be detained for years based solely on unproven accusations. The low conviction rate under the UAPA suggests systemic over-charging and misuse of the legislation to suppress dissent rather than genuine counter-terrorism enforcement. Prolonged pre-trial detention without trial amounts to punishment without conviction, violating basic principles of natural justice. The vague and expansive definitions of terrorist activity within the UAPA enable authorities to criminalize legitimate political dissent, protest, and advocacy. The inability of accused persons to effectively challenge evidence at the bail stage, particularly when witness statements are redacted and documents are selectively presented by the prosecution, violates the right to fair hearing.

Recent judicial decisions have attempted to strike a balance between these competing considerations. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb recognized that while Section 43D(5) imposes stringent conditions, it cannot become an instrument for indefinite incarceration without trial, which would violate Article 21. The Court held that constitutional courts retain authority to grant bail when detention violates fundamental rights, even when statutory provisions appear to bar bail. Similarly, in Vernon v. State of Maharashtra, the Court emphasized that restrictions on bail must be interpreted in light of constitutional values, requiring individualized assessment of evidence quality rather than mechanical acceptance of prosecution allegations. These decisions suggest an evolving jurisprudence that acknowledges legitimate security concerns while insisting on constitutional safeguards against arbitrary detention.

The challenge lies in developing principled standards that can be consistently applied across cases. Some scholars propose a proportionality framework where the severity of restrictions on liberty must be proportionate to the strength of evidence and the nature of threat posed. Others advocate for mandatory timelines for trial completion in UAPA cases, ensuring that if trials cannot proceed expeditiously, accused persons must be released on bail regardless of statutory restrictions. The Supreme Court itself has suggested that the constitutionality of harsh bail provisions is justified on the touchstone of speedy trials, implying that extended delays undermine the legitimacy of continued detention. Implementing these principles requires both judicial will to enforce constitutional rights and legislative reform to build procedural safeguards into the UAPA framework itself.

Procedural Safeguards and Practical Considerations

Despite the stringent provisions of Section 43D(5), certain procedural safeguards exist within the UAPA framework and have been developed through judicial interpretation. The requirement that the public prosecutor must be given an opportunity to be heard before bail is granted ensures that the state can present its case against release. Courts have held that this hearing must be meaningful, with the prosecution required to present specific materials establishing prima facie complicity rather than making general assertions. The court’s duty to peruse the case diary or charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides a documentary foundation for the bail decision, preventing purely arbitrary determinations. The provision that bail restrictions under Section 43D(5) are in addition to general restrictions under the Code means that even if the UAPA test is satisfied, courts can still consider ordinary bail factors like severity of punishment, nature of accusation, and character of accused.

Courts have also recognized certain exceptions and considerations that can lead to bail grants notwithstanding Section 43D(5). Prolonged delay in trial, particularly when coupled with substantial incarceration already undergone, can constitute grounds for bail based on Article 21 violation as established in K.A. Najeeb. Poor health of the accused, especially when adequate medical facilities are unavailable in custody, may warrant release on bail on humanitarian grounds. The fact that co-accused persons have been granted bail or have been acquitted can be a relevant consideration, though not determinative. Where the accused’s alleged role is peripheral or the evidence of complicity is weak or contradictory, courts following Vernon’s approach may grant bail after analyzing evidence quality. Age of the accused, with juveniles or elderly persons potentially deserving greater consideration for bail, represents another relevant factor.

Practical considerations in UAPA bail litigation require specialized legal expertise and strategic case presentation. Defense counsel must meticulously analyze the chargesheet and case diary, identifying weaknesses, contradictions, or gaps in the prosecution evidence. Demonstrating that allegations rely on speculation, inference, or association rather than direct evidence of participation in terrorist activities is crucial. Presenting contrary evidence or explanations for circumstances relied upon by the prosecution can rebut the prima facie case. Emphasizing the length of pre-trial custody, comparing it to likely sentences for co-accused or similar cases, strengthens Article 21 arguments. Highlighting health conditions, family circumstances, or other humanitarian factors can supplement legal arguments. Documenting trial delays attributable to the prosecution or court system, rather than defense tactics, supports speedy trial claims.

Contemporary Challenges and Reform Proposals

The current state of UAPA bail jurisprudence presents several pressing challenges requiring urgent attention. The inconsistency in judicial approaches, with different benches of the Supreme Court and various High Courts adopting divergent interpretations of Section 43D(5), creates uncertainty and unpredictability in bail outcomes. The Watali precedent remains influential in many courts, leading to mechanical denial of bail based on prosecution allegations without meaningful evidential scrutiny. However, Vernon’s requirement for assessing evidence quality represents a conflicting approach, and subsequent decisions like Gurwinder Singh have muddied the waters further. Lower courts and High Courts face difficulty determining which precedent controls, particularly when benches of different strengths have pronounced apparently conflicting principles.

The systemic issue of trial delays fundamentally undermines the rationale for stringent bail provisions. If the justification for restricted bail is the need for speedy trials to protect innocent civilians, then the reality of trials extending for years or decades destroys this justification. The National Investigation Agency Act provides that appeals should preferably be heard and disposed of within three months, but neither the UAPA nor the NIA Act specifies timelines for investigation completion or trial conclusion. In practice, trials under the UAPA often continue for five, ten, or even fifteen years, with accused persons spending this entire period in custody. This prolonged incarceration without conviction constitutes punishment without trial, violating the essence of criminal justice.

Several reform proposals have been advanced by legal scholars, practitioners, and human rights organizations. Mandatory timelines for trial completion, with automatic bail if trials cannot conclude within a specified period such as two or three years, would create meaningful accountability. Requiring periodic judicial review of continued detention at six-month or annual intervals, with the burden on the prosecution to justify continued custody, would ensure ongoing scrutiny rather than one-time bail determinations. Amending Section 43D(5) to permit courts to examine evidence quality and require the prosecution to establish prima facie case with credible materials, rather than accepting allegations at face value, would better balance security and liberty. Establishing specialized UAPA courts with adequate resources to ensure expeditious trials would address the systemic delay problem. Providing legal aid and resources to accused persons to effectively contest bail denials would reduce the practical disadvantages faced by indigent accused.

Some have proposed that Section 43D(5) should be read down or struck down as unconstitutional to the extent it permits indefinite detention without trial. Article 21’s guarantee of life and personal liberty cannot be negated by ordinary legislation, and extended pre-trial detention without conviction violates this fundamental right. The provision’s effective reversal of the presumption of innocence by requiring accused persons to disprove prima facie cases established by the prosecution contradicts bedrock principles of criminal jurisprudence. However, given the Supreme Court’s repeated affirmation of the provision’s constitutional validity, such a radical step appears unlikely without a larger constitutional bench reconsidering the question. More realistic reform would involve legislative amendment to build safeguards into the statute itself, coupled with consistent judicial interpretation emphasizing constitutional values.

Conclusion

The bail provisions of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), particularly Section 43D(5), represent one of the most challenging intersections between national security concerns and constitutional rights in contemporary Indian jurisprudence. The provision’s fundamental departure from ordinary criminal law principles – replacing the presumption of innocence with a requirement that accused persons disprove prima facie cases, restricting judicial discretion to grant bail, and permitting extended pre-trial detention – creates profound tensions with Article 21’s guarantee of life and personal liberty. The judicial precedents governing UAPA bail reflect this tension, oscillating between restrictive approaches that privilege security concerns and expansive interpretations that emphasize constitutional values. The Watali doctrine established a deferential standard discouraging meaningful evidential scrutiny at the bail stage, while Najeeb recognized that prolonged detention without trial violates fundamental rights regardless of statutory restrictions, and Vernon insisted on assessing evidence quality before denying bail.

The path forward requires reconciling these competing precedents into a coherent framework that serves both legitimate security interests and constitutional imperatives. Courts must consistently apply the principle that constitutional rights cannot be indefinitely suspended by statute, that prolonged pre-trial detention without trial violates Article 21, and that bail determinations require individualized assessment of evidence quality rather than mechanical acceptance of prosecution allegations. Legislative reform should establish mandatory trial timelines, provide for periodic review of continued detention, and ensure adequate resources for expeditious UAPA trials. The ultimate measure of any counter-terrorism framework is whether it effectively addresses security threats while maintaining fidelity to constitutional values that distinguish democracy from authoritarianism. The UAPA’s bail provisions, as currently structured and applied, often fail this test, sacrificing individual liberty without demonstrable enhancement of security. Achieving the necessary balance demands ongoing judicial vigilance, legislative responsiveness, and societal commitment to the rule of law even in confronting grave threats. Only through such sustained effort can India develop a counter-terrorism framework that is both effective and constitutional, securing both the nation and the liberties it was established to protect.

References

[1] The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, Section 43D(5). Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/96524627/ 

[2] National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1. Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/117627977/ 

[3] Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713. Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/18346623/ 

[4] Vernon v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 639 of 2023 (Decided on 28.07.2023). Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/97883907/ 

[5] Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal No. 704 of 2024 (Decided on 07.02.2024). Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/196856201/ 

[6] Supreme Court Observer, “Bail Under UAPA: Court in Review.” Available at: https://www.scobserver.in/journal/bail-under-uapa-court-in-review/ 

[7] SCC Times, “Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: Interpretation on Rigours of Grant of Bail” (December 31, 2021). Available at: https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2021/12/31/unlawful-activities-prevention-act-1967-interpretation-on-rigours-of-grant-of-bail/ 

[8] People’s Union for Civil Liberties, “‘Jail, not Bail’: Is the SC setting the clock back?” (March 7, 2024). Available at: https://pucl.org/manage-press-stateme/jail-not-bail-is-the-sc-setting-the-clock-back/ 

[9] Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy Blog, “Recovering the Basics: The Supreme Court’s Bail Order in Vernon Gonsalves’ Case” (July 29, 2023). Available at: https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2023/07/29/recovering-the-basics-the-supreme-courts-bail-order-in-vernon-gonsalves-case/