Section 27 Evidence Act: Materials Handed Over During Police Check Cannot Be Termed Section 27 Recoveries: Supreme Court Analysis

Introduction

In a significant ruling that clarifies the boundaries of evidentiary law in criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court of India has held that materials handed over by an accused person during routine police checks cannot be characterized as recoveries under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This judgment in the case of Shaik Shabuddin v. State of Telangana[1] reinforces the principle that the element of concealment is essential for invoking Section 27, and mere seizure of articles already in possession of the accused at the time of arrest does not satisfy the legal requirements for admissibility under this provision. The bench comprising Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice K. Vinod Chandran delivered this judgment while examining a criminal appeal concerning convictions under Sections 302 and 376D of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, along with provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

Understanding Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act

Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, operates as a carefully crafted exception to the general prohibition against confessions made to police officers or while in police custody as laid down in Sections 25 and 26 of the Act. The provision states: “Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”[2] This section embodies the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events, which posits that if a fact is actually discovered as a consequence of information given by an accused person, such discovery provides a guarantee that the information supplied is truthful. The legislative intent behind this provision was to balance the need for effective investigation with the protection of accused persons from coerced confessions during police custody.

The foundational interpretation of Section 27 comes from the landmark Privy Council judgment in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor[3], where it was established that the term “fact discovered” does not merely refer to the physical object produced but encompasses the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused regarding that place. The Privy Council emphasized that information supplied by a person in custody stating “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife, as knives were discovered many years ago, but rather leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge. This distinction between the object itself and the fact of its concealment remains crucial in understanding the proper application of Section 27.

Facts and Background of the Shaik Shabuddin Case

The case arose from a heinous incident that occurred on November 24, 2019, involving the gang rape and murder of a female utensil hawker. The prosecution’s case was that three accused persons followed the victim after she was dropped at Yellapatar Village, subsequently raped her in an isolated area, and then killed her by slitting her throat to eliminate evidence of their crime. The deceased’s body was discovered the next day in bushes near the road. The trial court, after considering the evidence, awarded the death penalty to all three accused. However, the High Court of Telangana modified this sentence, commuting it to life imprisonment without remission for the remainder of the accused’s natural life. The High Court’s judgment relied significantly on alleged confessions and what it characterized as recoveries under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, particularly the recovery of the victim’s mobile phone and other articles from the accused persons.

The Supreme Court’s Analysis of Section 27 Recoveries

The Supreme Court undertook a meticulous examination of the circumstances under which articles were allegedly recovered from the accused persons. The prosecution’s own version revealed that the mobile phone, knife, cash, and clothes were already in the physical possession of the accused at the time of their arrest and were subsequently handed over during routine police custody procedures. The Court noted that according to the prosecution’s case, one of the accused handed over the victim’s mobile phone to a witness at the police station during a personal check. This factual matrix became crucial in the Court’s determination that these circumstances did not satisfy the requirements for invoking Section 27. The bench observed that when material objects could have been seized from the body of the accused through a mere search at the time of arrest, any attempt to project such seizure as a recovery under Section 27 cannot be accepted. This approach, the Court held, goes against the very principle underlying Section 27, which requires that the disclosure must relate to the concealment and subsequent recovery of material objects pursuant to information provided by the accused.

The Court emphasized that for Section 27 to be attracted, there must be prior concealment of the relevant fact or object by the accused, and its subsequent discovery by the police must be a direct consequence of the information furnished by the accused. In the present case, since the articles were recovered from the accused’s person during routine checks following arrest, there was no element of concealment involved. The recovery was not made at some place pointed out by the accused based on information leading to discovery, but rather consisted of articles that were already visible and accessible to the investigating officers at the time of arrest. The Supreme Court categorically stated that there was no concealment as such, and when material objects could have been seized from the body of the accused on a mere search by the police, the attempt to convert it as a recovery under Section 27 cannot at all be accepted.[1]

The Doctrine of Confirmation by Subsequent Events

The principle underlying Section 27 is deeply rooted in the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. This doctrine operates on the premise that when information provided by an accused person leads to the actual discovery of a previously unknown or concealed fact, such discovery serves as a guarantee of the truthfulness of the information provided. The Supreme Court in State of NCT of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu[4] reiterated this principle and clarified that normally the section is brought into operation when a person in police custody produces from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body, weapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused. The emphasis on concealment is paramount because it is the discovery of the concealed object, based on information that only the accused could have known, that provides the confirmatory value to the disclosure statement.

In the context of the Shaik Shabuddin case, the Supreme Court found that this essential element of concealment was entirely missing. The articles that the prosecution sought to introduce as Section 27 recoveries were not concealed in any manner but were openly carried by the accused at the time of arrest. The Court noted that the investigating officers could have seized these items through a routine search immediately upon arrest without any disclosure statement being necessary. Therefore, the subsequent characterization of these seizures as discoveries under Section 27 was legally unsustainable. This distinction is critical because it prevents the misuse of Section 27 to legitimize what would otherwise be inadmissible confessional statements made during police custody.

Essential Requirements for Section 27 Admissibility

The Supreme Court has consistently held that certain conditions must be satisfied for information to be admissible under Section 27. First, there must be a discovery of a fact that is relevant in consequence of information received from the accused person. Second, the discovery of such fact must be deposed to, meaning that the fact should not already be known to the police from prior sources. Third, at the time of receipt of the information, the accused must be in the custody of a police officer. Fourth, only so much information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible.[5] These requirements create a stringent framework designed to ensure that only genuinely probative evidence is admitted while protecting accused persons from the potential abuse of custodial interrogation.

In applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court found that the second requirement was fundamentally not met. The articles in question were not discovered as a consequence of any information provided by the accused but were simply taken from their persons during routine police procedures following arrest. There was no hidden location revealed, no concealed cache uncovered, and no knowledge demonstrated that was unique to the accused. The prosecution’s attempt to clothe these routine seizures with the evidentiary status of Section 27 discoveries was thus rejected by the Court as legally untenable and as an attempt to circumvent the safeguards built into the Evidence Act.

Safeguards Against Coerced Confessions

The judgment must be understood in the broader context of the constitutional and statutory safeguards against self-incrimination and coerced confessions. Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India provides that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. This constitutional protection finds reinforcement in Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, which render confessions made to police officers or while in police custody generally inadmissible. Section 27 was enacted as a limited exception to these protective provisions, but the courts have been vigilant in ensuring that this exception does not swallow the rule. The Supreme Court’s approach in the Shaik Shabuddin case reflects this vigilance by refusing to permit investigative practices that seek to legitimize otherwise inadmissible confessions through artificial characterizations of routine seizures as discoveries.

The Court’s reasoning underscores an important principle: the evidentiary value of Section 27 lies not in the object recovered but in the demonstration that the accused possessed knowledge about the location or concealment of incriminating material that was not within the knowledge of the investigating officers. When articles are seized from the person of the accused at the time of arrest, no such unique knowledge is demonstrated, and therefore no proper basis exists for invoking Section 27. This interpretation serves the dual purpose of preventing the misuse of custodial statements while ensuring that genuinely probative evidence obtained through legitimate investigative methods remains admissible.

Impact on Conviction and Sentencing

Despite finding that the High Court had erroneously relied on the alleged Section 27 recoveries, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the accused for gang rape and murder. The Court found that the prosecution had established a complete chain of circumstantial evidence through credible ocular evidence, medical evidence, forensic evidence, and DNA analysis. The vicinity evidence established that the accused and deceased were seen in the same area just prior to the crime. The medical evidence regarding time of death matched the timeline established by witnesses. Crucially, the DNA analysis linked the accused to the crime, with autosomal STR analysis indicating that seminal stains on the victim’s saree matched the DNA profiles of the accused and were of the same biological origin.[1] This finding demonstrates that while the Court was stringent in its application of evidentiary standards regarding Section 27, it did not allow technical considerations to result in the acquittal of persons whose guilt was otherwise established beyond reasonable doubt through admissible evidence.

However, the Supreme Court modified the sentence imposed by the High Court. The High Court had sentenced the accused to life imprisonment “till the last breath” without any possibility of remission. The Supreme Court modified this to a fixed term of twenty-five years of imprisonment without remission. Additionally, the Court set aside the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, holding that the essential ingredient of knowledge of the victim’s caste had not been established by the prosecution. This aspect of the judgment reinforces that each element of an offence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and assumptions cannot substitute for evidence even in heinous crimes.

Implications for Criminal Jurisprudence

The judgment has significant implications for the conduct of criminal investigations and the presentation of evidence in courts across India. It serves as a stern reminder to investigating agencies that procedural shortcuts and attempts to artificially inflate the evidentiary value of routine police actions will not withstand judicial scrutiny. The decision reinforces that Section 27 is not a general tool for admitting custodial statements but a carefully circumscribed exception that operates only when specific conditions are met. Investigating officers must ensure that when they seek to rely on Section 27, they can demonstrate genuine concealment by the accused and actual discovery resulting from information uniquely known to the accused.

The judgment also provides guidance to trial courts and High Courts in evaluating Section 27 evidence. Courts must carefully scrutinize whether articles said to be recovered under Section 27 could have been seized through routine search procedures at the time of arrest. If such routine seizure was possible, then the characterization of such seizure as a Section 27 discovery is improper. This scrutiny is essential to maintain the integrity of the evidentiary framework and to ensure that the constitutional and statutory protections against self-incrimination are not rendered illusory through investigative practices that prioritize convenience over legality.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Shaik Shabuddin v. State of Telangana represents a significant clarification of the law relating to Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. By holding that materials handed over by an accused during routine police checks cannot be termed Section 27 recoveries, the Court has reinforced the fundamental principle that concealment and subsequent discovery based on unique knowledge of the accused are essential prerequisites for invoking this provision. The judgment strikes an important balance between the needs of effective criminal investigation and the protection of fundamental rights of accused persons. While upholding the conviction based on other admissible evidence, the Court demonstrated that adherence to proper evidentiary standards does not impede the cause of justice but rather strengthens it. This decision will serve as an important precedent in ensuring that investigating agencies follow proper procedures and that courts maintain vigilant oversight over the admissibility of evidence obtained during custodial interrogation. The principles established in this judgment contribute to the broader objective of ensuring fair trials and preventing the misuse of custodial power while maintaining the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in addressing serious crimes.

References

[1] Shaik Shabuddin v. State of Telangana, 2025 INSC 1449. Available at: https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/section-27-evidence-act-materials-handed-over-by-accused-during-police-check-cant-be-termed-27-recoveries-513730

[2] The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 27. Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1312051/

[3] Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67. Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/254739/

[4] State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600. Available at: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d20b7144-2a99-49b0-a37b-a6dff1f7fd98

[5] Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Drishti Judiciary. Available at: https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/current-affairs/section-27-of-indian-evidence-act-1872