Trump’s Tariffs at the Supreme Court: The Constitutional Clash Over IEEPA, Plan B Alternatives, and India’s Trade Opportunity

I. Introduction: A Defining Constitutional Moment

On November 5, 2025, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in what may become one of the most consequential cases of the decade—the first major constitutional test of Trump’s IEEPA tariffs at the Supreme Court, a legal showdown over whether President Donald Trump possesses the authority to impose sweeping global tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The case, arising from consolidated challenges to Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs announced in April 2025, represents far more than a dispute over trade policy. It fundamentally questions the scope of presidential power in foreign commerce, the limits of congressional delegation, and the viability of the “major questions” doctrine in constraining executive overreach. [1][2]

The stakes are extraordinary. Since implementing tariffs ranging from 10% on most nations to 145% on China—and subsequently escalating tariffs on India to 50%—the Trump administration has collected an estimated $89 billion in tariff revenue between February and September 2025, with some estimates suggesting that figure could reach $1 trillion by June 2026 if current tariff regimes remain in effect. Yet three lower courts, including the U.S. Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, have already ruled against the administration, finding that Trump exceeded his constitutional authority under IEEPA.​​

What transpired during the Supreme Court oral arguments, however, suggested that even the conservative justices—including those appointed by Trump himself—harbor serious doubts about the government’s legal theory. This article examines the constitutional framework at issue, the collapse of the administration’s primary legal position, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s outlined alternatives, and the potential implications for India-US trade relations in the wake of a likely adverse ruling.​​[3]

II. The IEEPA Framework: Statutory History and Purpose

A. Origins and Design Constraints

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, enacted on December 28, 1977, was designed as a deliberate curtailment of presidential power, not an expansion of it. Congress created IEEPA in direct response to President Richard Nixon’s shocking assertion of emergency executive authority in August 1971, when he imposed a temporary 10% tariff on virtually all imported goods without congressional authorization or public warning.​[3][4]

When Nixon’s tariff was challenged in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the predecessor to the Federal Circuit), the court upheld it under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)—the predecessor statute to IEEPA—on the basis that the law’s reference to presidential power to “regulate” imports could encompass tariff measures. This precedent alarmed Congress. In response, lawmakers enacted three critical reform measures in 1976-1977: the National Emergencies Act, which imposed procedural requirements on emergency declarations; Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which explicitly authorized temporary tariffs of up to 15% for up to 150 days to address balance-of-payments crises; and finally, IEEPA itself in December 1977.​

Critically, IEEPA’s legislative history makes abundantly clear that Congress was tightening, not loosening, the reins on presidential emergency power. The House Report accompanying IEEPA explicitly referenced Nixon’s 1971 tariff adventure and concluded: “The need for this legislation is apparent from the background discussed above…. [S]ection 5(b) [of the TWEA] has become essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review.” Congress deliberately chose not to include any mention of tariffs in IEEPA’s text.​[5]

B. What IEEPA Authorizes

Under its current codification (50 U.S.C. § 1701-1707), IEEPA authorizes the president to declare the existence of an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to national security, foreign policy, or the economy when that threat “has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States.” Once such a declaration is made, the president may “investigate, regulate, or prohibit … transactions and transfers … involving any property or any interest therein” and may block and freeze assets related to foreign nationals or entities.​

Critically, the statute’s operative language grants power to “regulate” commerce and transactions related to national emergencies—but the statute contains no explicit authorization to impose tariffs, duties, or taxes. All presidents since IEEPA’s enactment in 1977 until Trump have used the statute exclusively for its intended purpose: imposing targeted sanctions against hostile nations, terrorists, or actors engaged in illegal conduct. No president had ever attempted to use IEEPA as a general tariff authority until Trump.​​[1][2]

III. Trump’s Unprecedented Application: The “Regulate Importation” Argument

A. The Administration’s Legal Theory

In April 2025, Trump declared a national “economic emergency” and invoked IEEPA to impose what he termed “reciprocal tariffs” on nearly all U.S. trading partners. The administration’s legal defense rests on a deceptively simple—but constitutionally explosive—argument: that IEEPA’s language authorizing the president to “regulate” imports during emergencies necessarily encompasses the power to impose tariffs, including unlimited-duration, unlimited-magnitude tariffs on goods from any country, regardless of their status as allies or adversaries.​

This interpretation represents a fundamental departure from statutory text, legislative intent, and historical practice. The administration argues from what it characterizes as the inherent foreign affairs authority of the president under Article II of the Constitution, layered atop IEEPA’s delegation of authority, placing the president in the constitutional “Youngstown Zone 1” posture of maximum executive power. Crucially, however, the government does not contend that the president possesses inherent tariff authority in peacetime; the entire theory depends on IEEPA’s grant.​[6]

B. The “Wafer-Thin Reed” Problem

During oral arguments before the Supreme Court on November 5, 2025, even sympathetic justices expressed skepticism about the administration’s interpretive framework. Justice Amy Coney Barrett directly challenged Solicitor General D. John Sauer: “Can you cite any other instance in the code or any historical precedent where that phrase ‘regulate importation’ has been interpreted to grant tariff-imposing powers?”​​

The Federal Circuit had already described the administration’s legal foundation as “a wafer-thin reed”—a phrase that echoes through the current Supreme Court case. The court found it “unlikely that Congress intended” to grant the president “unlimited authority to impose tariffs” through the mere word “regulate,” particularly in a statute enacted specifically to constrain Nixon-era executive overreach.​​[1]

Justice Brett Kavanaugh, a Trump appointee, noted: “One problem you have is that presidents since IEEPA have not done this.” And Justice Elena Kagan’s observation proved pithy: the IEEPA “has a lot of verbs … It just doesn’t have the one you want.”​[7]

IV. The “Major Questions” Doctrine and Constitutional Limits on Delegation

A. The Doctrine’s Application

Alongside the narrow statutory interpretation question, the Supreme Court is grappling with whether IEEPA’s purported delegation of tariff authority passes constitutional muster under the “major questions” doctrine. This doctrine, articulated most forcefully in recent years by the Roberts Court, requires that executive actions of vast economic and political significance must be based on clear congressional authorization rather than on ambiguous statutory language or general delegations.​​

Chief Justice John Roberts signaled the doctrine’s centrality to the case: “The justification is being used for a power to impose tariffs on any product, from any country, in any amount, for any length of time. I’m not suggesting it’s not there, but it does seem like that’s major authority, and the basis for the claim seems to be a misfit.”​​[1]

The administration’s tariffs easily meet the threshold of “major” action. The collected tariff revenue—$89 billion to $100 billion from IEEPA-based tariffs alone—represents a staggering exercise of economic power. Entire sectors of the U.S. economy, from small businesses to multinational manufacturers, have reorganized their supply chains in response to the tariff regime.​​[3]

B. Congressional Delegation and Separation of Powers

Underlying the major questions debate is a deeper separation-of-powers concern. The U.S. Constitution vests all power to “lay and collect duties” in Congress, not the president. Over the past two centuries, Congress has delegated portions of tariff authority to the executive through various statutes—but always with explicit authorization and carefully crafted limitations.​[8]

Justice Neil Gorsuch, another Trump appointee, pressed Sauer on this point: “What prevents Congress, once it’s handed over power to the president, from simply repealing the legislation [that] limits that power back?” Gorsuch’s question cut to the heart of the constitutional anxiety: if IEEPA’s vague language can authorize unlimited tariffs, what statutory restriction on presidential power remains meaningful?​​[1]

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson emphasized that IEEPA itself was designed to restrict presidential power: “It’s pretty clear that Congress was trying to constrain the emergency powers of the president.” This observation aligns with the statutory history: the National Emergencies Act and IEEPA were enacted in the 1970s after a series of presidential abuses of emergency authority.​

C. The Revenue-Raising Question

A particularly tricky constitutional question emerged during the arguments: are Trump’s tariffs best understood as regulatory measures (which might fall within executive power) or as taxes (which the Constitution reserves exclusively for Congress)?​​[3]

The administration’s position strains credulity. Solicitor General Sauer insisted: “These are tariffs, not revenue-raising tariffs.” Yet the evidence is overwhelming. The tariffs have generated tens of billions of dollars in revenue for the federal government. Justice Sonia Sotomayor pointedly noted the contradiction: “You want to assert that tariffs are not taxes, but that’s precisely what they are. They’re generating money from American citizens revenue.”​​

This revenue-raising aspect becomes material under the Constitution. If the tariffs function substantially as taxes—which they manifestly do—then they fall outside executive authority and require congressional authorization.​​[5]

V. The Lower Courts’ Consensus Rejection

Before reaching the Supreme Court, Trump’s IEEPA tariffs faced consistent judicial rejection across multiple circuits and judicial philosophies. In May 2025, the U.S. Court of International Trade—the specialized tribunal with expertise in trade law—ruled that Trump had exceeded his authority under IEEPA. The court found that every other statutory provision granting presidential tariff authority contains “well-defined procedural and substantive limitations,” and that Congress’s silence on tariffs in IEEPA was deliberate. The court further held that interpreting IEEPA to permit Trump’s worldwide tariffs would constitute an unconstitutional delegation of Congress’s core taxing power.​[8]

On August 29, 2025, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in a 7-4 decision. The majority emphasized that none of the statutes explicitly granting tariff authority “includes… the power to tax,” and that the phrase “regulate importation” cannot plausibly bear the weight of authorizing tariffs of unlimited duration and magnitude on allied nations.​​

Most tellingly, the court noted: “It seems unlikely that Congress intended… to grant the president unlimited authority to impose tariffs” under a statute enacted specifically to constrain emergency presidential authority. A concurring opinion went further, holding that the tariff regime violated the major questions doctrine.​

For Trump to prevail before the Supreme Court, at least six of nine justices would need to overturn two lower court decisions, both reaching the same conclusion from different angles.​​

VI. The Supreme Court’s Skepticism: The November 5 Arguments

The oral arguments on November 5, 2025, revealed a court divided, but with the conservative majority seemingly aligned against the government’s position. This was striking, as the Court had previously been reluctant to curtail Trump’s expansive executive claims in immigration, federal employment, and other domains.​​[3]

Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s questioning was particularly telling. Rather than accepting the government’s “regulate importation” framing, she demanded historical precedent for using that phrase to authorize tariffs. Sauer could provide none.​​

Chief Justice Roberts, a crucial swing vote and the likely arbiter of the Court’s institutional interests, signaled deep concern about the breadth of the claimed authority. His repeated emphasis on the mismatch between a vague statutory phrase and an extraordinary grant of power suggested sympathy with the challenger’s position.​​

Even Justice Brett Kavanaugh, whom many assumed would support the administration, noted the problem: “[O]ne problem you have is that presidents since IEEPA have not done this.” This historical silence cuts against the government’s position.​

The most reliable indicator came from prediction markets. Before the arguments, traders placed Trump’s chances of victory at approximately 40-50%. After the arguments, those odds collapsed to 20-30%, with contracts on Kalshi and Polymarket showing particularly steep declines. Market participants interpreted the justices’ skeptical questioning as signaling a likely adverse outcome for the administration.​

VII. The Constitutional Principles at Stake

Beyond the technical statutory question lies a profound constitutional issue: whether the Roberts Court will permit the executive to evade carefully crafted congressional limitations on emergency power by invoking sufficiently ambiguous statutory language.​​

The Framers anticipated this danger. The Constitution assigns Congress the power to levy taxes and regulate foreign commerce. Over time, Congress has delegated portions of this authority to the president, but always with explicit authorization and meaningful constraints. Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 exemplifies Congress’s approach: it permits temporary tariffs up to 15% for up to 150 days to address balance-of-payments crises, and it requires either congressional extension or statutory expiration.​[9]

By contrast, Trump’s IEEPA tariffs are unlimited in duration, unlimited in magnitude (reaching 50% on India, 145% on China), and apply to allies as readily as adversaries. If permitted to stand, they would represent a fundamental shift in the constitutional balance—a transfer of taxing and commerce-regulating power from Congress to the president based solely on the executive’s declaration of emergency.​​[1]

Justice Gorsuch’s question captures the institutional stakes: once Congress yields authority to the president, can Congress meaningfully reclaim it? The answer to that question will shape the presidency for generations.​​

VIII. Scott Bessent’s Plan B: Alternative Legal Authorities

Anticipating that IEEPA might not survive judicial scrutiny, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has publicly outlined a comprehensive “Plan B” of alternative legal authorities through which the Trump administration could maintain its tariff regime even if the Supreme Court strikes down the IEEPA approach.​[4]

A. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: National Security Tariffs

Section 232 grants the president authority to impose tariffs based on recommendations from the U.S. Secretary of Commerce if imports threaten to “impair the national security.” The procedure involves: (1) the Commerce Department initiating or receiving a petition for an investigation; (2) a formal investigation concluding with a report within 270 days; (3) presidential action within 90 days of receiving the report.​[11]

Section 232 was largely dormant from 1995 until Trump’s 2018 first term, when the administration used it to impose 25% tariffs on steel and 10% on aluminum, citing national security concerns. The Trump administration has already re-invoked Section 232 in its second term, initiating investigations into copper, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and other goods.​

The advantages of Section 232 for the administration are significant: the statute explicitly grants tariff authority; the presidential action is based on a Commerce Department report that provides procedural legitimacy; and the tariff rates can be calibrated by product and country. The disadvantages include: the requirement for an investigative process (consuming 270 days); the appearance of applying a “national security” rationale to ordinary trade goods (which invites WTO challenges and international derision); and the comparatively slower implementation timeline compared to IEEPA’s immediate proclamations.​

B. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Unfair Trade Practices

Section 301 authorizes the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate claims of unfair trade practices by foreign countries—including intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, discriminatory policies, or violations of trade agreements—and to impose tariffs as retaliation if negotiations fail.​[12]

Section 301 has a robust historical pedigree. It was used extensively in the 1980s and 1990s against Japan and has been the centerpiece of Trump’s trade war with China since 2018. The mechanism involves: (1) USTR self-initiation or receipt of a petition from domestic industry; (2) a formal investigation with opportunities for affected parties to comment; (3) USTR findings that foreign practices are unjustified, unreasonable, or discriminatory; (4) negotiation for compensation or elimination of the barrier; and (5) retaliatory tariffs if negotiations fail.​

A critical advantage is that Section 301 explicitly authorizes tariffs with no percentage ceiling—unlike Section 122, which caps tariffs at 15%. The administration has recently pursued Section 301 investigations into multiple countries, including Brazil, targeting purported unfair trade practices.​

The disadvantage is that Section 301 requires a finding of concrete unfair trade practices—not merely a trade deficit or alleged emergency. This creates vulnerability to WTO challenge and requires the administration to articulate specific trade violations.​

C. Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974: Balance-of-Payments Tariffs

Section 122 represents Congress’s attempt to formalize temporary emergency tariff authority following Nixon’s 1971 adventure. It permits the president to impose quotas or tariffs of up to 15% for up to 150 days when an emergency pertaining to the country’s balance of payments exists, targeting countries with “large and serious” surpluses with the United States.​[9]

Section 122 has never been used in practice, but it was specifically mentioned by the Court of International Trade as a potential statutory hook for tariff authority. If Congress permits, the temporary tariffs can be extended indefinitely through successive legislation.​

The critical constraints under Section 122 are: (1) tariff rates capped at 15%; (2) duration limited to 150 days unless congressional extension; (3) applicability to countries with large balance-of-payments surpluses (not enemies or security threats).​

D. Section 338 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act: The Discredited Option

Among Bessent’s “Plan B” options is Section 338 of the notorious Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930—a statute so economically disastrous that its invocation signals desperation. Section 338 permits the president to impose tariffs up to 50% on countries engaging in discriminatory trade practices against the United States.​

Section 338 is what Bessent alluded to when he suggested the administration possessed “lots of other [tariff] authorities.” However, the statute remains highly controversial. It is associated with catastrophic economic consequences—the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of the 1930s precipitated a global trade war that deepened the Great Depression by choking off U.S. exports and international commerce. That Congress deliberately confined Section 338 to foreign discrimination claims suggests the statute is a blunt instrument for addressing perceived trade imbalances or economic emergencies.​[4]

E. Bessent’s Own Words: The Assessment of Alternatives

In interviews, Bessent has characterized IEEPA as the most potent tool: “There are numerous other authorities that can be utilized, but IEEPA is by far the most straightforward, providing the U.S. and the president the greatest negotiating power. The alternatives may be more complex, yet they can still be effective.” He further elaborated: “There are lots of other [tariff] authorities that can be used, but [they are] not as efficient, not as powerful.”​[4]

This candid admission reveals the administration’s true preference: unconstrained tariff authority under IEEPA, which permits immediate, unlimited-duration tariffs on any country. The alternatives all impose constraints—temporal limits, magnitude caps, investigative procedures, or requirements to identify specific trade violations. Yet they remain available, suggesting that even an adverse Supreme Court ruling would not end the tariff regime entirely, but would reshape and potentially reduce it.​

IX. Implications for India-US Trade Relations

A. The Pre-Tariff Optimism

Earlier in 2025, before the tariff escalation spiral, there were genuine reasons for optimism regarding India-US trade relations. In April, Treasury Secretary Bessent signaled that India could be among the first countries to finalize a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement with the United States. Bessent emphasized India’s “relatively open trade practices” and “fewer non-tariff barriers” as factors accelerating negotiations.​

The sentiment aligned with the Modi administration’s ambitious “Mission 500” agenda—a goal of reaching $500 billion in bilateral trade by 2030, up from roughly $150 billion at that time.​

B. The August Catastrophe: 50% Tariffs on India

This optimistic trajectory collapsed dramatically in August 2025. On August 27, the Trump administration imposed a comprehensive tariff regime on Indian exports: initially a 25% “reciprocal” tariff under IEEPA (justified by alleged trade imbalances), followed by an additional 25% tariff (justified by India’s continued importation of Russian crude oil)—bringing the total to 50% on most Indian export categories except pharmaceuticals and semiconductors (which remained exempted to protect U.S. supply chains dependent on Indian generics).​[13]

This 50% tariff represented the highest rate imposed on any major U.S. trading partner outside China (30%) and exceeded the rates on Vietnam and the Philippines (20%).​

C. The Economic and Diplomatic Fallout

The impact on Indian exporters was immediate and severe. India’s merchandise exports to the United States fell 20% in September 2025 alone—the first full month under the 50% tariff regime. Over the four-month period from May to September, India’s exports to the U.S. declined 37.5%, from $8.8 billion in May to $5.5 billion in September.​[3]

The most severely affected sectors were labor-intensive industries central to India’s export competitiveness: textiles, gems and jewelry, leather and footwear, marine products, chemicals, auto parts, and agricultural goods. These sectors collectively represent over 55% of India’s exports to the United States.​

The diplomatic dimension was equally fraught. Treasury Secretary Bessent characterized India as “a bit recalcitrant” in trade talks and criticized India for what he termed not being “a great global actor” due to its continued purchases of Russian oil. Secretary of State Marco Rubio echoed this criticism, describing India’s energy ties with Russia as “a point of irritation” in U.S.-India relations. The Trump administration weaponized trade negotiations, linking tariff relief to India’s willingness to reduce Russian oil purchases—a demand that struck Indian policymakers as infringing on India’s strategic autonomy.​

D. The Trade Negotiation Stalemate

By mid-2025, India-US bilateral trade negotiations had stalled. The Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal expressed confidence that a deal could be concluded by November 2025, but the administration’s linkage of tariff relief to India’s energy policy created an impasse. Indian officials have stated that the U.S. is seeking market access for American agricultural products (particularly genetically modified soya and corn) in exchange for tariff reductions.​

India has responded with its own measures, including a GST rationalization and reform initiative intended to boost export competitiveness—but tariff relief requires negotiated agreement with the United States.​

E. A Supreme Court Victory for India’s Interests

Should the Supreme Court strike down Trump’s IEEPA tariffs, the consequences for India could be transformative. An adverse ruling would likely render invalid the 50% tariff regime currently imposed on Indian goods, requiring the administration to either:

(1) Refund collected tariffs (estimated at approximately $487 million on Indian goods alone);​

(2) Re-impose tariffs under an alternative legal authority (such as Section 232 or Section 301), which would require either an investigative process or a finding of specific unfair trade practices;​

(3) Negotiate bilateral trade agreements to replace the IEEPA-based unilateral regime;​

(4) Accept that India receives de facto relief pending the administration’s deployment of alternative authorities.

For India, a Supreme Court victory would reset the negotiating dynamic. Rather than negotiating under the shadow of unilateral 50% tariffs, India and the United States could engage on a more level playing field. India could credibly argue that the previous tariff regime was unconstitutional and unenforceable, clearing the path for genuine bilateral trade negotiations aimed at mutual benefit rather than submission to U.S. demands.

Moreover, an adverse ruling for Trump would vindicate India’s public position throughout the tariff crisis: that India’s strategic autonomy and energy policy decisions should not be subordinated to American trade demands, and that India remains a valued strategic partner in the Quad and Indian Ocean governance rather than a subordinate state subject to unilateral American economic coercion.​

F. India’s Diplomatic Hedging

Anticipating the possibility of IEEPA tariffs being struck down, India has pursued several parallel strategies:

(1) WTO Consultations: India has initiated formal consultations with the WTO regarding the legality of U.S. tariffs under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), creating a multilateral legal record of the dispute.​

(2) Export Diversification: Indian exporters have begun redirecting shipments toward alternative markets, including the UAE and China, partially offsetting the U.S. tariff impact.​

(3) Diplomatic Engagement: Modi has maintained engagement with Trump while publicly defending India’s strategic autonomy, seeking to preserve the relationship while signaling that India will not yield on fundamental foreign policy decisions.​

(4) Sectoral Support: The Indian government has announced targeted measures to support MSMEs and labor-intensive export sectors facing tariff pressure, including working capital support and export insurance.​

X. Timeline and Procedural Considerations

A. Ruling Timing

While the Trump administration requested expedited consideration, the Supreme Court has not announced a timeline for its decision. Historically, the Court takes several months to issue decisions following oral arguments. Given the complexity of the case and the stakes involved, a ruling before the end of 2025 is possible but not certain.​​

However, Trump has warned the Court that delay itself could impose costs, arguing that further months of tariff uncertainty could trigger cascading economic damage. The uncertainty regarding timing creates a prolonged period of commercial and diplomatic limbo.​​[14]

B. The Refund Question

If the supreme court strikes down the trump’s IEEPA tariffs, a critical unresolved question is whether the United States would be required to refund the $89-100 billion in tariffs collected to date. The administration has indicated that any refund process would be protracted and complex, likely suggesting resistance to immediate full reimbursement.​​

This issue carries both domestic and international implications. U.S. importers and affected foreign governments could claim entitlement to refunds, creating administrative chaos and litigation.​[1][3]

XI. Conclusion: Constitutional Separation of Powers and the Future of Presidential Emergency Authority

The Trump tariff case represents a watershed moment for American constitutional law. At issue is not merely whether IEEPA authorizes the particular tariffs at stake, but whether the Constitution’s assignment of taxing power to Congress remains meaningful in the era of executive emergency authority—a conflict now brought into sharp focus as Trump’s use of IEEPA for sweeping tariffs comes under direct scrutiny at the Supreme Court.

The evidence before the Supreme Court is overwhelming. The text of IEEPA contains no authorization for tariffs. The statutory history demonstrates that Congress deliberately constrained presidential emergency power in response to Nixon’s 1971 adventure. The historical practice shows that no president until Trump interpreted IEEPA as authorizing comprehensive tariff regimes. The constitutional structure assigns commerce regulation and taxation to Congress. And the major questions doctrine requires clear congressional authorization for actions of vast economic and political significance.

Against this evidence, the Trump administration offers only the word “regulate,” which it contends encompasses unlimited tariff authority. Justice Kagan’s bon mot captured the inadequacy of this approach: IEEPA has many verbs, but not the one the administration wants.

The Supreme Court’s own expressed skepticism during oral arguments suggests an unfavorable ruling is probable. Prediction markets have adjusted sharply downward, reflecting traders’ assessment that the Court will likely strike down the IEEPA tariffs. Should the administration lose—as the betting markets currently suggest is probable—the Court would signal important limits on executive emergency power and reassert Congress’s constitutional role in trade and taxation.

For India, such a ruling would offer an unexpected reprieve. India would transition from being subjected to punitive 50% unilateral tariffs to negotiating a bilateral trade framework on more equal footing. This would vindicate India’s insistence on strategic autonomy and create space for genuine trade negotiations focused on mutual benefit rather than American economic coercion.

Ultimately, the tariff case will reveal whether the Roberts Court is willing to apply its major questions doctrine evenhandedly—including against presidents of its own party—or whether the doctrine has become merely another tool of political expedience. The Court’s answer will resonate far beyond trade policy, shaping the contours of presidential power for generations to come.

References

[1] US Supreme Court Slams Trump Tariffs! Scott Bessent’s Plan B! India To Get Better US Deal? Kinjal Available at: US Supreme Court Slams Trump Tariffs! Scott Bessent’s Plan B! India To Get Better US Deal? Kinjal

[2] Big test for Donald Trump: US Supreme Court raises doubts on legality of reciprocal tariffs – but will they be struck down?  Available at: Big test for Donald Trump: US Supreme Court raises doubts on legality of reciprocal tariffs – but will they be struck down? – The Times of India

[3] Conservative justices sharply question Trump tariffs in high-stakes hearing Available at: Supreme Court justices sharply question Trump tariffs in hearing

[4] what happens if-trumps tariffs are struck down bessent mentions plan b a look at 5

Fallback options Available at: What happens if Trump’s tariffs are struck down? Bessent mentions ‘Plan B’ | A look at 5 fallback options

[5] On Tariffs and Constitutional Structure Available at: On Tariffs and Constitutional Structure | ACS

[6] Supreme Court Oral Argument: IEEPA Tariffs and Presidential Power Available at:

Supreme Court Oral Argument: IEEPA Tariffs and Presidential Power

[7] Odds surge Supreme Court will strike down Trump’s tariffs Available at:

Odds surge Supreme Court will strike down Trump’s tariffs – Asia Times

[8] What’s at Stake in the Supreme Court Tariffs Case   Available at:

What’s at Stake in the Supreme Court Tariffs Case | Brennan Center for Justice

[9] A Time Machine and a Bag of Hammers: U.S. Tariffs are not Over Available at:

A Time Machine and a Bag of Hammers: U.S. Tariffs are not Over | Global Trade Law Blog

[10] US Supreme Court justices grill lawyer for Trump on legality of tariffs Available at: US Supreme Court justices grill lawyer for Trump on legality of tariffs | Donald Trump News | Al Jazeera

[11] A Guide to Trump’s Section 232 Tariffs, in Maps  Available at: A Guide to Trump’s Section 232 Tariffs, in Maps | Council on Foreign Relations

[12] Section 301 Tariffs: A Complete Guide Available at: Section 301 Tariffs: A Complete Guide – Shapiro

[13] US Tariff on India: Impact, Affected Products, Rates & India’s Response Available at: US Tariff on India: Impact, Affected Products, Rates and India’s Response

[14] Supreme Court tariff arguments, as they happened Available at: Supreme Court tariff arguments, as they happened | Reuters