The Narrow Bridge of Admissibility: Deconstructing Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

The Prohibition and the Proviso: Regulating Police Power

The framework of criminal law in India is meticulously designed to protect individuals against the coercive environment of police custody, ensuring that confessions are free and voluntary. This foundational principle is enshrined within the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [1], which meticulously regulates what information may be presented before a court of law. Specifically, Sections 25 and 26 operate as stringent exclusionary rules, creating a near-absolute bar against the use of statements made to or while in the custody of a police officer.

Section 25 of the Act unequivocally declares that a confession made to a police officer shall not be proved as against a person accused of any offence. This blanket prohibition is rooted in a historical distrust of police methods, recognizing the potential for abuse, duress, and coercion in extracting self-incriminating statements. Similarly, Section 26 extends this protection, making a confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer inadmissible, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, who is deemed a neutral authority capable of verifying voluntariness. The combined force of these two sections ensures that a person’s words, when uttered under the inherent pressure of custodial interrogation, are ordinarily denied the status of admissible evidence.

However, the mechanism of justice necessitates a balance between safeguarding the rights of the accused and enabling the investigation of truth. This critical equilibrium is addressed by Section 27, which functions as a narrow, tightly controlled proviso or exception to the general exclusionary rule of Sections 25 and 26. This exception is not intended to nullify the protective intent of the preceding sections but rather to admit information that possesses an inherent, objective guarantee of truth. This guarantee arises not from the accused’s mere statement of guilt, but from the consequential discovery of a fact that was previously unknown to the police authorities.

The precise wording of the provision, which has been subject to rigorous judicial scrutiny for over seven decades, remains the touchstone for admissibility:

Section 27: How much of information received from accused may be proved.

Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be prov1ed. [2]

A close reading reveals that the exception is conditional on four essential elements: the person must be an accused; he must be in police custody; he must provide information; and, crucially, this information must lead to the discovery of a fact. The admissibility is strictly limited to “so much of such information… as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered.” It is the interpretative boundary of this phrase, particularly concerning disclosures about the use of a recovered object, that has recently been underscored by the Supreme Court of India.

The Judicial Limitation: The Doctrine of Confirmation by Subsequent Events

The purpose of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is to allow the prosecution to prove the knowledge of the accused regarding the existence and location of a particular object or circumstance, as confirmed by the subsequent event of discovery. This principle, known as the Doctrine of Confirmation by Subsequent Events, provides the necessary reliability that is otherwise absent in a custodial statement.

The Defining Authority of Pulukuri Kottaya

The enduring interpretation of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and the strict delineation of its scope owes its origin to the landmark Privy Council decision in Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor (1947) [3]. This judgment is the foundational text that guards against the section being misused to admit a full confession masquerading as a discovery statement.

In Kottaya, the Privy Council addressed the common practice of police officials recording statements that were essentially confessions, but which also mentioned the location of an object. The Court held that the “fact discovered” is not merely the physical object, such as the knife or the blood-stained garment, but a complex of three interconnected components: (1) The object found; (2) The place from which it is produced; and (3) The knowledge of the accused about its existence and location.

The pivotal clarification made by the Privy Council was regarding the scope of the phrase, “so much of such information… as relates distinctly.” It ruled that information as to the past user or the past history of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. For instance, if an accused states, “I killed the victim with a knife and hid it under the banyan tree,” and the knife is subsequently recovered:

• Admissible Part: “I hid a knife under the banyan tree.” (Relates distinctly to the discovery of the knife at that location).
• Inadmissible Part: “I killed the victim with a knife” or “…with which I stabbed the victim.” (This relates to the commission of the offence—the confession—and not to the discovery of the fact that the knife was concealed there).

The Privy Council emphasized that if statements involving the use of the weapon in the crime were allowed, the protective barriers erected by Sections 25 and 26 would be rendered completely illusory. This restrictive interpretation ensures that only the element which is guaranteed by the physical discovery—the accused’s knowledge of concealment—is admissible [4].

The Contemporary Rationale: Rajendra Singh and the Forensic Linkage Requirement

The Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the narrow construction laid down in the Kottaya principle, and the recent ruling in Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal reinforced this doctrine with emphasis, particularly in cases where the prosecution attempts to substitute missing forensic evidence with a mere confessional disclosure [5].

In the Rajendra Singh case, the appellants were initially acquitted by the Trial Court but subsequently convicted by the High Court, largely on the basis of disclosure statements made under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, where they allegedly confessed that the recovered weapons were indeed the weapons of crime. The Supreme Court, in overturning the High Court’s judgment and restoring the acquittal, found this reliance to be a manifest error of law, directly contravening the established judicial precedent on the scope of the provision [5].

The Bench emphatically stated that the statement of the accused that the weapons recovered were the weapons of crime cannot be read against them. The Court held that:

“Only that part of the statement which leads the police to the recovery of the weapons is admissible, and not the part which alleges that the weapons recovered were actually the weapons of crime.”

This judgment crystallizes the distinction: the act of hiding is an act antecedent to the disclosure and is confirmed by the recovery; the act of using the weapon in the crime is a matter of confession, which is inadmissible. The mere recovery of an object, even if the accused claims it was used in the murder, only proves the accused’s possession and knowledge of its concealment. It does not, by itself, prove its use in the crime, nor does it establish the identity of the user as the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Indispensable Role of Corroboration and Forensic Evidence

A crucial element highlighted in the Rajendra Singh judgment, tying the law of evidence to the necessity of concrete proof, was the failure of the prosecution to establish a forensic link between the recovered weapons and the deceased [6]. The police had recovered weapons allegedly on the pointing out of the appellants, but no report from the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) was produced to confirm that the weapons were stained with the deceased’s blood.

The Court correctly observed that without an FSL report establishing a nexus, the recovery evidence, even if technically admissible under Section 27, only proves the accused’s knowledge of the place of concealment. It is an incomplete link in the chain of circumstantial evidence. The conviction cannot be sustained solely on the recovery of a weapon if that weapon is not conclusively and forensically linked to the offence. This view is consistent with the well-established principles for evaluating circumstantial evidence, requiring the chain of circumstances to be complete and point only to the guilt of the accused, as laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) [7].

Therefore, the regulation of Section 27 evidence extends beyond mere admissibility; it dictates its probative value. The disclosure statement is not self-probatory; it is a piece of corroborative evidence. Its strength depends entirely on the independent, physical fact discovered, which must, in turn, be connected to the crime through external, reliable evidence like forensic reports [8].

The Mechanism of Severability and Admissibility

The application of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act imposes a serious responsibility on the Investigating Officer (IO) and the trial court to perform a task of meticulous severance, splitting the statement into its admissible and inadmissible components. This judicial exercise ensures that only the distinctly relevant part is placed on record, thereby upholding the constitutional mandate against self-incrimination while allowing truth to emerge.

The Test of Distinct Relation

The expression “relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered” is the operative phrase that governs the severability test. The Supreme Court in Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra (1976) [9] provided a clear judicial template for applying this test. The Court explained that the information must be such that it leads to the discovery of a fact of which the investigating agency had no prior knowledge. If the police already knew the location or the existence of the object, the subsequent disclosure by the accused, even if voluntary, does not constitute a “discovery” and is inadmissible, as held in cases like Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2004) [10].

Furthermore, the process demands that the statement recorded by the IO must be precise. It must be a succinct recital of the accused’s statement that directly causes the police to recover the object. Any descriptive phrases or assertions that detail the commission of the crime—such as the motive, the manner of assault, or the identity of co-conspirators—are confessions and must be excised by the court. The admissible statement must be narrowly phrased to confirm the accused’s knowledge:

• Correct Admissible Form: “I have concealed the axe (weapon) wrapped in a cloth in the dry well near the field.” (Leads distinctly to discovery).
• Incorrect, Inadmissible Form (Confessional): “I killed him with this axe and concealed it in the dry well.” (The part relating to the use, “I killed him with this axe,” is inadmissible).

The Supreme Court’s consistent position, notably affirmed by the eleven-Judge Bench in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961) [4], is that Section 27 is constitutionally valid because the admissible statement is not viewed as a testimonial self-incrimination, but as an objective fact of discovery that serves as circumstantial evidence. The evidence provided is not the mental act of confessing guilt, but the physical act of showing where the weapon is, confirming a mental fact (knowledge of location).

Implications for Investigating Agencies

The stringent judicial interpretation imposes a high burden on police officers:

1. Meticulous Documentation: The Memorandum of Statement (or Panchnama) must be recorded verbatim and must clearly distinguish between the confessional part (inadmissible) and the leading statement (admissible).
2. Independent Recovery: The recovery must be witnessed by independent panch witnesses, and their testimony must corroborate the police officer’s deposition regarding the act of discovery.
3. Mandatory Corroboration: The police cannot rest their case on the recovery alone. They must secure the necessary forensic, scientific, or other independent evidence to link the recovered object to the commission of the crime, as the Rajendra Singh ruling makes clear. Without the forensic nexus—the blood match, the ballistic comparison, or the positive material trace—the recovery of a weapon, even if proved, is rendered inconclusive as evidence of guilt.

This regulatory mechanism ensures that Section 27, while serving as a vital tool for investigators, remains fundamentally aligned with the broader human rights regime. It prevents the police from using the exception as a backdoor to admit coerced confessions, restricting its use only to verifiable facts that emerge as a direct and distinct consequence of the accused’s unique knowledge. The latest affirmation in Rajendra Singh is a timely and necessary restatement that protects the fairness of the criminal trial process by re-emphasizing that the exception is merely a fragment of the rule, and cannot be permitted to override the primary prohibitions against custodial confessions [5].

Summary of Legal Position and Key Takeaways

The law regulating the admissibility of discovery statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is marked by restraint and clarity:

• Rule of Exclusion (Sections 25 & 26): Confessions made to police or while in police custody are inadmissible.
• Exception (Section 27): Only that portion of the information which distinctly relates to the discovery of a fact previously unknown to the police is admissible.
• Scope of Admissibility (The Narrow Bridge): The admissible portion is restricted to the accused’s knowledge of the existence and location of the object (e.g., “I hid the knife under the tree”).
• Scope of Inadmissibility (The Prohibition): Any statement concerning the past history or use of the object in the commission of the crime (e.g., “I killed the victim with this knife”) is a confessional statement and is strictly inadmissible [3, 5].
• Evidentiary Value: The discovery evidence is circumstantial and cannot, in most cases, lead to conviction without robust corroboration, such as independent eyewitness testimony or conclusive forensic linkage (e.g., blood group match, as underscored in the Rajendra Singh judgment) [6, 7].

The regulation is thus a constitutional safeguard, ensuring that the principle of “discovery” is not abused to prove the statement of guilt itself, but only the specific mental fact (knowledge of concealment) confirmed by the subsequent physical recovery.

References

[1] The Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Ministry of Law and Justice, Legislative Department, Government of India. Link to Indian Evidence Act, 1872

[2] Section 27, The Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Link to Indian Evidence Act, 1872

[3] Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67. Privy Council. Link to Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor

[4] State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR 1961 SC 1808. Supreme Court of India. Link to State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad

[5] Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 980. Supreme Court of India (Judgment authored by Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B. Varale). Link to Live Law Article on Rajendra Singh v. State of Uttaranchal

[6] Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 980 (Specific observation on forensic linkage). Link to Law Trend Article on Rajendra Singh case

[7] Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116. Supreme Court of India (Laying down the Panchsheel principles for circumstantial evidence). Link to Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra

[8] Manjunath and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 14 SCC 653. Supreme Court of India (Affirming the limited scope of Section 27). Link to Manjunath v. State of Karnataka

[9] Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 828. Supreme Court of India (Elucidating the conditions for admissible evidence under S. 27).  Link to Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra

[10] Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 657. Supreme Court of India (On the requirement of discovery of a previously unknown fact). Link to Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan