Continuity of CrPC Discharge and Framing of Charges Under BNSS: Supreme Court Judgment in Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh

Introduction

The replacement of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 marked a major reform in Indian criminal procedure. Questions arose whether this transition affected the substantive legal standards, particularly the discharge and framing of charges under BNSS. In February 2026, the Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark judgment in Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. [1], clarifying the continuity of jurisprudence between the two enactments.

The judgment, delivered by a bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh on 10 February 2026, holds profound significance for criminal practitioners, trial courts, and accused persons across India. The Court unequivocally held that the substantive legal standards governing discharge and framing of charges under the CrPC continue unchanged under the BNSS, while the new legislation introduces regulatory discipline through express timelines and procedural structuring.

Background of the Case

The case originated from an incident on 15 November 2022 in Ratlam, Madhya Pradesh, during the unveiling of a statue of Bhagwan Birsa Munda. An FIR was registered at PS Bilpank, District Ratlam, alleging that members of the JAYS organization, including Dr. Anand Rai, had intercepted vehicles of Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assembly and engaged in a confrontation with district officials [1]. The appellant was charged under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, along with Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

The Trial Court partially accepted the discharge application, framing charges under both the IPC and the SC/ST Act. The Madhya Pradesh High Court upheld this decision in an appeal under Section 14A of the SC/ST Act. The appellant challenged this order before the Supreme Court, raising two primary contentions: first, that the charges under the SC/ST Act were not sustainable in the absence of any material establishing the complainant’s caste or the appellant’s knowledge thereof; and second, that the High Court had failed to independently examine the record as required in a first appellate proceeding.

Statutory Provisions: Section 227 CrPC and Section 250 BNSS

Section 227 of the CrPC provided that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing [2].

Section 250(2) of the BNSS retains the same substantive language, stating that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing [3]. The critical difference introduced by the BNSS is procedural rather than substantive.

Section 250(1) of the BNSS introduces a new provision stipulating that the accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment of the case under Section 232 [3]. This timeline was not present in the CrPC, representing a regulatory innovation aimed at structuring the process and reducing delay. Similarly, Section 251 of the BNSS prescribes that charges should ordinarily be framed within sixty days from the date of first hearing in Sessions-triable cases [4].

Supreme Court’s Observations on Continuity of Discharge and Framing of Charges Under BNSS

The Supreme Court conducted a close textual analysis of both the CrPC and the BNSS to determine whether there had been any substantive change in the legal standards applicable at the stages of discharge and framing of charges. The Court observed that “on a close reading of the statutory text of the CrPC and the BNSS, the position is one of continuity rather than change in relation to the Court’s power at the stages of discharge and framing of charge” [1].

The Court explained that at the stage of discharge, the Court is required to consider whether there is any sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused in Sessions cases, or whether the charge is groundless in Magistrate warrant cases. At the subsequent stage, charges are to be framed only if the Court forms an opinion that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence [1]. These formulations, the Court emphasized, have long anchored the exercise of judicial discretion under the CrPC and are carried forward in substance in the corresponding provisions of the BNSS, without any textual indication that the level of scrutiny is intended to be either heightened or diluted.

Addressing the nature of changes introduced by the BNSS, the Court held that “what the BNSS does is to change the procedural setting within which this discretion is exercised. The new statute introduces express timelines for the filing of discharge applications and for the framing of charges, and it expressly recognises the possibility of the accused being heard or examined through electronic means. These changes are regulatory in nature. They are aimed at structuring the process and reducing delay, not at transforming the judicial task itself” [1].

Established Jurisprudence Under the CrPC Remains Applicable

The Court conclusively held that “the established jurisprudence developed under the Cr.P.C. on the scope and limits of consideration at the stages of discharge and framing of charges under BNSS continues to hold the field. The statutory language supports the conclusion that the Legislature has retained the same substantive balance between the rights of the accused and the interest of prosecution, while seeking to impose greater procedural discipline and expedition. In substance, the power remains the same; only the manner of its exercise has been more tightly structured” [1].

This declaration is of immense practical significance. It means that the entire body of precedents developed by the Supreme Court and High Courts interpreting Section 227 CrPC regarding discharge, and Section 228 CrPC regarding framing of charges, continues to guide courts operating under the BNSS. The foundational principles laid down in landmark cases remain fully applicable.

Key Precedents That Continue to Apply

The most significant precedent governing discharge proceedings is Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [5], decided in 1979. This judgment laid down four fundamental principles that have guided discharge proceedings for over four decades. First, the Judge while considering the question of framing charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.

Second, where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. Third, the test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.

Fourth, in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code, the Judge cannot act merely as a Post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial [5].

These principles have been consistently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in numerous subsequent judgments. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala [6], the Court reiterated that if two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused. In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [7], the Court clarified that the defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged, and the expression “the record of the case” is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution.

More recently, in M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. Central Bureau of Investigation [8], decided in 2020, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that at the stage of discharge, a strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be found on some material which can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. In 2025, the Supreme Court again emphasized in State Represented by Inspector of Police, CBI, ACB, Visakhapatnam v. M/s. Cotton Corporation of India Limited [9] that an accused has no right to rely on documents outside the chargesheet at the stage of framing of charges, and only the report filed under Section 173 CrPC and the materials submitted with it can be considered.

Regulatory Innovations Under the BNSS

While the substantive standards remain unchanged, the BNSS introduces significant regulatory innovations aimed at reducing delay and imposing procedural discipline. The most important of these is the introduction of express timelines. Section 250(1) of the BNSS requires that an application for discharge be filed within sixty days from the date of commitment of the case [3]. This timeline, which did not exist under the CrPC, is designed to prevent indefinite delay in the filing of discharge applications.

However, the Kerala High Court in Sajith v. State of Kerala [4] clarified an important aspect of this provision. The Court held that the use of the word “may” in Section 250(1) makes the sixty-day timeline directory rather than mandatory. The Court observed that unlike Section 330(1) of the BNSS, which uses the word “shall” and includes a proviso for extension, Section 250(1) uses “may” and contains no such proviso. Therefore, even after the expiry of sixty days, a petition for discharge can be considered by the court since the time limit is not mandatory and is only directory.

The Kerala High Court also identified a legislative gap in Section 250(1) regarding cases where committal is not possible, such as proceedings under special statutes like the POCSO Act, NDPS Act, or SC/ST Act. In such cases, there is no committal procedure, and the Special Court takes cognizance directly. To address this ambiguity, the Orissa High Court in a 2025 judgment [3] directed that in POCSO cases, the sixty-day period for filing discharge applications should be counted from the date when copies of documents are supplied to the accused under Section 230 of the BNSS.

Section 251 of the BNSS prescribes that in Sessions-triable cases, charges should ordinarily be framed within sixty days from the date of first hearing [4]. This timeline reflects the legislative intent to expedite the pre-trial stage and reduce the prolonged pendency that has historically plagued criminal trials in India. The Supreme Court in 2025 expressed concern over prolonged pendency at the charge-framing stage and underscored the need for strict adherence to these statutory timelines, observing that delays at this stage undermine both the rights of the accused and public confidence in the justice system.

Another procedural innovation is that the BNSS expressly recognizes the possibility of the accused being heard or examined through electronic means [1]. This provision acknowledges the technological capabilities now available to courts and seeks to facilitate proceedings without requiring physical presence in all cases, thereby reducing delay and inconvenience.

Impact on Criminal Practice and Trial Courts

The Supreme Court’s clarification in Dr. Anand Rai has several important implications for criminal practice. First, it provides certainty to practitioners and trial courts that the extensive body of case law developed under the CrPC remains fully applicable under the BNSS. This means that arguments, precedents, and principles that were well-established under the CrPC need not be re-litigated or re-established under the new legislation.

Second, the judgment emphasizes that the Court’s obligation to apply its mind to the record, to hear both sides, and to record reasons where discharge is ordered remains exactly as before, as does the caution against weighing evidence or conducting a mini-trial [1]. This continuity ensures that the fundamental safeguards against frivolous prosecutions remain intact.

Third, the introduction of timelines imposes a discipline on both courts and parties. The sixty-day timeline for filing discharge applications encourages accused persons to promptly exercise their right to seek discharge rather than allowing matters to linger. The sixty-day timeline for framing charges similarly requires trial courts to prioritize these matters and dispose of them expeditiously. While these timelines are primarily directory in nature, they represent clear legislative expectations regarding the pace at which pre-trial proceedings should move.

Fourth, the judgment clarifies that the regulatory changes introduced by the BNSS do not transform the judicial task itself. Courts are not required to apply either a more lenient or a more stringent standard when considering discharge applications under the BNSS. The test remains whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, evaluated by considering whether the prosecution material discloses grave suspicion that has not been properly explained.

The SC/ST Act Dimension: Knowledge as a Foundational Element

In the Dr. Anand Rai case itself, the Supreme Court also addressed important substantive questions regarding the SC/ST Act. The Court held that for charges under Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, the element of knowledge regarding the victim’s caste identity is not incidental but foundational. Section 3(2)(v) requires that the accused must have knowledge that the victim belongs to SC/ST, and this knowledge must be prima facie established at the stage of framing charges [1].

The Court found that in the present case, there was no averment whatsoever in the FIR or the statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC that the complainant belonged to a SC or ST community, nor was there any material showing that the appellant acted with knowledge of the victim’s caste [1]. In the absence of such prima facie material, the Court held that continuation of proceedings under the SC/ST Act would amount to mechanical application of a protective statute and quashed the charges under that Act.

Duty of Appellate Courts Under Section 14A of SC/ST Act

The judgment also clarified the nature of appellate jurisdiction under Section 14A of the SC/ST Act. The Court held that the High Court does not function as a revisional or supervisory Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 14-A but assumes the role of a first appellate court. A mechanical affirmation of the order of the Special Court, without independent scrutiny, would be inconsistent with settled appellate jurisprudence and would amount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction [1].

The Court emphasized that even where the appellate Court ultimately agrees with the reasoning of the Courts below, the judgment must disclose that the material was independently examined. In this case, the High Court’s judgment, though running into eighteen pages, did not deal at all with the charges under the SC/ST Act and merely recorded that the trial court had assigned elaborate reasons. This approach was found to be insufficient [1].

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh represents a significant judicial pronouncement on the transition from the CrPC to the BNSS. By unequivocally holding that the substantive legal standards governing discharge and framing of charges under BNSS continue unchanged, the Court has provided clarity and certainty to the criminal justice system. The extensive jurisprudence developed over decades under the CrPC remains fully applicable, ensuring continuity and predictability.

At the same time, the judgment acknowledges and validates the regulatory innovations introduced by the BNSS. The express timelines for filing discharge applications and framing charges represent legislative efforts to impose greater procedural discipline and expedition. While these timelines are primarily directory in nature, they signal clear expectations regarding the pace at which pre-trial proceedings should move.

The judgment also underscores the human consequences of criminal prosecutions. As the Court observed, at the stage of framing of charge or considering discharge, the Court is not dealing with an abstract legal exercise but with real people, real anxieties, and the real weight of criminal prosecution [1]. This reminder emphasizes the importance of courts exercising their discharge jurisdiction with due care, ensuring that no person is subjected to the ordeal of a trial without sufficient ground.

For practitioners, trial courts, and appellate courts, the message is clear: in substance, the power remains the same; only the manner of its exercise has been more tightly structured. The foundational principles established in cases like Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal continue to guide the exercise of judicial discretion at the pre-trial stage. The BNSS has not transformed the judicial task; it has merely structured the procedural setting within which that task is performed.

References

[1] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., 2026 INSC 141 (Criminal Appeal No. 814/2026, decided on 10 February 2026). Available at: https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/crpc-jurisprudence-on-discharge-framing-of-charges-continues-under-bnss-supreme-court-522780

[2] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 227.

[3] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Section 250. See also: https://drishtijudiciary.com/current-affairs/section-250-of-bnss

[4] Sajith v. State of Kerala, Kerala High Court, Crl.Rev.Pet No. 879 of 2024. Available at: https://www.lawweb.in/2024/09/kerala-hc-sessions-or-special-court-has.html

[5] Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr., (1979) 3 SCC 4, 1979 AIR 366, decided on 6 November 1978. Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1360078/

[6] P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398.

[7] State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, AIR 2005 SC 359.

[8] M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. Central Bureau of Investigation, Bengaluru, (2020) 2 SCC 768.

[9] State Represented by Inspector of Police, CBI, ACB, Visakhapatnam v. M/s. Cotton Corporation of India Limited & Ors., Supreme Court judgment dated July 2025. Available at: https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/accused-cannot-rely-on-documents-beyond-chargesheet-to-seek-discharge-supreme-court-1500704