NCLT IBC Amendment: Restoring Credit Hierarchy and Enforcing Resolution Timelines

NCLT IBC Amendment Bill: Credit Hierarchy Restored, Resolution Plans And Time Limit Binding

Introduction

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019 represents a watershed moment in India’s corporate insolvency framework, addressing critical gaps that emerged during the initial implementation of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The amendments were necessitated by judicial interpretations that deviated from the original legislative intent, operational challenges in resolution processes, and the need to establish greater certainty for creditors and resolution applicants. These modifications fundamentally altered three crucial aspects of corporate insolvency proceedings: the restoration of credit hierarchy among creditors, the binding nature of resolution plans on all stakeholders including governmental authorities, and the mandatory enforcement of time-bound resolution processes.

The amendments emerged from experiences gained during landmark cases that revealed systemic inadequacies in the original legislation. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), as the primary adjudicating authority under the Code, witnessed increasing complexity in balancing creditor rights with the objective of corporate revival. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code Amendment 2019 sought to recalibrate this balance by clarifying ambiguities that had led to prolonged litigation and uncertainty in insolvency proceedings.

Historical Context and Legislative Evolution

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 2016 to consolidate and amend laws relating to reorganization and insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms, and individuals in a time-bound manner. Prior to the Code, India’s insolvency framework was fragmented across multiple legislations, including the Companies Act, 2013, the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985, and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. This fragmentation resulted in prolonged resolution processes, with cases often taking seven to ten years for resolution, leading to significant value erosion of distressed assets.

The Code introduced a paradigm shift by establishing a creditor-driven resolution process wherein the Committee of Creditors (CoC), comprising financial creditors, would have the commercial wisdom to determine the fate of the corporate debtor. The legislative intent was clear: prioritize secured financial creditors who extend credit based on risk assessment and security interest, ensure time-bound resolution within 180 days extendable by 90 days, and maximize asset value through restructuring rather than liquidation. However, within three years of implementation, several judicial decisions and practical challenges necessitated substantive amendments to preserve the Code’s original objectives.

Restoration of Credit Hierarchy

The Original Legislative Intent

The fundamental principle underlying the IBC was the establishment of a clear waterfall mechanism under Section 53 for distribution of assets in liquidation proceedings [1]. This section explicitly prioritized secured financial creditors over operational creditors and government dues. The Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee, which drafted the Code, had recommended that parliamentary law on insolvency should override other laws, and that government dues should rank below even unsecured financial creditors to promote credit availability and develop bond markets.

The rationale for this hierarchy was economic rather than equitable. Secured financial creditors, typically banks and financial institutions, extended credit after conducting due diligence and accepting collateral security. Their lending decisions were predicated on their priority status in recovery proceedings. Operational creditors, by contrast, such as suppliers and service providers, typically extend credit as part of their business operations without similar risk assessment or security interests. The original Code recognized this distinction and structured the distribution mechanism accordingly.

Judicial Challenges to Credit Hierarchy

The credit hierarchy faced its most significant challenge in the Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta case, where the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) initially directed that secured financial creditors should share recoveries with operational creditors on a pari passu basis, irrespective of the ranking of their security positions [2]. The NCLAT’s interpretation suggested that equitable treatment required equal distribution among all creditor classes, fundamentally undermining the statutory waterfall mechanism established under Section 53.

This interpretation created substantial uncertainty in credit markets. If secured creditors could not rely on their priority status, the fundamental basis for credit risk assessment would collapse. The pricing of credit, development of secondary debt markets, and willingness of financial institutions to extend credit to stressed companies would all be adversely affected. The Supreme Court’s intervention became necessary to restore the legislative intent and provide clarity to all stakeholders.

Supreme Court Clarification in Essar Steel

In November 2019, the Supreme Court delivered its landmark judgment in the Essar Steel case, categorically rejecting the NCLAT’s approach of equal distribution [3]. The Court held that the Committee of Creditors does not act in any fiduciary capacity to any group of creditors but takes business decisions based on commercial wisdom that bind all stakeholders. The judgment clarified that fair and equitable treatment of operational creditors does not mean they must receive the same recovery percentage as financial creditors.

The Supreme Court emphasized that while operational creditors are entitled to fair treatment, the resolution plan need only ensure they receive an amount not less than what they would have received in liquidation. The Court observed that the Code’s waterfall mechanism under Section 53 clearly distinguishes between secured creditors and operational creditors, and this distinction must be maintained during resolution processes. The judgment reinforced that dissenting financial creditors and operational creditors are entitled only to their liquidation value, with the CoC having complete flexibility in determining distribution among various creditor classes.

Statutory Amendments to Section 30

The Amendment Act introduced critical modifications to Section 30 to codify the principles established in Essar Steel and prevent future deviations from the credit hierarchy. Section 30(2)(b) was amended to provide that payment to operational creditors must be the higher of the amount they would receive in liquidation under Section 53, or the amount they would receive if the resolution plan amount were distributed according to Section 53’s priority waterfall [4].

Furthermore, the amendments clarified that the CoC must consider the manner of distribution proposed in resolution plans while taking into account the order of priority among creditors as prescribed under Section 53, including the priority and value of security interest of secured creditors. This provision explicitly requires adherence to the statutory waterfall during resolution planning, ensuring that the pre-insolvency entitlements of secured creditors are respected during the insolvency process.

The retrospective application of these amendments to pending proceedings was particularly significant. Section 6 of the Amendment Act specified that the amendments to Section 30 would apply to resolution processes pending approval or under appeal before the NCLAT or Supreme Court. This retrospective application demonstrated the legislature’s determination to correct judicial interpretations that had deviated from the Code’s original objectives.

Resolution Plans Binding on Government Authorities

The Problem of Post-Approval Demands

One of the most vexing issues in early IBC implementation was the tendency of governmental authorities to raise fresh demands or continue recovery proceedings against corporate debtors after resolution plan approval. Central and state governments, along with local authorities, often argued that they were not bound by resolution plans approved by the NCLT, particularly when such plans provided for reduction or waiver of statutory dues including taxes, penalties, and royalties.

This created significant uncertainty for resolution applicants. Even after successfully bidding for a stressed asset and obtaining NCLT approval for their resolution plan, acquirers faced the prospect of governmental authorities initiating fresh proceedings or attaching assets for pre-resolution liabilities. Such actions fundamentally undermined the “fresh slate” principle that is central to successful resolution under the IBC.

The issue was further complicated by provisions in various tax and regulatory statutes that created statutory first charges on the properties of defaulting entities. For instance, several state VAT Acts contained provisions stating that tax dues would constitute a first charge on the dealer’s property, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law. Governmental authorities relied on these provisions to assert priority over financial creditors or to claim exemption from the binding nature of resolution plans.

Amendment to Section 31

To address this fundamental challenge, the Amendment Act modified Section 31(1) to explicitly state that a resolution plan approved by the NCLT shall be binding on the corporate debtor and its employees, members, creditors, including the Central Government, any State Government or any local authority to whom a debt in respect of payment of dues arising under any law for the time being in force, such as authorities to whom statutory dues are owed, guarantors and other stakeholders involved in the resolution plan [5].

This amendment left no ambiguity regarding the binding nature of approved resolution plans. Governmental authorities, regardless of whether they are owed income tax, GST, VAT, customs duties, or any other statutory dues, are bound by the resolution plan once approved by the NCLT. If a resolution plan provides for cancellation, reduction, or deferred payment of operational debts including governmental dues, such provisions are binding on all governmental authorities.

The rationale behind this amendment was to provide certainty to resolution applicants and facilitate the “fresh slate” or “clean slate” doctrine. Under this principle, once a resolution plan is approved, the corporate debtor is relieved from all past liabilities except those specifically provided for in the resolution plan. The successful resolution applicant acquires the corporate debtor free from claims of previous creditors, enabling a genuine fresh start for the revived entity.

The Rainbow Papers Controversy

Despite the amendments to Section 31, controversy persisted regarding whether governmental authorities could claim status as secured creditors based on statutory first charges created under tax laws. This issue came to the fore in State Tax Officer v. Rainbow Papers Limited, where the Supreme Court held that statutory charges created under the Gujarat VAT Act would constitute “security interest” under Section 3(31) of the IBC, thereby elevating the State Government to the status of a secured creditor [6].

The Rainbow Papers judgment created significant consternation among insolvency practitioners and creditors. If every governmental authority with a statutory first charge could claim secured creditor status, the carefully constructed waterfall mechanism under Section 53 would be disrupted. The judgment potentially undermined the priority of secured financial creditors who had extended credit based on contractual security interests.

However, it is important to note that the Rainbow Papers decision was specific to the Gujarat VAT Act, which did not contain an exception for the IBC. Subsequently, most GST laws were amended to explicitly exclude the IBC from their ambit, clarifying that statutory charges under GST laws would not override the IBC’s waterfall mechanism. The issue highlighted the ongoing tension between the IBC’s comprehensive framework and sector-specific statutes with their own priority mechanisms.

The 2025 Amendment Bill’s Approach

Recognizing the disruption caused by the Rainbow Papers interpretation, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill, 2025 proposes to amend Section 3(31) to clarify that “security interest” means only those interests created pursuant to an agreement or arrangement by the act of two or more parties, and shall not include security interests created merely by operation of law [7]. This proposed amendment seeks to restore the original legislative intent by excluding statutory charges from the definition of security interest, thereby preventing governmental authorities from claiming secured creditor status merely by operation of tax statutes.

Mandatory Time Limits for Resolution

The Original Timeline Framework

The IBC originally provided that the corporate insolvency resolution process must be completed within 180 days from the insolvency commencement date, with a possible one-time extension of up to 90 days under Section 12(3). This 270-day timeline was considered critical for preserving asset value and ensuring that the resolution process did not become another protracted litigation mechanism like its predecessor regimes.

However, the original provisions were ambiguous regarding whether time taken in legal proceedings should be excluded from the 270-day timeline. Courts interpreting the provisions held that time spent in litigation before the NCLT, NCLAT, or Supreme Court should be excluded from the resolution period, as these delays were beyond the control of the resolution professional and the Committee of Creditors.

This interpretation, while seemingly reasonable, led to resolution processes extending well beyond the intended timeline. In several high-profile cases, resolution processes continued for two to three years due to successive appeals and legal challenges. The prolonged timelines resulted in deterioration of asset value, loss of business continuity, and erosion of creditor confidence in the IBC framework.

The Essar Steel Timeline Precedent

The Essar Steel resolution process itself exemplified the timeline challenges. Essar Steel was admitted to insolvency in August 2017, but the final Supreme Court judgment approving the resolution plan came only in November 2019, more than two years after admission [8]. While the complexity of the case and the amounts involved justified careful consideration, the extended timeline demonstrated that without strict enforcement of time limits, the IBC’s objectives could be frustrated.

The Supreme Court in the Essar Steel judgment noted that timelines under the IBC are mandatory in nature and not merely directory. However, the Court also recognized that in exceptional cases involving significant legal issues, extensions beyond the statutory period might be necessary. This created an interpretative challenge: how to balance the mandatory nature of timelines with the practical reality of complex litigation.

Amendment to Section 12: The 330-Day Mandate

The Amendment Act addressed this challenge by amending Section 12 to provide that the corporate insolvency resolution process shall be completed mandatorily within 330 days from the insolvency commencement date, including any extension granted under Section 12(3) and the time taken in legal proceedings in relation to the resolution process [9]. The use of the word “mandatorily” and the phrase “shall be completed” left no room for interpretation regarding the binding nature of this timeline.

The 330-day period represents the maximum outer limit for completing the resolution process, including all litigation. The calculation includes the initial 180 days, the 90-day extension under Section 12(3), and an additional 60 days to account for typical litigation delays. By including litigation time within the overall limit, the amendment sought to incentivize all parties to pursue legal challenges judiciously and avoid frivolous litigation that could delay the process indefinitely.

For resolution processes that had already exceeded 330 days when the Amendment Act came into force, the Act provided a transitional mechanism. Such pending matters were required to be completed within 90 days from the commencement of the Amendment Act. This provision applied to hundreds of pending cases, forcing a conclusion to protracted proceedings that had undermined the IBC’s credibility.

NCLT’s Duty to Record Reasons for Delay

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code Amendment 2019 also modified the provisions requiring the NCLT to determine the existence of default within 14 days of receiving an application for initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process. The amended provision requires that if the NCLT has not made such determination within 14 days from the insolvency commencement date, it must pass an order recording the reasons in writing for such delay in determination.

This amendment introduced judicial discipline and accountability. The NCLT could no longer indefinitely delay admission of applications without providing reasoned justification. The provision addressed the significant problem of applications not being listed for admission for periods exceeding four months at some tribunals. By requiring written reasons for any delay beyond 14 days, the amendment sought to expedite the admission process and prevent unnecessary delays at the threshold stage.

The provision also serves a broader purpose of creating a record of delays and their causes, enabling the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to identify systemic bottlenecks and take corrective measures. Whether delays are due to inadequate tribunal infrastructure, shortage of benches, or other systemic issues, the requirement to record reasons creates data for evidence-based policy interventions.

Power of CoC to Liquidate

The  Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code Amendment 2019 also clarified the power of the Committee of Creditors to decide on liquidation at any time after its constitution and before confirmation of the resolution plan, including before preparation of the information memorandum. Section 33(2) as amended provides that if the resolution professional informs the NCLT of a decision by the CoC (approved by 66 percent majority) to liquidate the corporate debtor, the NCLT shall pass a liquidation order.

This amendment recognized the commercial wisdom of the CoC to determine when continuation of the resolution process is futile. If, after constitution, the CoC determines that the corporate debtor has no realistic prospect of revival, or that liquidation would yield better returns than resolution, it can abort the resolution process. This prevents wastage of resources on hopeless cases and allows quicker transition to liquidation where appropriate.

The provision balances efficiency with creditor rights. While the CoC has the power to decide on liquidation, this decision must be taken by the same supermajority (66 percent) required for approving resolution plans. This ensures that the decision to liquidate represents genuine commercial consensus among financial creditors rather than arbitrary action by a few creditors.

Regulatory Framework and Implementation

Role of IBBI in Standard-Setting

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India plays a crucial role in operationalizing the statutory framework through regulations. The IBBI has issued the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, which provide detailed procedural requirements for conducting corporate insolvency resolution processes.

These regulations specify the duties of resolution professionals, the constitution and functioning of the Committee of Creditors, the contents of resolution plans, and the procedures for evaluating and approving such plans. Regulation 38 specifically addresses the treatment of different creditor classes in resolution plans, requiring that operational creditors receive fair and equitable treatment without mandating equal treatment with financial creditors.

The IBBI regulations have been amended multiple times to align with judicial interpretations and statutory amendments. Following the 2019 Amendment Act, the IBBI amended its regulations to incorporate the principles established in Essar Steel regarding creditor hierarchy and the binding nature of timelines. The regulatory framework continues to evolve based on implementation experience and emerging challenges in the insolvency ecosystem.

NCLT’s Limited Scope of Review

A critical aspect of the amended framework is the limited scope of judicial review available to the NCLT when considering resolution plans approved by the Committee of Creditors. The Supreme Court in Essar Steel held that the NCLT cannot sit in appeal over the commercial wisdom of the CoC. If the CoC has considered all relevant factors and made a conscious decision to approve a resolution plan, the NCLT must adopt a “hands-off” approach.

The NCLT’s role is limited to ensuring that the resolution plan meets the requirements specified in Section 30(2) of the IBC, including provisions for payment to operational creditors not less than liquidation value, adherence to the priority waterfall under Section 53, and provision for management of the corporate debtor after approval. The NCLT cannot reject a resolution plan merely because it considers a different distribution mechanism more equitable or because operational creditors are receiving lower recoveries than financial creditors.

This limited scope of review is fundamental to the creditor-driven nature of the IBC. The commercial wisdom to determine what resolution plan best serves the objective of maximizing asset value rests with the CoC, not with the adjudicating authority. Judicial restraint in reviewing CoC decisions is essential to preserve the efficiency and commercial orientation of the resolution process.

Challenges and Ongoing Reforms

Despite the clarifications provided by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code Amendment 2019, several challenges persist in IBC implementation. The mandatory 330-day timeline, while laudable in intent, remains difficult to achieve given the infrastructure constraints of the NCLT. Many benches are overburdened with cases, and the quality of tribunal infrastructure varies significantly across locations. Without corresponding increases in judicial capacity, timeline mandates risk creating pressure without enabling compliance.

The issue of governmental dues continues to generate litigation despite the amendments to Section 31. Different governmental authorities interpret the binding nature of resolution plans differently, with some continuing to initiate fresh proceedings for pre-resolution liabilities. The proposed 2025 amendment to Section 3(31) seeks to address this by excluding statutory charges from security interest, but its effectiveness will depend on implementation and further judicial interpretation.

The treatment of related party creditors remains contentious. The Essar Steel judgment held that claims of related party financial creditors cannot be considered by the resolution professional as they are conflicted creditors. However, determining who constitutes a “related party” under the IBC’s expansive definition continues to generate disputes and uncertainty for corporate groups with complex structures.

Cross-border insolvency remains an area requiring legislative attention. While the IBC contains provisions for cross-border insolvency, detailed regulations for implementing these provisions have not been finalized. Cases involving corporate debtors with assets or creditors across multiple jurisdictions continue to pose challenges for resolution professionals and tribunals.

Conclusion

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019 represents a critical refinement of India’s corporate insolvency framework. By restoring the credit hierarchy among creditors, ensuring that resolution plans bind all stakeholders including governmental authorities, and mandating time-bound completion of resolution processes, the amendments address fundamental challenges that emerged during the initial years of IBC implementation.

The amendments reflect a maturation of the insolvency ecosystem, incorporating lessons from landmark cases like Essar Steel and responding to practical challenges faced by resolution professionals, creditors, and tribunals. The legislative interventions demonstrate the government’s commitment to maintaining the creditor-driven, time-bound nature of the resolution process while balancing the interests of all stakeholders.

However, effective implementation remains the key challenge. The success of the amended framework depends on adequate judicial infrastructure, capacity building among insolvency professionals, consistent interpretation by tribunals, and restraint from governmental authorities in respecting approved resolution plans. The proposed 2025 amendments indicate that the legislative evolution of the IBC continues, responding to emerging challenges and refining the framework based on implementation experience.

As India’s insolvency regime enters its second decade, the foundational principles established by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code Amendment 2019—priority of secured creditors based on contractual security interests, binding nature of resolution plans on all creditors including government, and strict adherence to resolution timelines—will continue to shape the framework’s development and determine its success in achieving the twin objectives of maximizing asset value and promoting entrepreneurship.

References

[1] PRS Legislative Research. (2019). The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill, 2019. https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-insolvency-and-bankruptcy-code-amendment-bill-2019 

[2] India Corporate Law Blog. (2022). Essar Steel India Limited: Supreme Court Reinforces Primacy of Creditors Committee in Insolvency Resolution. https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2019/11/essar-steel-india-limited-supreme-court-reinforces-primacy-of-creditors-committee-insolvency-resolution/ 

[3] IBC Laws. (2019). Summary of landmark judgment of Supreme Court in Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited vs Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors. https://ibclaw.in/summary-of-landmark-judgment-of-supreme-court-in-committee-of-creditors-of-essar-steel-india-limited-vs-satish-kumar-gupta-ors-under-ibc/ 

[4] India Law Offices. (2019). The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019. https://www.indialawoffices.com/legal-articles/the-insolvency-and-bankruptcy-code-act-2019 

[5] IndiaFilings. (2025). Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code Amendments 2019. https://www.indiafilings.com/learn/ibc-amendments-2019/ 

[6] LiveLaw. (2024). IBC Resolution Plan Can’t Ignore Government Dues: Supreme Court Dismisses Review Petitions Against ‘Rainbow Papers’. https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/supreme-court-judgment-government-status-secured-creditor-ibc-sanjay-agarwal-v-state-tax-officer-241305 

[7] LiveLaw. (2025). IBC 2.0: Has the 2025 Amendment Fixed the Cracks in India’s Insolvency Regime? https://www.livelaw.in/articles/ibc-20-has-the-2025-amendment-fixed-the-cracks-in-indias-insolvency-regime-301741 

[8] Mondaq. (2021). Case Note: Judgement Of The Supreme Court In The Essar Steel Case. https://www.mondaq.com/india/insolvencybankruptcy/1058270/case-note-judgement-of-the-supreme-court-in-the-essar-steel-case 

[9] Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co. (2022). IBC amendment bill: Credit hierarchy restored, resolution plans and time limit binding. https://www.amsshardul.com/insight/ibc-amendment-bill-credit-hierarchy-restored-resolution-plans-and-time-limit-binding/