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Supreme Court Ruling on Enforcement Directorate Powers: Restricting Arrests After Cognizance Under PMLA
Introduction
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 remains one of India’s most stringent legislative instruments designed to combat financial crimes and money laundering activities. The Enforcement Directorate, functioning under the Ministry of Finance, is vested with extensive powers under the PMLA to investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals suspected of money laundering offenses. However, recent judicial pronouncements by the Supreme Court of India have significantly recalibrated the balance between effective law enforcement and the protection of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The landmark judgment in Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, delivered on May 16, 2024, represents a watershed moment in the evolving jurisprudence surrounding the exercise of Enforcement Directorate arrest powers under the PMLA. This decision has fundamentally altered the procedural landscape governing arrests under the Act, particularly after a Special Court has taken cognizance of money laundering offenses.
The judgment emerged from a consolidation of multiple criminal appeals wherein accused persons, who had not been arrested during the investigation phase, challenged the denial of anticipatory bail after Special Courts issued summons under Section 44 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. The Supreme Court’s intervention clarifies critical aspects of procedural criminal law, particularly the limits placed on the Enforcement Directorate’s power to arrest under the PMLA once judicial cognizance has been taken. This ruling must be understood within the broader context of judicial efforts to temper the otherwise expansive powers granted to investigative agencies while simultaneously preserving the effectiveness of anti-money laundering enforcement mechanisms.
Legislative Framework and Institutional Mandate
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, enacted in 2002, emerged from India’s international commitments under the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The legislation criminalizes money laundering and provides for confiscation of property derived from or involved in money laundering activities. Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act defines the offense of money laundering as any process or activity connected with proceeds of crime, including its concealment, possession, acquisition, or use, and projecting it as untainted property. Section 4 prescribes punishment ranging from three to seven years of imprisonment for money laundering offenses, which can extend to ten years in certain aggravated circumstances.
The Enforcement Directorate operates as the principal investigative agency empowered under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. Originally established in 1956 as the Enforcement Unit under the Department of Economic Affairs to handle violations of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, the organization was renamed the Enforcement Directorate in 1957 and its administrative control was transferred to the Department of Revenue in 1960. Today, the Enforcement Directorate is headed by a Director holding the rank of at least Additional Secretary to the Government of India, with five regional offices located across major metropolitan centers including Chandigarh, Chennai, Delhi, Kolkata, and Mumbai. The agency’s primary function involves the administration and enforcement of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, including investigation of money laundering offenses, filing prosecution complaints before Special Courts, attachment and confiscation of property involved in money laundering, and facilitating international cooperation with competent authorities in foreign jurisdictions.
Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) vests the Enforcement Directorate with the power to arrest individuals. This provision stipulates that if the Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director, or any other officer authorized by the Central Government has, on the basis of material in his possession, reason to believe that any person has been guilty of an offense punishable under the PMLA Act, he may arrest such person and shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest. Section 50 empowers authorized officers to summon any person whose attendance they consider necessary, either to give evidence or to produce any records during any investigation or proceeding under the Act. The stringent nature of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act becomes particularly evident in Section 45, which imposes twin conditions for bail, requiring the court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of the offense and that he is not likely to commit any offense while on bail.
Foundational Jurisprudence on Procedural Safeguards
The constitutional and statutory framework governing arrests under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) has evolved through a series of significant judicial pronouncements. The Supreme Court’s decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, delivered on July 27, 2022, represents the foundational text for interpreting various provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act [2]. In this extensive judgment spanning over two hundred pages, a three-judge bench upheld the constitutional validity of numerous contested provisions of the Act, including Section 19 governing arrests, Section 45 prescribing twin conditions for bail, and Section 50 relating to summoning powers. The Court held that these provisions were not violative of Articles 14, 20, and 21 of the Constitution of India. The judgment emphasized that the Prevention of Money Laundering Act must be stringent as it was designed to tackle what the Court characterized as heinous financial crimes that undermine economic stability and national security.
However, the expansive interpretation of enforcement powers in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary created practical difficulties in implementation, particularly concerning the manner in which grounds of arrest were communicated by the Enforcement Directorate to accused persons. This gap was addressed in the subsequent judgment of Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, decided on October 3, 2023 [3]. In this case, the Supreme Court mandated that grounds of arrest under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act must be furnished in writing by the Enforcement Directorate to the arrested person, without any exception. The Court observed that merely reading out the grounds of arrest or allowing the accused to read them would not constitute adequate compliance with the constitutional mandate under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and the statutory requirement under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. The judgment emphasized that the arrested person must receive a written copy of the grounds to ensure transparency and facilitate the pursuit of legal remedies, particularly given the stringent bail conditions prescribed under Section 45 of the Act.
Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India provides that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest. This constitutional guarantee forms the bedrock of personal liberty protections in the Indian legal system. The Supreme Court in Pankaj Bansal held that this right is meant to enable the arrested person to seek legal remedies, such as bail, and to challenge the validity and legality of his arrest. The Court further observed that providing written grounds of arrest would ensure transparency, accountability, and fairness in the functioning of the Enforcement Directorate and would prevent any abuse or misuse of power. The judgment also noted that the person arrested under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act must be able to understand the reasons for the belief held by the arresting officer that the person is guilty of an offense, so as to enable effective legal representation during bail proceedings.
The Tarsem Lal Decision: Restricting Post-Cognizance Arrests
The factual matrix in Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement involved allegations of a conspiracy wherein revenue officials wrongfully allotted village common lands to persons not qualified to receive them. Tarsem Lal, one of the co-accused, was alleged to have received substantial sums of money from property dealers by misusing government machinery. The offenses alleged constituted predicate offenses listed in the Schedule to the Prevention of Money Launanning Act, which triggered the Enforcement Directorate’s jurisdiction to investigate money laundering aspects. On June 16, 2023, the Enforcement Directorate filed a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act before the Special Court. Significantly, Tarsem Lal had not been arrested during the investigation phase despite being named as an accused in the complaint. The Special Court took cognizance of the offense and issued summons to Tarsem Lal, requiring him to appear before the court. When he failed to appear, the Special Court issued warrants for his arrest. Tarsem Lal then filed an application for anticipatory bail before the Special Court, which was rejected. His subsequent appeal to the Punjab and Haryana High Court was also dismissed, leading him to approach the Supreme Court.
The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Enforcement Directorate retained the power to arrest an accused under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act after a Special Court had taken cognizance of the complaint filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the Act. A bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan delivered the judgment on May 16, 2024, which fundamentally restricted the Enforcement Directorate’s arrest powers in post-cognizance scenarios [1]. The Court held that after cognizance is taken of the offense punishable under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act based on a complaint under Section 44, the Enforcement Directorate and its officers are powerless to exercise powers under Section 19 to arrest the person shown as accused in the complaint. The Court reasoned that the power to arrest under Section 19 is designed to facilitate investigation, and once the investigation is complete and a complaint has been filed, there exists no valid justification for permitting the investigating agency to arrest the accused independently.
The Court’s reasoning was grounded in a careful analysis of the interplay between the Prevention of Money Laundering Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 65 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act provides that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. Section 46 further stipulates that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply to proceedings before the Special Court, which shall be deemed to be a Court of Session for the purposes of the Code. The Supreme Court noted that once a complaint is filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, the provisions of Sections 200 to 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure become applicable. These provisions govern the procedure after a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offense, including the examination of the complainant, inquiry into the case, and the issuance of process.
The Court specifically addressed Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which empowers the Magistrate to issue either a warrant or summons for securing the attendance of the accused. The Supreme Court held that in cases where the accused has not been arrested during the investigation, the Special Court should ordinarily issue summons rather than warrants in the first instance. This interpretation was based on the principle established in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, which held that issuance of summons is the rule unless the accused is charged with a heinous crime and there exists a reasonable apprehension that the accused is likely to tamper with evidence or evade the process of law [4]. The Court further held that if an accused who was not arrested during investigation fails to cooperate by defying summons issued under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, the Special Court may issue a bailable warrant, but even in such cases, it is not mandatory to issue a warrant while issuing process, and issuance of summons would suffice.
A critical aspect of the Tarsem Lal judgment concerns the application of Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which empowers the court to take bonds for appearance. The Court held that when an accused who was not arrested by the Enforcement Directorate during investigation appears before the Special Court pursuant to summons, the court has the power under Section 88 to require the accused to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for ensuring regular appearance before the court. The Supreme Court categorically rejected the Enforcement Directorate’s argument that an accused appearing pursuant to summons should be considered to be in the custody of the court. The Court reasoned that if an accused appearing pursuant to summons were deemed to be in custody, there would be no purpose in the court having the power under Section 205(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to exempt personal appearance of the accused. A bond furnished under Section 88 is merely an undertaking that the accused will appear before the court and does not constitute custody.
The judgment established that the stringent twin conditions prescribed under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act for grant of bail would not apply to accused persons who were never arrested during investigation and who appear before the Special Court pursuant to summons. The Court held that these accused persons are not required to apply for bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and consequently, the rigorous bail conditions under Section 45 have no application to such contingencies. This distinction is crucial because Section 45 creates an extremely high threshold for bail, requiring the court to be satisfied on twin grounds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of the offense and that the accused is not likely to commit any offense while on bail. By holding that these conditions do not apply to accused who were never arrested and who appear pursuant to summons, the Supreme Court has created a significant protection for the liberty rights of such individuals.
The Court further held that if the Enforcement Directorate requires custody of an accused who appears after service of summons for conducting further investigation of the same offense, the Enforcement Directorate must seek custody of the accused by applying to the Special Court under Section 309(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This provision empowers the court to remand the accused to custody if necessary for the purposes of investigation. The Supreme Court emphasized that such an application must be heard only after affording an opportunity to the accused to oppose the remand request, and the Special Court must pass an order recording brief reasons for granting or refusing custody. The Court held that custody may be permitted only if the Special Court is satisfied that custodial interrogation at that stage is required, even though the accused was never arrested under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.
Regulatory Framework and Case Law Synthesis
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act establishes a comprehensive regulatory framework through various sections that govern different aspects of money laundering enforcement. Section 5 provides for provisional attachment of property involved in money laundering, enabling authorities to freeze assets pending the completion of investigation and trial. Section 8 governs adjudication proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority for confirming attachment orders and determining whether the attached property constitutes proceeds of crime. Section 17 and Section 18 deal with search and seizure operations, empowering authorized officers to search persons, premises, and conveyances, and to seize records and property suspected to be proceeds of crime. Section 24 creates a reverse burden of proof, requiring the accused to prove that the alleged proceeds of crime are actually untainted property, once the prosecution establishes that the accused was in possession of such property and cannot satisfactorily account for its acquisition.
The Prevention of Money Laundering Rules, 2005, supplement the statutory provisions with detailed procedural requirements. Rule 2(1)(g) and Rule 2(1)(h) specifically address the procedure for arrest, mandating that the authorized officer must record in writing the grounds for forming the belief that the person is guilty of an offense punishable under the Act. These rules reinforce the safeguards incorporated in Section 19 and have been interpreted by courts as mandatory requirements that must be strictly complied with. The rules also prescribe the procedure for forwarding the grounds of arrest to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope, ensuring that sensitive investigative information is protected while simultaneously documenting the reasons for arrest.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation established an important principle that has been extended to Prevention of Money Laundering Act cases [5]. In that judgment, the Court held that wherever an accused is not arrested consciously by the prosecution during investigation, then he should not be arrested at the instance of the court upon filing of the charge-sheet. This principle recognizes that the decision not to arrest during investigation reflects a prosecutorial assessment that custodial interrogation was not necessary, and this assessment should generally be respected even after filing of the charge-sheet. The Tarsem Lal judgment specifically incorporates this principle, holding that after taking cognizance of the complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Launancing Act by the Special Court, the Enforcement Directorate and authorities named under Section 19 are rendered powerless to arrest any accused named in the complaint who was not arrested during the investigation phase.
The evolution of judicial thinking on Prevention of Money Laundering Act procedures reflects an ongoing tension between the imperatives of effective law enforcement against sophisticated financial crimes and the protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The judgment in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, delivered by a two-judge bench in 2017, had struck down the twin conditions for bail under Section 45 as unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution [6]. However, this decision was subsequently overruled by the three-judge bench in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, which upheld the constitutional validity of Section 45 by drawing parallels with similar provisions in the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and other special legislations dealing with serious offenses. The Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary held that the principle of innocence of the accused is regarded as a human right, but this presumption can be interdicted by a law made by Parliament when the nature of the offense and the threat it poses to society justifies such stringent measures.
Practical Implications and Procedural Guidelines
The Tarsem Lal judgment establishes several concrete procedural guidelines that fundamentally alter the manner in which Prevention of Money Laundering Act cases are handled after the filing of a complaint. When a complaint is filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act before the Special Court, the court must first apply Sections 200 to 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to determine whether cognizance should be taken. If the Special Court decides to take cognizance, it must then decide whether to issue a summons or warrant under Section 204(1)(b) of the Code. The Supreme Court has mandated that if the accused was not arrested during investigation, the Special Court must ordinarily issue summons as the first step, reserving the issuance of warrants for situations where there is reasonable apprehension that the accused will not appear or will tamper with evidence.
When an accused who was not arrested during investigation appears before the Special Court pursuant to summons, the accused is not deemed to be in custody of the court. Instead, the court may require the accused to furnish a bond under Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with or without sureties, to ensure regular appearance. The accused is not required to file an application for bail, and consequently, the stringent twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act do not apply. If the accused fails to appear pursuant to summons without sufficient cause, the Special Court may then issue a bailable warrant. Even in cases where warrants are issued, the accused, upon appearance, would be entitled to be released on furnishing appropriate bonds rather than being subjected to the rigorous bail conditions of Section 45.
If the Enforcement Directorate, after filing the complaint and after cognizance has been taken, believes that further custodial interrogation of the accused is necessary for investigation, the agency cannot exercise its power of arrest under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). Instead, the Enforcement Directorate must file an application before the Special Court under Section 309(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking custody of the accused. This application must set out the specific reasons why custodial interrogation is necessary and what further investigation needs to be conducted. The Special Court must afford an opportunity to the accused to oppose this application, and both parties must be heard before any order for custody is passed. The Special Court must record brief reasons for granting or refusing the custody request, and custody should be permitted only if the court is satisfied that custodial interrogation at that stage is genuinely required despite the fact that the accused was never arrested during the initial investigation phase.
The judgment clarifies that the power of arrest under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act exists primarily to facilitate investigation. Once the investigation is substantially complete and a complaint has been filed under Section 44(1)(b), the rationale for permitting the investigating agency to arrest the accused independently ceases to exist. The shift in control from the investigating agency to the judicial authority at this stage is consistent with fundamental principles of criminal procedure that vest courts with supervisory jurisdiction over deprivation of personal liberty. This does not mean that the Enforcement Directorate cannot arrest any person after cognizance has been taken; the agency retains the power to arrest persons who are not named as accused in the original complaint if, during further investigation, the agency discovers involvement of additional persons in the money laundering offense. However, for persons already named as accused in the complaint who were not arrested during investigation, the power to deprive them of liberty shifts to the Special Court.
Contemporary Judicial Developments
The principles established in Tarsem Lal must be understood in conjunction with other contemporary developments in Prevention of Money Laundering Act jurisprudence. In Prabir Purkayastha v. State, decided on May 15, 2024, the Supreme Court extended the ratio of the Pankaj Bansal judgment to arrests made under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, holding that the requirement to provide written grounds of arrest applies across special legislations [7]. This demonstrates the Court’s consistent approach toward ensuring that procedural safeguards protecting personal liberty are uniformly applied regardless of the specific statute under which arrest is made. The judgment in Prabir Purkayastha emphasized that the constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22(1) of the Constitution is not statute-specific but applies universally to all arrests, and the requirement to communicate grounds of arrest in writing is an essential component of this safeguard.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation has acquired particular significance in the context of Prevention of Money Laundering Act cases involving Enforcement Directorate arrest powers under the PMLA. In that judgment, the Court had held that arrest is not mandatory even in serious offenses if the accused has cooperated during investigation and there is no risk of absconding or tampering with evidence [5]. This principle has been invoked in several Prevention of Money Laundering Act cases to argue that accused persons who have appeared whenever summoned and have cooperated with investigation should not be subjected to arrest merely because the Enforcement Directorate has filed a complaint. The Tarsem Lal judgment reinforces this principle by holding that once the Enforcement Directorate has consciously chosen not to arrest an accused during investigation despite having the opportunity and power to do so, this decision should generally be respected even after cognizance is taken.
The judgment in Moloy Ghatak v. Enforcement Directorate addressed the mandatory nature of compliance with summons issued under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act [8]. The Court held that any person summoned under Section 50 is bound to attend in person or through an authorized agent and to state the truth upon any subject concerning which he is being examined or is expected to make a statement, and is required to produce documents. The Court held that statements recorded in response to Section 50 summons are admissible in nature and can be relied upon to build a case regarding the offense of money laundering, and such statements cannot be alleged to be violative of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. However, the Court also clarified that mere non-cooperation of a witness in response to summons issued under Section 50 will not automatically render him liable to be arrested under Section 19, as emphasized in the Pankaj Bansal judgment.
The Karnataka High Court’s judgment in V.C. Mohan addressed the specific question of whether Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act applies to anticipatory bail proceedings [9]. The Supreme Court, in subsequent appeals, has held that the rigorous conditions of Section 45 apply equally to anticipatory bail as they do to regular bail, creating a uniform standard that makes it extremely difficult for accused persons to secure pre-arrest protection. However, the Tarsem Lal judgment creates an important exception to this principle by holding that accused persons who were never arrested during investigation and who appear pursuant to summons are not required to seek bail at all, whether regular or anticipatory, and therefore the question of compliance with Section 45 does not arise in their cases.
Constitutional Dimensions and Rights Protection
The Tarsem Lal judgment represents a significant judicial intervention aimed at protecting constitutional rights while simultaneously preserving the effectiveness of anti-money laundering enforcement. Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The Supreme Court has consistently held that this procedure must be fair, just, and reasonable, and cannot be arbitrary or oppressive. The Court’s decision to restrict Enforcement Directorate arrest powers under the PMLA after cognizance has been taken reflects the constitutional imperative that deprivation of personal liberty must be subject to meaningful judicial oversight and cannot be left to the unfettered discretion of investigating agencies.
Article 22(1) of the Constitution mandates that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest. This provision serves multiple purposes: it enables the arrested person to know the case against him, facilitates effective legal representation, and allows for meaningful judicial review of the arrest. The Supreme Court’s insistence in Pankaj Bansal that grounds of arrest must be provided in writing rather than merely being read out orally is grounded in the recognition that oral communication alone may not provide the arrested person with sufficient information to exercise his rights effectively, particularly given the complexity of money laundering investigations and the stringent bail conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act [3].
Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. The question of whether Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act violates Article 14 by creating an unreasonable classification has been the subject of considerable judicial debate. The judgment in Nikesh Tarachand Shah had held that the twin conditions create arbitrary discrimination between persons accused under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act and persons accused under ordinary criminal laws, as the former face significantly higher hurdles in obtaining bail [6]. However, the three-judge bench in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary overruled this view, holding that the classification is reasonable and based on intelligible differentia having a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved, which is combating the menace of money laundering [2]. The Tarsem Lal judgment does not disturb this holding but instead creates procedural safeguards that mitigate the harsh impact of Section 45 in cases where the accused was never arrested during investigation.
The constitutional principle of presumption of innocence, while not explicitly articulated in any specific constitutional provision, is recognized as an integral part of the fair trial guarantee under Article 21. This principle holds that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the burden of proving guilt lies upon the prosecution. However, Section 24 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act creates a reverse burden of proof, requiring the accused to prove that the alleged proceeds of crime are actually untainted property. The Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary upheld this provision, holding that the presumption of innocence can be interdicted by Parliament through legislation when dealing with special categories of offenses that pose serious threats to society and the economy [2]. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently emphasized that such presumptions must be balanced against other constitutional safeguards, and procedural protections must be scrupulously maintained to prevent abuse of the reverse burden provision.
Enforcement Directorate: Powers, Limitations, and Accountability
The Enforcement Directorate’s institutional structure and operational framework have evolved significantly since its establishment in 1956. The agency currently maintains a headquarters investigation unit along with numerous zonal offices and sub-zonal offices spread across the country. The Enforcement Directorate’s primary mandate encompasses three main areas: enforcement of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act including investigation of money laundering offenses and filing of prosecution complaints before Special Courts; enforcement of the Foreign Exchange Management Act dealing with violations of foreign exchange regulations; and enforcement of the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act targeting individuals who have fled India to avoid facing prosecution for economic offenses. The agency also carries out international cooperation with competent authorities in foreign jurisdictions for purposes of asset tracing, freezing, and repatriation.
The investigation process under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act typically begins with the registration of an Enforcement Case Information Report, which is analogous to a First Information Report under the Code of Criminal Procedure but is not governed by the same procedural requirements. The Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary held that the Enforcement Case Information Report need not be supplied to the accused as a matter of course, unlike a First Information Report which must be provided to the accused under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [2]. This holding has been criticized as creating an information asymmetry that disadvantages the accused, but the Court justified it on the ground that supplying the Enforcement Case Information Report at an early stage might compromise the investigation by alerting other potential accused persons or enabling destruction of evidence.
The Enforcement Directorate has the power to conduct searches and seizures under Sections 17 and 18 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). These provisions enable authorized officers to search premises, conveyances, and persons, and to seize documents, property, and other materials that may be relevant to the money laundering investigation. The Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary upheld these provisions as constitutional, noting that they contain adequate safeguards including requirements for recording reasons, maintaining inventories, and providing copies of seizure records to affected persons [2]. However, the Court also emphasized that these powers must be exercised in accordance with the statutory requirements and cannot be used arbitrarily or for purposes extraneous to the investigation of money laundering offenses.
The power to provisionally attach property under Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) is one of the most potent weapons in the Enforcement Directorate’s arsenal. This provision enables the agency to freeze assets suspected to be proceeds of crime even before formal charges are filed, preventing the dissipation or transfer of such assets during the investigation. The attachment can be confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority after following prescribed procedures, and ultimately the property can be confiscated after conviction. The Supreme Court has held that provisional attachment is a preventive measure rather than a punitive one, and is justified by the need to preserve the proceeds of crime for eventual confiscation. However, courts have also held that the power of attachment must be exercised judiciously and cannot be used to cause unnecessary hardship to innocent third parties who may have legitimate interests in the attached property.
Conclusion and Broader Significance
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement represents a careful judicial recalibration of the balance between effective law enforcement and protection of constitutional rights in the context of money laundering investigations. By restricting the Enforcement Directorate’s power to arrest accused persons after a Special Court has taken cognizance of the offense, the Court has created an important procedural safeguard that prevents potential abuse of arrest powers while simultaneously preserving the agency’s ability to effectively investigate and prosecute money laundering offenses. The judgment recognizes that the power of arrest under Section 19 of the PMLA vested in the Enforcement Directorate is designed primarily to facilitate investigation, and once the investigation is substantially complete and a complaint has been filed, the justification for the independent exercise of arrest powers by the investigating agency diminishes considerably.
The principles established in this judgment have far-reaching implications for the practice of criminal law in cases involving special legislations that grant enhanced powers to investigating agencies. The Court’s emphasis on judicial oversight, procedural regularity, and respect for personal liberty sends a clear message that even in cases involving serious economic offenses, the fundamental constitutional guarantees cannot be compromised. The judgment also reflects the Court’s recognition that stringent bail conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act create significant barriers to personal liberty, and therefore the circumstances under which these conditions must be satisfied should be carefully circumscribed.
The ongoing evolution of Prevention of Money Laundering Act jurisprudence demonstrates the judiciary’s continuing engagement with the difficult questions posed by the intersection of special legislation and fundamental rights. While the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary upheld the broad framework of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act as constitutional, subsequent decisions like Pankaj Bansal and Tarsem Lal have introduced important procedural safeguards that moderate the exercise of enforcement powers. This incremental approach allows the legal system to learn from experience and to make necessary adjustments that ensure both effective enforcement against financial crimes and protection of individual rights. The challenge for courts, investigating agencies, and legal practitioners is to implement these principles in a manner that achieves both objectives without compromising either.
References
[1] Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, Jalandhar Zonal Office, 2024 INSC 434 (May 16, 2024). Available at: https://www.scobserver.in/cases/enforcement-directorates-power-to-arrest-under-pmla-after-special-courts-cognisance-tarsem-lal-v-directorate-of-enforcement/
[2] Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929 (July 27, 2022). Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/14485072/
[3] Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244 (October 3, 2023). Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/189692408/
[4] Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1. Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/855018/
[5] Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2021) 10 SCC 773. Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7148380/
[6] Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1. Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/117859307/
[7] Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine SC (May 15, 2024). Available at: https://www.livelaw.in/top-
