Motive Insignificant When Direct Evidence In Form Of Dying Declaration Exists: Supreme Court

Introduction

The Indian judicial system places extraordinary evidentiary weight on dying declarations, recognizing them as one of the most reliable forms of testimony in criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court of India recently reinforced this principle in the landmark case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, where a bench comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice R. Mahadevan held that when credible and trustworthy dying declarations exist as direct evidence, the absence of conclusive proof of motive does not weaken the prosecution’s case. This judgment represents a significant reaffirmation of established legal principles while providing clarity on the interplay between motive, circumstantial evidence, and direct testimony in murder trials.

The ruling overturned the acquittal granted by the Himachal Pradesh High Court and restored the trial court’s conviction of Chaman Lal under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for murdering his wife Saro Devi by setting her ablaze. The High Court had doubted the dying declaration based on minor procedural discrepancies, but the Supreme Court categorically rejected this approach, holding that courts must not discard crucial evidence on speculative or hyper-technical grounds. This decision underscores the judiciary’s commitment to ensuring that justice prevails even when traditional elements like motive are not established with mathematical precision.

Understanding Dying Declarations Under Indian Law

The legal framework governing dying declarations in India is primarily enshrined in Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which provides an exception to the general rule against hearsay evidence[1]. This provision states that when a statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not at the time when they were made under expectation of death. The foundation of this exception rests on the ancient maxim “nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri,” which translates to “a man will not meet his maker with a lie on his mouth.”

Dying declarations occupy a unique position in evidentiary law because they are admissible despite being hearsay. The rationale behind this exception is twofold: necessity and trustworthiness. In homicide cases, the victim is often the only eyewitness to the crime, and exclusion of their statement would defeat the ends of justice. Furthermore, the law presumes that a person facing imminent death has no motive to fabricate testimony, as worldly considerations cease to hold significance when confronting mortality. This presumption of truthfulness distinguishes dying declarations from other forms of evidence that require corroboration.

Unlike common law jurisdictions where dying declarations are admissible only in criminal proceedings and require the declarant to be under expectation of death, Indian law has adopted a broader approach. Under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, the declaration is relevant irrespective of whether the declarant was under expectation of death at the time of making the statement[2]. This wider scope reflects the pragmatic needs of the Indian justice system and the recognition that victims may not always have time to contemplate their mortality before succumbing to their injuries.

The Chaman Lal Case: Facts and Judicial Journey

The case originated from a tragic incident that occurred on December 7, 2009, in Village Rampur, District Chamba, Himachal Pradesh. Chaman Lal allegedly poured kerosene on his wife Saro Devi and set her on fire following a domestic dispute. The couple had married in 2002, but their relationship was marred by persistent discord, with the accused frequently doubting his wife’s character and subjecting her to verbal abuse and humiliation. On the day of the incident, after calling her derogatory names including “Kanjri” (woman of bad character), Chaman Lal committed the horrific act that would ultimately claim Saro Devi’s life.

Following the attack, Saro Devi was rushed to the District Hospital, Chamba, where she received medical treatment for severe burn injuries. On December 8, 2009, the Tehsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate recorded her dying declaration after obtaining medical certification that she was conscious and fit to make a statement. In this declaration, Saro Devi categorically stated that her husband had set her on fire after insulting her character. Despite medical intervention, she succumbed to her burn injuries on January 15, 2010, transforming what began as an attempted murder into a case of culpable homicide amounting to murder.

The Sessions Judge, Chamba, convicted Chaman Lal under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code on July 16, 2010, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The trial court placed significant reliance on the dying declaration, finding it to be voluntary, truthful, and reliable. However, on appeal, the Himachal Pradesh High Court reversed this conviction on August 26, 2014, acquitting the accused. The High Court expressed doubts about the dying declaration on two primary grounds: an alleged inconsistency regarding the time at which the Tehsildar arrived at the hospital to record the statement, and uncertainty about whether the Tehsildar personally recorded the statement or merely dictated it to a clerk.

The State of Himachal Pradesh, dissatisfied with the acquittal, appealed to the Supreme Court. The apex court, after examining the evidence and the legal principles governing dying declarations, found that the High Court had committed a manifest error in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court emphasized that minor discrepancies of the nature highlighted by the High Court do not create any dent in the credibility of an otherwise reliable dying declaration, particularly when recorded by a competent authority under proper safeguards.

Motive in Criminal Law: Significance and Limitations

Motive refers to the reason or purpose that prompts an individual to commit a particular act. In criminal jurisprudence, establishing motive can strengthen the prosecution’s case by providing a logical explanation for why the accused would commit the alleged offense. Courts have traditionally viewed proof of motive as a circumstance that adds credibility to the prosecution’s narrative, particularly in cases where the evidence is primarily circumstantial. When direct evidence is lacking, demonstrating that the accused had a compelling reason to commit the crime can help establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

However, Indian law has consistently held that proof of motive is not an essential ingredient for conviction in murder cases. While motive may enhance the prosecution’s case, its absence does not create a fatal flaw when other evidence conclusively establishes guilt. The Supreme Court in Chaman Lal’s case reiterated this principle, stating that motive assumes significance primarily in cases based on circumstantial evidence[3]. Where there is direct evidence in the form of a credible and trustworthy dying declaration, the absence of strong proof of motive is not fatal to the prosecution case.

This distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is crucial. In cases relying on circumstantial evidence, where guilt must be inferred from a chain of proven facts, motive serves as an important link in that chain. It helps answer the fundamental question of why the accused would commit the crime, thereby strengthening the inference of guilt. However, when direct evidence positively identifies the perpetrator and describes the commission of the offense, the question of motive becomes secondary. The testimony itself provides the necessary proof, regardless of whether the underlying reason for the crime has been fully explained.

The Supreme Court in the Chaman Lal judgment observed that in the present case, the evidence on record disclosed that Chaman Lal subjected Saro Devi to frequent quarrels, humiliation, and verbal abuse, including branding her a woman of bad character and repeatedly asking her to leave the matrimonial home. The dying declaration itself referred to persistent matrimonial discord and ill-treatment, thereby furnishing a plausible background for the commission of the offense. The Court further noted that the prosecution is not required to establish motive with mathematical precision, and failure to conclusively prove motive does not weaken an otherwise reliable and cogent case.

Evidentiary Value and Reliability of Dying Declarations

The Supreme Court has developed a robust jurisprudence on the evidentiary value of dying declarations through numerous precedents. The landmark case of Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay established the fundamental principle that there is no absolute rule of law, or even a rule of prudence, that a dying declaration unless corroborated by other independent evidence is not fit to be acted upon and made the basis of conviction[4]. This decision marked a significant departure from the more cautious approach that had prevailed in some quarters, where courts insisted on corroboration as a matter of prudence if not law.

The rationale articulated in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay was that dying declarations stand on the same footing as other pieces of evidence and must be judged in light of surrounding circumstances with reference to principles governing the weight of evidence. The supreme court Court emphasized that necessity for corroboration does not arise from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, but from the fact that in a given case, the court has come to the conclusion that particular dying declaration was not free from infirmities. If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is truthful, voluntary, and free from external influence, it can form the sole basis for conviction without requiring additional corroborative evidence.

Building upon this foundation, the Supreme Court in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra addressed critical questions regarding the procedural requirements for recording dying declarations[5]. The supreme court Court held that there is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate, and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate, there is no specified statutory form for such recording. What evidential value or weight is to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The essential requirement is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind.

The Laxman judgment further clarified that where it is proved by the testimony of the magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor, the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution, and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise. This pragmatic approach recognizes that in emergency situations, insistence on rigid formalities might result in valuable testimony being lost forever.

Courts must evaluate dying declarations by considering several factors to determine their reliability. These include the opportunity of the dying person for observation, the amount of light at the site of the incident if the crime was committed at night, the possibility of tutoring or external influence, inconsistencies in multiple declarations if several opportunities were given to make statements, and whether the capacity of the person to remember facts had been impaired at the time of making the statement. The physical and mental condition of the declarant at the time of making the statement is of paramount importance, as this directly affects the reliability of the testimony.

Application of Legal Principles in the Chaman Lal Case

The Supreme Court in the Chaman Lal case meticulously examined the dying declaration made by Saro Devi against the backdrop of established legal principles. The Court found that the statement was recorded by the Tehsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate, a competent and neutral public officer, after obtaining medical certification that the patient was conscious and fit to make a statement. The magistrate’s testimony confirmed that he had personally questioned Saro Devi to ascertain her mental fitness before recording her declaration. These procedural safeguards ensured that the statement was taken under proper circumstances that enhanced its reliability.

Addressing the High Court’s concerns about the time discrepancy, the Supreme Court observed that the Tehsildar and the Deputy Superintendent of Police had consistently deposed that the statement was recorded around 11:00-11:15 a.m. The Court noted that minor variations in the recollection of exact timings by different witnesses do not ipso facto render the dying declaration unreliable, particularly when the core facts remain consistent. Such discrepancies are natural consequences of human memory and do not indicate fabrication or unreliability unless they go to the root of the matter.

The Supreme Court also rejected the High Court’s doubt about whether the Tehsildar personally recorded the statement or merely dictated it to a clerk. The supreme Court emphasized that the law does not prescribe any rigid format for recording dying declarations, and what matters is whether the statement truly reflects the words and intentions of the declarant. The magistrate’s testimony that he had recorded the statement after satisfying himself about Saro Devi’s fitness was sufficient to establish the authenticity of the declaration.

Crucially, the Supreme Court examined the content of the dying declaration itself, which provided a detailed account of the incident and clearly identified Chaman Lal as the perpetrator. Saro Devi had stated that her husband poured kerosene on her and set her on fire after verbally abusing her. This straightforward narrative, recorded soon after the incident while the events were fresh in her mind, bore the hallmarks of truthfulness. The declaration was also consistent with the nature of injuries observed by the medical professionals, further corroborating its reliability.

Implications and Broader Legal Significance

The Supreme Court’s decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal carries significant implications for the administration of criminal justice in India. By reaffirming that motive is not indispensable when credible direct evidence exists, the Court has reinforced the principle that convictions should rest on the strength of evidence rather than on the satisfaction of non-essential elements. This approach prevents accused persons from escaping justice merely because the prosecution cannot establish why they committed the crime, provided there is reliable evidence establishing that they did commit it.

The judgment also serves as an important reminder to appellate courts about the limits of their interference with trial court findings. The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for discarding crucial evidence on speculative and hyper-technical grounds, emphasizing that appellate courts should not reverse convictions based on minor discrepancies that do not affect the core reliability of the evidence. This principle is essential for maintaining consistency in judicial decision-making and ensuring that technicalities do not triumph over substantive justice.

Furthermore, the supreme court decision provides valuable guidance on evaluating dying declarations in domestic violence cases. The supreme Court’s observation that the dying declaration itself referred to persistent matrimonial discord and ill-treatment, thereby furnishing a plausible background for the commission of the offense, demonstrates how such declarations can serve dual purposes. They not only identify the perpetrator but also provide context for understanding the crime, which is particularly important in cases involving intimate partner violence where the full history of abuse may not always be documented.

Comparative Analysis with International Jurisprudence

While Indian law has adopted a relatively liberal approach to dying declarations, it is instructive to compare this with the treatment of such evidence in other common law jurisdictions. In English law, dying declarations were historically admissible only in cases of murder or manslaughter, and only when the declarant was under a settled hopeless expectation of death. These restrictions have been largely superseded in England by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which abolished the common law dying declaration exception and replaced it with broader statutory provisions for admitting hearsay evidence when the declarant is unavailable.

In the United States, the Federal Rules of Evidence recognize dying declarations under Rule 804(b)(2), which permits their admission in both criminal homicide prosecutions and civil actions. However, unlike Indian law, American jurisprudence requires that the declarant must have believed death was imminent when making the statement. This requirement of subjective belief in impending death creates a higher threshold for admissibility compared to the Indian approach, which focuses more on the relevance of the statement to the cause of death rather than the declarant’s state of mind.

The Indian approach reflects a pragmatic recognition of the unique challenges faced by the criminal justice system in a vast and diverse country. By not requiring proof that the declarant was under expectation of death, Indian law avoids the artificial exclusion of valuable testimony that might otherwise be lost due to the sudden or unexpected nature of death. This broader framework has enabled courts to admit dying declarations even in cases where the victim initially survived for some time but later succumbed to their injuries, ensuring that their testimony is not rendered inadmissible merely because they did not immediately recognize the gravity of their condition.

Safeguards Against Misuse

While dying declarations enjoy substantial evidentiary weight in Indian criminal law, the judiciary has established important safeguards to prevent their misuse. Courts have consistently emphasized that dying declarations must be subjected to close scrutiny, keeping in view that the statement was made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity to test its veracity through cross-examination. This heightened scrutiny is essential because the declarant is not available for questioning, and the accused cannot challenge the testimony through the normal adversarial process.

The requirement that the person recording the dying declaration must be satisfied about the declarant’s fitness to make the statement serves as a crucial safeguard. This assessment should ideally be supported by medical certification, although as established in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, the absence of such certification is not fatal if other evidence demonstrates that the declarant was conscious and capable of making a coherent statement. The person recording the statement should also take care to ensure that the declarant is not being influenced or tutored, and that the statement truly reflects their own words and observations.

Courts have also recognized that dying declarations are not gospel truth and must be evaluated like any other evidence. In cases where multiple dying declarations exist, courts must examine them for consistency and reconcile any discrepancies. If the inconsistencies are fundamental and irreconcilable, the reliability of the declarations may be called into question. However, minor variations that do not affect the core narrative are not sufficient to discard otherwise credible statements.

Procedural Best Practices for Recording Dying Declarations

The Indian legal system has evolved certain best practices for recording dying declarations, even though strict compliance is not mandated by law. Ideally, a dying declaration should be recorded by a Judicial Magistrate, as this ensures independence and reduces the likelihood of influence by investigating authorities. The magistrate should personally assess the declarant’s fitness by asking preliminary questions to determine whether they are conscious, coherent, and capable of understanding and responding to questions.

Medical certification confirming the declarant’s fitness is highly desirable and adds to the reliability of the statement. The certificate should ideally state that the declarant is not only conscious but also in a fit state of mind to make a statement. The dying declaration should be recorded in a question-and-answer format wherever possible, as this allows for clarity and reduces ambiguity. The declarant’s responses should be recorded verbatim to the extent practicable, preserving their exact words rather than paraphrasing or summarizing.

When recording the dying declaration, the person taking the statement should avoid leading questions that might suggest answers or influence the declarant’s testimony. The declaration should be read back to the declarant for confirmation, and their signature or thumb impression should be obtained if possible. Witnesses to the recording should also append their signatures, providing additional authentication. These procedural safeguards, while not mandatory, significantly enhance the credibility and reliability of dying declarations.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal represents a significant reaffirmation of fundamental principles governing dying declarations and their role in the Indian criminal justice system. By holding that motive assumes significance primarily in circumstantial evidence cases and that credible direct evidence in the form of a trustworthy dying declaration can sustain conviction without proof of motive, the Court has reinforced the primacy of reliable evidence over non-essential elements. This approach ensures that justice is not defeated by the inability to establish why a crime was committed, provided there is credible proof that it was committed and by whom.

The judgment also serves as an important reminder about the need for courts to evaluate evidence holistically rather than focusing on minor discrepancies or procedural technicalities. The Supreme Court’s criticism of the High Court for discarding crucial evidence on speculative and hyper-technical grounds underscores the principle that appellate courts should exercise restraint in interfering with trial court findings unless there are substantial reasons to do so. This promotes consistency and predictability in judicial decision-making while ensuring that the quest for perfection does not undermine the pursuit of justice.

As the Indian legal system continues to evolve, the principles articulated in this judgment will serve as valuable guidance for trial courts, appellate courts, and investigating authorities dealing with cases involving dying declarations. The decision reinforces that dying declarations, when properly recorded and evaluated, constitute reliable and sufficient evidence for conviction, embodying the law’s recognition that truth sits upon the lips of a dying person. This principle, rooted in ancient wisdom and validated through modern jurisprudence, continues to play a vital role in ensuring that victims of heinous crimes receive justice even when they cannot personally testify in court.

References

[1] Legal Service India. (n.d.). Dying Declaration-Section 32(1) of Indian Evidence Act. Retrieved from https://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/1682/Dying-Declaration-Section-32(1)-of-Indian-Evidence-Act.html 

[2] WritingLaw. (2023). What Is Dying Declaration Under the Indian Evidence Act. Retrieved from https://www.writinglaw.com/dying-declaration-under-evidence-act/ 

[3] Daily Pioneer. (2025). Trustworthy dying declaration in absence of strong proof of motive not fatal to prosecution case: SC. Retrieved from https://dailypioneer.com/news/trustworthy-dying-declaration-in-absence-of-strong-proof-of-motive-not-fatal-to-prosecution-case-sc 

[4] Drishti Judiciary. (n.d.). Kushal Rao v. The State of Bombay, 1958 AIR 22. Retrieved from https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/landmark-judgement/kushal-rao-v-the-state-of-bombay-1958-air-22 

[5] Indian Kanoon. (2002). Laxman vs State Of Maharashtra on 27 February, 2002. Retrieved from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/375231/ 

[6] Law Trend. (2025). Dying Declaration Cannot be Discarded on Speculative or Hyper-Technical Grounds: Supreme Court. Retrieved from https://lawtrend.in/dying-declaration-cannot-be-discarded-on-speculative-or-hyper-technical-grounds-supreme-court/ 

[7] Cornell Law School. (n.d.). Dying declaration. Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dying_declaration 

[8] LawBhoomi. (2024). Kushal Rao vs The State of Bombay. Retrieved from https://lawbhoomi.com/kushal-rao-vs-the-state-of-bombay/