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Understanding the Doctrine of Repugnancy in Indian Constitutional Law
Introduction
The Constitution of India establishes an intricate balance between the legislative powers of the Union and the States through a federal structure that divides authority across three distinct lists enumerated in Schedule VII. This division, while necessary for effective governance, sometimes creates situations where laws enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures overlap or contradict each other. To resolve such conflicts and maintain constitutional harmony, the framers incorporated the doctrine of repugnancy under Articles 251 and 254 of the Constitution. This doctrine serves as a fundamental mechanism that determines which law shall prevail when both the Union and a State have legislated on the same subject matter, particularly concerning entries in the Concurrent List.
The doctrine of repugnancy addresses the most fundamental question in federal governance: when two legislative authorities, both acting within their constitutional powers, enact conflicting laws on the same subject, which legislation should be given effect? This question becomes particularly acute in India’s quasi-federal structure where the Constitution seeks to balance state autonomy with national unity. Through judicial interpretation spanning over seven decades, Indian courts have developed a sophisticated jurisprudence around this doctrine, clarifying its scope, application, and limitations.
Constitutional Framework: Article 254
The primary constitutional provision governing the doctrine of repugnancy is Article 254, which addresses inconsistencies between laws made by Parliament and laws made by State Legislatures. This article, derived from Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935, establishes the fundamental principle that when a State law conflicts with a Parliamentary law on a subject in the Concurrent List, the Parliamentary law shall prevail.[1]
Article 254(1) provides that if any provision of a State law is repugnant to any provision of a Parliamentary law which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any existing law concerning matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then the Parliamentary law shall prevail and the State law shall be void to the extent of the repugnancy. This provision applies regardless of whether the Parliamentary law was passed before or after the State law. The principle embedded here reflects the supremacy of Parliamentary legislation in matters where both Parliament and State Legislatures have concurrent jurisdiction.
However, Article 254(2) introduces a significant exception to this general rule. It stipulates that where a State law on a Concurrent List matter contains provisions repugnant to an earlier Parliamentary law or existing law, the State law shall prevail within that State if it has been reserved for the President’s consideration and has received Presidential assent.[2] This exception recognizes the federal character of the Constitution by allowing States to enact legislation that may differ from Union laws, provided they secure Presidential approval. Nevertheless, the proviso to Article 254(2) restores Parliamentary supremacy by providing that Parliament may at any time enact legislation on the same matter, including laws that add to, amend, vary, or repeal the State law.
The distinction between the effects of repugnancy under Articles 251 and 254 is particularly noteworthy. While Article 251 renders a State law merely inoperative during the currency of Parliamentary legislation under Articles 249 and 250, Article 254 declares the conflicting State law void to the extent of repugnancy. This means that under Article 251, the State law can revive automatically once the overriding Parliamentary law ceases to have effect, whereas under Article 254, the State law becomes permanently void unless re-enacted.
Article 251 and Emergency Provisions
Article 251 deals with a more specific type of repugnancy that arises when Parliament exercises its special legislative powers under Articles 249 and 250. Article 249 empowers Parliament to legislate on State List matters when the Council of States passes a resolution by a two-thirds majority declaring that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest for Parliament to make laws on a specified State List subject.[3] Article 250 grants Parliament similar powers during a Proclamation of Emergency to legislate on any State List matter. These provisions represent temporary invasions of state legislative domain justified by exceptional circumstances of national importance or emergency.
When Parliament exercises these extraordinary powers, Article 251 provides that State laws on the same subject become inoperative to the extent of their repugnancy with the Parliamentary law. However, this inoperativeness is temporary. The State law remains dormant but retains potential vitality, ready to spring back into operation once the Parliamentary law ceases to have effect. Under Article 250(2), laws made by Parliament during an emergency cease to have effect six months after the Proclamation of Emergency ends, except for actions already taken or omitted under such laws.[4] This temporal limitation distinguishes Article 251 repugnancy from the more permanent void created under Article 254.
The framers designed this mechanism to ensure that during periods of national crisis or when matters of national importance arise, the Union can exercise overriding legislative authority without permanently displacing state laws. Once the emergency or exceptional circumstance passes, the federal balance restores automatically, and state legislation regains its force without requiring re-enactment.
Tests for Determining Repugnancy
The Supreme Court has developed sophisticated tests to determine when repugnancy exists between Union and State laws. The landmark judgment in M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India (1979) articulated the foundational principles that continue to guide courts in assessing repugnancy.[5] The Court held that repugnancy arises when provisions of a Central Act and a State Act are fully inconsistent and absolutely irreconcilable, making it impossible to obey one without disobeying the other.
The Supreme Court identified three primary situations where repugnancy can be established. First, when there is direct conflict between the provisions such that following one law necessarily means violating the other. This represents the clearest case of repugnancy. Second, when Parliament has intended to lay down an exhaustive and complete code on the subject matter, thereby replacing any existing State legislation. Third, when both laws occupy the same field, even if there is no direct contradiction in their specific provisions. This third test recognizes that comprehensive legislation by Parliament on a subject may leave no room for concurrent state legislation, even if technical inconsistencies are absent.
In Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1959), the Supreme Court provided further clarity on the occupied field doctrine.[6] The Court examined the Uttar Pradesh Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955, which provided for nationalization of motor transport services, against the backdrop of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which Parliament had amended in 1956 to include similar provisions. The Court held that when Parliament amended the central law to cover the same field as the state law, the state legislation became void due to repugnancy, even though the laws could theoretically be obeyed simultaneously. The Court recognized that when Parliament legislates comprehensively on a subject in the Concurrent List, it occupies the field, rendering inconsistent state laws void.
The case of Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay (1954) illustrated repugnancy arising from different penalties prescribed for the same offense.[7] The State of Bombay had enacted legislation prescribing a maximum punishment of seven years imprisonment for violations of essential commodities regulations, while the Central Act provided for only three years imprisonment. The Supreme Court held this to be a case of repugnancy because it was impossible to reconcile the two penalty provisions when both applied to the same offense. Even though both laws could technically be obeyed in terms of the prohibited conduct, the different consequences made them irreconcilable. This decision established that repugnancy can exist not only when laws command different actions but also when they prescribe different legal consequences for the same conduct.
The Role of Presidential Assent
The mechanism of Presidential assent under Article 254(2) serves as a crucial safeguard of federal autonomy within India’s constitutional framework. This provision acknowledges that while Parliamentary supremacy must generally prevail on Concurrent List matters, States should have the flexibility to enact legislation suited to their particular circumstances, even if such legislation conflicts with existing Union laws. By requiring Presidential assent, the Constitution ensures that such deviations from national uniformity receive scrutiny at the highest level and do not undermine national interests.
However, the protection afforded by Presidential assent is not absolute. The proviso to Article 254(2) makes clear that Parliament retains the ultimate authority to legislate on Concurrent List matters. Even after a State law has received Presidential assent and prevails within the State, Parliament may subsequently enact legislation on the same subject that overrides the State law. This arrangement reflects the Constitution’s careful calibration of federal relations, granting States meaningful autonomy while preserving Parliamentary supremacy in matters of national importance.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List” in Article 254(2) to require substantial connection between the State law and the Concurrent List subject. It is not sufficient that the State law merely touches upon a Concurrent List matter; the legislation must be fundamentally concerned with that subject.[8] This interpretation prevents States from circumventing Parliamentary supremacy by claiming that laws primarily dealing with State List subjects incidentally relate to the Concurrent List.
Distinction from Related Doctrines
The doctrine of repugnancy must be distinguished from the doctrine of pith and substance, though both concern conflicts between Union and State legislation. The doctrine of pith and substance applies when determining the legislative competence of Parliament or a State Legislature. When legislation appears to encroach upon matters outside the enacting body’s constitutional authority, courts apply the pith and substance doctrine to examine the true character and substance of the legislation. If the law’s dominant purpose falls within the legislature’s competence, incidental encroachment on other areas does not invalidate it.
The doctrine of repugnancy, in contrast, assumes that both Parliament and the State Legislature were acting within their respective legislative competence but have enacted conflicting laws on the same subject. The question is not whether either body had authority to legislate, but which law should prevail given that both were validly enacted. The M. Karunanidhi judgment clarified that the pith and substance doctrine can help resolve conflicts where laws from different lists appear to overlap, while repugnancy addresses conflicts when both legislatures have validly exercised concurrent jurisdiction.[9]
Similarly, repugnancy differs from the ultra vires doctrine. When legislation is struck down as ultra vires, the enacting body lacked constitutional authority to make that law. The legislation is void from inception because it exceeded legislative competence. With repugnancy, both laws are within their respective legislature’s competence. The State law becomes void not because the State Legislature lacked authority to enact it, but because Parliamentary law prevails under the constitutional scheme when both have legislated on concurrent subjects.
Severability and Extent of Repugnancy
An important aspect of Article 254(1) is the phrase “to the extent of the repugnancy.” This language incorporates the principle of severability, recognizing that not every part of a State law conflicting with a Parliamentary law need be struck down. Courts are required to preserve as much of the State legislation as possible, invalidating only those specific provisions that are actually repugnant to the Parliamentary law. This approach reflects judicial respect for legislative efforts and the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to all legislation.
The severability principle requires courts to undertake careful analysis to identify precisely which provisions of the State law conflict with Parliamentary legislation and which can stand independently. If the non-repugnant provisions can operate meaningfully without the repugnant portions, and if they would have been enacted by the legislature even without the invalid portions, those provisions should be preserved. This approach ensures that State legislative efforts are not unnecessarily nullified and that the scope of federal preemption extends no further than constitutionally required.
Impact on Federal Relations
The doctrine of repugnancy plays a vital role in maintaining India’s federal structure. By establishing clear rules for resolving conflicts between Union and State legislation, it prevents the chaos that would result if contradictory laws on the same subject could coexist. At the same time, by allowing State laws to prevail with Presidential assent and by limiting repugnancy to the extent of actual conflict, the doctrine preserves meaningful state autonomy.
The requirement of Presidential assent for State laws under Article 254(2) creates a deliberative process that can accommodate legitimate state interests while protecting national uniformity where necessary. This mechanism has allowed States to enact progressive legislation addressing local conditions while ensuring such laws receive scrutiny to prevent fragmentation of national policy on matters of broad concern.
Contemporary Application
Recent jurisprudence continues to refine the doctrine’s application. In Forum for Peoples Collective Efforts v. State of West Bengal (2021), the Supreme Court struck down the West Bengal Housing Industry Regulation Act, 2017, for repugnancy with the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016. The Court found that the State Act virtually replicated the Central Act with minor variations, constituting repugnancy under the occupied field doctrine even absent direct contradictions.
This judgment demonstrates that courts remain vigilant against State legislation that essentially duplicates Parliamentary enactments on Concurrent List matters without Presidential assent, even when States argue they are addressing local circumstances. The decision reinforces that States must either work within the framework of Parliamentary legislation or secure Presidential assent for divergent approaches.
Conclusion
The doctrine of repugnancy represents a carefully calibrated constitutional mechanism that balances the need for national uniformity with respect for state autonomy in India’s federal system. By establishing Parliamentary supremacy on Concurrent List matters while preserving state legislative authority through the Presidential assent mechanism, Articles 251 and 254 create a framework that has successfully managed potential conflicts over seven decades. The sophisticated jurisprudence developed by Indian courts has provided clarity on when repugnancy exists and how it should be resolved, ensuring legal certainty while maintaining flexibility to address evolving federal dynamics. As India’s federal relations continue to develop, the doctrine of repugnancy will remain essential to maintaining constitutional harmony between the Union and the States.
References
[1] Indian Kanoon, “Article 254 in Constitution of India,” https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1930681/
[2] Legal Service India, “The Doctrine of Repugnancy In The Indian Constitution,” https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-964-the-doctrine-of-repugnancy-in-the-indian-constitution.html
[3] Testbook, “Article 251 of Indian Constitution: Inconsistency Between Central Laws,” https://testbook.com/constitutional-articles/article-251-of-indian-constitution
[4] Rules Era, “Article 250: Power of Parliament to Legislate During Emergency,” https://rulesera.com/constitution/part-xi/legislative-relations/article250.php
[5] Drishti Judiciary, “M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India (1979),” https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/landmark-judgement/indian-penal-code/m-karunanidhi-v-union-of-india-1979
[6] Law Bhoomi, “Deep Chand vs State of UP (1959),” https://lawbhoomi.com/deep-chand-vs-state-of-up-1959/
[7] Indian Kanoon, “Zaverbhai Amaidas vs The State Of Bombay,” https://indiankanoon.org/doc/345466/
[8] iPleaders, “Concept of repugnancy under Article 254: an insight,” https://blog.ipleaders.in/concept-repugnancy-article-254-insight/
[9] Law Bhoomi, “M. Karunanidhi v Union of India,” https://lawbhoomi.com/m-karunanidhi-v-union-of-india/
