Extension of Time under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act: High Court Jurisdiction Explained

 

Introduction

The jurisdiction of courts in extending time limits for arbitration proceedings has emerged as one of the most contentious issues in Indian arbitration law. The introduction of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act through the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 marked a paradigm shift in arbitration practice by prescribing mandatory timelines for the completion of arbitral proceedings and by authorising judicial intervention for the extension of time under the statutory framework governing arbitration. This legislative intervention was intended to address the chronic delays that had long plagued arbitral processes and to restore arbitration as a swift and efficient dispute resolution mechanism. However, the interpretation of this provision—particularly with respect to which court is competent to exercise jurisdiction under Section 29A and whether such extensions may be granted after the expiry of prescribed timelines has generated significant and often conflicting judicial debate across various High Courts in India.

Legislative Framework: Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 establishes a structured timeline framework for arbitration proceedings. The provision mandates that in domestic arbitrations, the arbitral award must be made within twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under Section 23(4) of the Act [1]. This twelve-month period represents the primary timeline within which arbitral tribunals are expected to conclude proceedings and deliver their awards.

The statutory framework further provides that parties may, through mutual consent, extend this initial period by an additional six months under Section 29A(3). This consensual extension mechanism reflects the legislature’s recognition of party autonomy while maintaining temporal discipline in arbitration proceedings. However, the Act explicitly prohibits any further extension beyond these eighteen months through party consent alone.

Section 29A(4) contains the crucial provision that has sparked considerable judicial interpretation. It states that if the award is not made within the specified period, “the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period” [2]. This language, particularly the phrase “either prior to or after the expiry,” has become the focal point of divergent judicial opinions across Indian High Courts.

The provision further incorporates safeguards against abuse through Section 29A(5), which requires parties seeking extensions to demonstrate “sufficient cause” for the delay. The power of courts to grant an extension of time under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act ensures that such safeguards are enforceable while maintaining the integrity of arbitral proceedings. Courts are empowered to impose terms and conditions while granting extensions, and under Section 29A(8), they may impose actual or exemplary costs upon parties. Where delays are attributable to the arbitral tribunal itself, courts may order fee reductions not exceeding five percent for each month of delay.

The Jurisdictional Conundrum: Which Court Can Entertain Extension Applications

A fundamental question that has divided judicial opinion concerns which court possesses jurisdiction to entertain applications under Section 29A. This question becomes particularly acute in cases where the arbitral tribunal was appointed by a High Court or the Supreme Court under Section 11 of the Act.

Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act defines “Court” as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. This definition creates complexity in determining the appropriate forum for extension applications, especially when High Courts exercise both original and appellate jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court addressed this jurisdictional question in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. M/s BSC & C and C JV [3]. In this landmark decision, the Court held that the power under Section 29A(4) vests in the Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e), which is the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district, including a High Court provided it possesses ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The Court clarified that in cases where the High Court does not have ordinary original civil jurisdiction, the power must be exercised by the principal civil court that is empowered to extend the time as provided in Section 29A(4).

This decision resolved significant confusion that had emerged from conflicting High Court judgments. The Delhi High Court in DDA v. Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co. had previously held that where arbitrators are appointed by the High Court or Supreme Court under Section 11, the same court should have jurisdiction under Section 29A to avoid conflicts in the power to substitute arbitrators [4]. The Bombay High Court in Cabra Instalaciones Y Servicios v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited had similarly concluded that only the Supreme Court has authority to entertain applications under Section 29A in international commercial arbitrations where it had appointed the arbitrator [5].

However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Chief Engineer established that the principal civil court would not only have jurisdiction to decide applications under Section 29A but would also possess the power to substitute an arbitrator if it concludes that delay was attributable to such arbitrator. This interpretation prioritizes the statutory definition of “Court” over contextual considerations related to the appointing authority.

Post-Expiry Applications: The Rohan Builders Controversy

Perhaps the most significant controversy has been whether applications for extension of time under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act can be filed after the expiry of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate. This question reached the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited v. Berger Paints India Limited, which clarified the circumstances under which courts may grant post-expiry extensions, thereby resolving longstanding uncertainty in Indian arbitration practice. [6].

The Calcutta High Court in its initial Rohan Builders decision had held that applications for extension under Section 29A(4) and (5) could only be entertained if filed before the expiry of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate. The Court reasoned that the legislature’s deliberate use of the word “terminate” rather than “suspend” (as recommended by the 176th Law Commission Report) reflected clear legislative intent that the mandate conclusively ends upon expiry of the statutory period. According to this interpretation, once the mandate terminates, the arbitral tribunal becomes functus officio and cannot be revived through a subsequent extension application.

This restrictive interpretation was supported by the Patna High Court in South Bihar Power Distribution Company Limited v. Bhagalpur Electricity Distribution Company Private Limited. However, several other High Courts took a contrary view. The Delhi High Court in ATC Telecom Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. held that the plain language of Section 29A(4) permits courts to extend the period “either prior to or after the expiry,” indicating no temporal bar on filing extension applications [7].

The Supreme Court comprehensively addressed this controversy in its September 12, 2024 judgment in Rohan Builders. The Court unequivocally held that applications for extension of time under Section 29A(4) read with Section 29A(5) are maintainable even after the expiry of the twelve-month or extended six-month period. The Court’s reasoning rested on several critical foundations.

First, the Court emphasized that the expression “either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified” is unambiguous and clearly permits post-expiry applications. The Court noted that the word “terminate” must be read in context rather than in isolation. The absence of a full stop after “terminate” and its connection to the subsequent clause through the word “unless” indicated that termination is conditional, not absolute.

Second, the Court rejected the argument that using “terminate” rather than “suspend” indicated legislative intent to prevent post-expiry applications. Instead, the Court reasoned that “suspend” would have created legal incongruity if no party filed an extension application, leaving proceedings suspended indefinitely. The word “terminate” was chosen to affirm party autonomy and ensure that proceedings definitively end if neither party seeks extension.

Third, the Court cautioned against judicial legislation through restrictive interpretation. Prescribing a limitation period where the legislature has refrained from doing so would amount to rewriting the statute. The Court observed that if the legislature intended to bar post-expiry applications, it would have explicitly stated that “the Court may extend the period only if the application is filed before the expiry of the mandate.”

Fourth, the Court emphasized that Section 29A(5) requires demonstration of “sufficient cause” for extension, which acts as a safeguard against abuse. Extensions are not granted mechanically but only upon showing adequate justification, with courts empowered to impose terms, conditions, and costs.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Rohan Builders has effectively settled this controversy, providing much-needed clarity and consistency across Indian arbitration practice. The Court’s interpretation balances the legislative objective of timely dispute resolution with practical flexibility necessary for complex arbitration proceedings.

Sufficient Cause and Judicial Discretion

The requirement of demonstrating “sufficient cause” under Section 29A(5) represents a critical gatekeeping mechanism that prevents abuse while maintaining flexibility. Courts have developed jurisprudence around what constitutes sufficient cause for granting extensions.

In Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., the Delhi High Court found sufficient cause where proceedings were at an advanced stage of evidence recording and no lack of diligence was attributable to the arbitrator [8]. Similarly, in Nikhil H. Malkan v. Standard Chartered Investment and Loans (India) Ltd., the Bombay High Court granted extension where proceedings had reached advanced stages of cross-examination and final hearings [9].

Courts have consistently held that sufficient cause must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, considering factors such as the complexity of disputes, volume of evidence, conduct of parties, actions of the tribunal, and any extraordinary circumstances affecting proceedings. The concept mirrors the interpretation of “sufficient cause” under the Limitation Act, 1963, but is applied specifically within the arbitration context.

The second proviso to Section 29A(4) provides that where an extension application is pending, the arbitral tribunal’s mandate continues until disposal of the application. This provision ensures continuity of proceedings and prevents wastage of time and resources already invested in the arbitration. However, the Supreme Court in Rohan Builders clarified that the tribunal may not pronounce the award while an extension application remains sub-judice before the court.

Regulatory Framework and Policy Considerations

The introduction of Section 29A represented a fundamental policy shift toward making Indian arbitration more time-bound and efficient. The provision was inserted through the 2015 Amendment with retrospective effect from October 23, 2015, reflecting legislative urgency in addressing arbitration delays. The 176th Law Commission Report extensively documented delays ranging from five to fourteen years in single arbitrations, undermining arbitration’s core advantage as a swift dispute resolution mechanism.

The regulatory framework established through Section 29A incorporates multiple layers of accountability. Section 29A(2) incentivizes early completion by entitling arbitral tribunals to additional fees if awards are made within six months. Section 29A(6) empowers courts to substitute arbitrators during extension proceedings if delays are attributable to them, with the reconstituted tribunal deemed to be in continuation of the previous one. This provision eliminates the need for fresh Section 11 applications and allows proceedings to continue from the stage already reached.

Section 29A(9) requires courts to dispose of extension applications expeditiously, endeavoring to do so within sixty days from service of notice. This provision ensures that the extension mechanism itself does not become a source of delay, maintaining the overall objective of swift dispute resolution.

The 2019 Amendment to Section 29A introduced significant modifications, particularly excluding international commercial arbitrations from strict time limits while encouraging expeditious disposal within twelve months. This differentiation recognizes the distinct nature of international commercial arbitrations and provides greater flexibility while maintaining aspirational timelines.

Impact on Arbitration Practice

The Supreme Court’s decisions on Section 29A have profound implications for arbitration practice in India. The clarification that extension applications can be filed post-expiry removes uncertainty that previously led parties to file protective applications prematurely. However, the requirement of demonstrating sufficient cause ensures that parties and tribunals remain mindful of statutory timelines and work diligently toward timely completion.

The jurisdiction clarification in Chief Engineer provides certainty about the appropriate forum for extension applications, reducing litigation over preliminary objections and enabling faster disposal. The decision that principal civil courts possess jurisdiction even when arbitrators are appointed by higher courts under Section 11 streamlines procedure, though it raises practical questions about coordination between different judicial forums.

For arbitral tribunals, these interpretations emphasize the importance of case management, adherence to timelines, and proactive communication with parties about potential delays. Tribunals must be cognizant that attributable delays may result in fee reductions and that courts scrutinize extension applications for sufficient cause.

For parties, the jurisprudence establishes that while extensions remain available post-expiry, they are not granted mechanically. Parties must demonstrate genuine reasons for delays, maintain diligence throughout proceedings, and be prepared for courts to impose costs and conditions. The flexibility provided by post-expiry applications must not be misinterpreted as license for lackadaisical conduct.

Conclusion

The evolution of jurisprudence surrounding Section 29A reflects the judiciary’s effort to balance competing imperatives of timely dispute resolution and practical flexibility. The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Rohan Builders has resolved fundamental questions about post-expiry applications, while Chief Engineer has clarified jurisdictional issues that previously created confusion and delay. In this context, the courts’ power to grant an extension of time under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act has emerged as a critical mechanism for reconciling statutory deadlines with procedural fairness and judicial oversight.

These judicial interpretations give life to the legislative intent behind Section 29A while avoiding rigid formalism that would undermine arbitration’s efficacy. By permitting post-expiry applications subject to demonstration of sufficient cause, courts maintain flexibility necessary for complex disputes while deterring dilatory tactics through discretionary oversight and cost consequences.

The regulatory framework established through Section 29A, as interpreted by Indian courts, represents a mature approach to managing arbitration timelines. It recognizes that arbitration’s efficiency depends not on mechanical application of deadlines but on structured flexibility that accommodates legitimate needs while maintaining accountability. As Indian arbitration law continues to evolve, the principles established in these landmark decisions will shape practice and ensure that arbitration remains an effective, efficient, and accessible dispute resolution mechanism.

References

[1] India Code. (2019). Section 29A – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Available at: https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_3_46_00004_199626_1517807323919&orderno=31 

[2] Supreme Court of India. (2024). Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited v. Berger Paints India Limited, Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 23320 of 2023. Available at: https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2023/41496/41496_2023_2_1501_55557_Judgement_12-Sep-2024.pdf 

[3] Casemine. (2024). Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. M/s BSC C and C JV, Supreme Court of India. Available at: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/66539e178cdb19280920fa6d  

[4] Lexology. (2025). Examining the ‘Court’ Quandary: Section 29A of the Arbitration Act. Available at: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0d1759e4-1584-4ad6-b0dc-117b49fbd0ce 

[5] Kluwer Arbitration Blog. (2019). Applications for Extension of Time for Passing the Award in India: Which Court to Entertain? Available at: https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/applications-for-extension-of-time-for-passing-the-award-in-india-which-court-to-entertain/ 

[6] Indian Kanoon. (2024). Chief Engineer (Nh) Pwd (Roads) vs M/S Bsc&C And C Jv on 22 April, 2024. Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/151583054/ 

[7] SCC Online. (2024). Application for extension of time for passing arbitral award under Section 29A of Arbitration Act is maintainable even after expiry of term of Tribunal: SC. Available at: https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2024/09/14/application-for-extension-of-time-passing-arbitral-award-arbit-act-maintainable-after-expiry-term-tribunal-sc/ 

[8] Mondaq. (2024). ‘Court’ Under Section 29A Of The Arbitration Act: Is The Conundrum Settled? Available at: https://www.mondaq.com/india/trials-appeals-compensation/1519532/court-under-section-29a-of-the-arbitration-act-is-the-conundrum-settled 

[9] LiveLaw. (2024). ‘Rohan Builders’ Not Binding Precedent, Court Empowered To Extend Arbitrator’s Mandate Even If Section 29-A Petition Filed After Termination: Calcutta High Court. Available at: https://www.livelaw.in/arbitration-cases/calcutta-high-court-rohan-builders-not-binding-precedent-court-empowered-to-extend-arbitrators-mandate-section-29-a-petition-filed-after-termination-264296 

 

Authorized and Published by Prapti Bhatt