Corporate Group Insolvency: Legal Framework, Regulatory Evolution and Judicial Precedents in India

Introduction

The insolvency landscape in India underwent a paradigm shift with the enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code in 2016. While the legislation brought much-needed consolidation to India’s fragmented insolvency regime, it initially remained silent on one critical aspect: the treatment of corporate groups during insolvency proceedings. Corporate groups, characterized by intricate shareholding structures, intertwined financial obligations, and operational interdependence, presented unique challenges that the original framework did not explicitly address. As corporate structures evolved to become more complex, with subsidiaries, holding companies, and associate entities forming tightly integrated business ecosystems, the absence of a dedicated group insolvency mechanism created significant operational and legal hurdles.

The resolution of insolvent group companies on an entity-by-entity basis often led to value erosion, conflicting orders, and inefficiencies that undermined the core objectives of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. Recognizing these challenges, Indian courts, particularly the National Company Law Tribunal, stepped in to fill the legislative vacuum through judicial innovation. The landmark Videocon Industries case became a watershed moment, demonstrating both the necessity and the practical application of group insolvency principles in India [1]. However, judicial precedents alone could not provide the comprehensive, predictable framework that stakeholders required. The recent introduction of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill 2025 marks a decisive legislative intervention, proposing to formalize group insolvency and cross-border insolvency frameworks that align India with global best practices.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016:  Foundational Framework

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code came into force in December 2016, representing the first comprehensive legislation addressing insolvency for corporate persons, partnership firms, and individuals [2]. Prior to this enactment, India’s insolvency framework was scattered across multiple statutes including the Companies Act 2013, the Sick Industrial Companies Act 1985, and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993. This fragmentation resulted in prolonged proceedings, creditor uncertainty, and suboptimal asset recovery rates. The Code established a time-bound Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, initially set at 180 days with a possible extension of 90 days, to be conducted under the supervision of the National Company Law Tribunal.

The legislation created the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India as the regulatory authority to oversee insolvency proceedings and register insolvency professionals. Under the Code, applications for initiating Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process can be filed by financial creditors under Section 7, operational creditors under Section 9, or by the corporate debtor itself under Section 10. Once admitted, the Adjudicating Authority declares a moratorium prohibiting legal proceedings against the corporate debtor, thereby providing breathing space for resolution efforts. The management of the corporate debtor is transferred to an insolvency professional who constitutes a Committee of Creditors comprising financial creditors. This committee exercises commercial wisdom in evaluating and approving resolution plans, requiring approval by 66 percent of voting shares.

The landmark Supreme Court judgment in Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta reinforced the primacy of the Committee of Creditors commercial wisdom while clarifying the limited scope of judicial review [3]. The Court held that the Adjudicating Authority’s scrutiny must remain confined to the parameters specified in Section 30(2) of the Code, which requires verification that the resolution plan complies with statutory requirements rather than substituting the Committee’s commercial judgment. This judgment established critical principles regarding creditor treatment, emphasizing that fair and equitable dealing does not mandate proportionate payment to all creditor classes but requires that the resolution plan demonstrate how it addresses the interests of different stakeholders.

The Challenge of Group Insolvency Under the Original Framework

Despite the Code’s comprehensive approach to individual corporate insolvency, it remained silent on the treatment of corporate groups. This legislative gap posed significant challenges when interconnected group companies faced financial distress simultaneously. Corporate groups typically operate as integrated economic units despite maintaining separate legal identities. They share resources, management, financial arrangements, and often guarantee each other’s obligations. When multiple entities within such a group become insolvent, treating each entity separately through individual Corporate Insolvency Resolution Processes creates several problems that undermine efficient resolution.

Separate proceedings for interconnected entities frequently result in conflicting judicial orders, duplication of administrative efforts, and increased costs. Potential resolution applicants find it difficult to evaluate and bid for individual entities whose value derives largely from their integration within the larger group structure. This often leads to lower or no bids, ultimately pushing viable businesses into liquidation. The cross-holdings, intra-group guarantees, and intercompany loans that characterize group structures become nearly impossible to unravel when each entity is treated in isolation. Creditors who have extended credit to multiple group entities face uncertainty regarding optimal recovery strategies, while operational creditors supplying goods or services across the group confront multiple parallel proceedings.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India recognized these challenges and constituted a Working Group on Group Insolvency in January 2019 under the chairmanship of Shri U.K. Sinha [4]. The Working Group submitted its report in September 2019, recommending a regulatory framework to facilitate insolvency resolution and liquidation of corporate debtors within a group. The report identified four critical facets requiring attention: procedural coordination among stakeholders, substantive consolidation in limited circumstances, rules to address perverse behavior within corporate groups, and clear criteria for determining group interconnection. Subsequently, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs constituted a Cross-Border Insolvency Rules Regulation Committee under Dr. K.P. Krishnan to analyze the UNCITRAL Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency and build upon the Working Group’s recommendations.

Judicial Innovation: The Videocon Industries Precedent

The absence of statutory provisions for group insolvency compelled Indian courts to develop principles through judicial interpretation. The most significant precedent emerged from the insolvency proceedings involving Videocon Industries Limited and related group companies. In 2018, following defaults on loans exceeding Rs. 45,000 crores, a consortium of 18 banks led by State Bank of India filed separate applications under Section 7 of the Code against 15 companies within the Videocon Group. The National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, admitted these applications and separate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Processes commenced for each entity. However, the separate proceedings failed to attract viable resolution bids because the companies were so deeply interconnected that potential investors could not assess individual entity value in isolation [5].

Recognizing the futility of parallel proceedings, State Bank of India and the chairman of Videocon Group filed applications before the National Company Law Tribunal seeking consolidation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Processes. The Mumbai Bench, through its order dated August 8, 2019, made the groundbreaking decision to consolidate 13 out of the 15 Videocon Group companies into a single insolvency process while excluding KAIL Limited and Trend Electronics Limited, which retained operational and financial independence. The Tribunal drew upon the doctrine of substantive consolidation, a concept primarily developed in United States bankruptcy law, which allows courts to merge assets and liabilities of legally separate but functionally integrated entities.

The National Company Law Tribunal established detailed parameters for determining whether consolidation was appropriate. These included common control through unified management, common directors exercising oversight across entities, shared assets and pooling of resources, intertwined liabilities including cross-guarantees, operational interdependence where entities could not survive independently, intricate financial interlacing, commingled accounts and interlooping debts, shared financial creditors across the group, and cross-shareholding structures [6]. The Tribunal emphasized that consolidation represents an exception rather than the rule, to be invoked only when demonstrably beneficial to the broader creditor community and necessary to preserve asset value.

The Videocon consolidation involved creating a single Committee of Creditors for all 13 corporate debtors, appointing a common resolution professional, and treating the group as a unified economic entity for resolution purposes. This approach enabled potential resolution applicants to evaluate the group holistically and submit comprehensive bids that could capture the synergies inherent in the integrated business. The resolution plan submitted by Twin Star Technologies, a Vedanta Group company, was initially approved by the National Company Law Tribunal in June 2021. However, this approval was subsequently challenged before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal by dissenting creditors, leading to the plan’s rejection in January 2022 on grounds that it did not comply with Sections 30(2)(b) and 31 of the Code regarding treatment of dissenting financial creditors [7].

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill 2025: Codifying Group Insolvency

Building upon judicial precedents and expert committee recommendations, the Government of India introduced the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill 2025 in the Lok Sabha on August 12, 2025 [8]. This legislation represents the most comprehensive overhaul of India’s insolvency regime since the Code’s inception, addressing systemic challenges that emerged during its implementation. The Bill was referred to a select parliamentary committee for detailed scrutiny, reflecting the significance of the proposed reforms. Among its most critical provisions are the formal frameworks for group insolvency and cross-border insolvency, which aim to modernize India’s corporate resolution ecosystem and align it with international best practices.

The proposed Section 59A introduces enabling provisions for a group insolvency framework that is voluntary, flexible, and coordination-focused rather than mandating automatic consolidation. The Bill defines a corporate group to include holding companies, subsidiary companies, and associate companies as defined under the Companies Act 2013, while also permitting the Adjudicating Authority to include companies that are intrinsically linked to form part of a group in commercial understanding even if not covered by the statutory definition. The framework recognizes that control in modern corporate structures can be exercised through minority shareholding, particularly in widely-held companies, and accounts for control exercised directly or indirectly through shareholding, management rights, ownership interests, shareholders agreements, and voting agreements.

One distinguishing feature of the proposed group insolvency framework is the provision for enforceable coordination agreements under Section 59A(2)(e). These agreements outline measures to coordinate and synchronize different aspects of group insolvency proceedings. Once approved by participating companies and their respective Committees of Creditors, these agreements become binding, with Adjudicating Authorities empowered to issue necessary implementation orders. The framework also addresses cost allocation, recognizing that coordination activities consume time and resources. The rules may permit treatment of costs incurred for coordinating insolvency proceedings of corporate debtors that form part of a group, providing a legitimate mechanism for allocating these expenses.

The group insolvency framework enables establishment of a common bench for hearing related matters, appointment or replacement of a shared insolvency professional across group entities, procedural coordination of insolvency proceedings, and formation of a joint committee comprising creditor committees of the group’s corporate debtors. This mechanism is expected to prove particularly useful in cases involving corporate groups facing simultaneous financial distress, potentially saving substantial time and costs while maximizing recovery for stakeholders. The framework deliberately adopts a cautious approach to substantive consolidation, recognizing it as an extreme form of relief to be applied only in exceptional circumstances where companies function as a single economic unit or where separation would significantly prejudice creditors [9].

Cross-Border Insolvency Framework: Aligning with Global Standards

Complementing the group insolvency provisions, the Amendment Bill introduces Section 59C, which empowers the Central Government to formulate a framework for cross-border insolvency proceedings. This framework will set out the manner and conditions for administering and conducting cross-border insolvency proceedings under the Code for such classes of debtors and corporate debtors as may be notified. The cross-border insolvency provisions draw significantly from the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, which has been adopted by approximately 60 countries worldwide. This alignment positions India to participate effectively in international insolvency cooperation, facilitating recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings, cooperation between Indian and foreign courts, and coordinated resolution of multinational group insolvencies.

The proposed framework addresses critical gaps in enforcement of claims against overseas assets, an area that has historically presented significant challenges for Indian creditors. By providing for recognition and enforcement of foreign insolvency orders, the framework enhances the prospects of asset recovery in cross-border scenarios. The legislation contemplates designation of special benches within the National Company Law Tribunal to handle cross-border insolvency matters, recognizing the specialized expertise required for such cases. The framework also enables reciprocal arrangements with foreign jurisdictions, potentially streamlining resolution of cases involving assets or operations spanning multiple countries.

Regulatory Oversight and Institutional Framework

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India serves as the principal regulatory authority overseeing insolvency proceedings in the country. Established under the Code, the Board comprises ten members including representatives from the Ministries of Finance and Law, and the Reserve Bank of India. The Board’s mandate encompasses regulation of insolvency professionals, insolvency professional agencies, and information utilities that maintain financial information about corporate debtors. Through various regulations, circulars, and guidelines, the Board has progressively refined operational aspects of the insolvency resolution process, addressing challenges that emerged during implementation.

The Board’s issuance of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations established detailed procedural frameworks for conducting Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. Regulation 38, as amended, addresses the contents of resolution plans, requiring them to provide for payment of insolvency resolution process costs in priority to other debts, payment to operational creditors in specified amounts or percentages, management and control of the business of the corporate debtor after approval of the resolution plan, and implementation and supervision of the resolution plan. The Supreme Court in the Essar Steel judgment clarified that fair and equitable treatment of operational creditors under Regulation 38 does not mandate proportionate payment but requires that the resolution plan state how it has dealt with their interests.

Creditor-Initiated Insolvency Resolution Process: Out-of-Court Mechanism

The Amendment Bill 2025 introduces another significant innovation: the Creditor-Initiated Insolvency Resolution Process, an out-of-court initiation mechanism for genuine business failures. This process differs fundamentally from the existing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process in that it may be initiated only by specified financial creditors, requires out-of-court initiation with at least 51 percent (by value of debt) of notified financial creditors agreeing to the initiation, and allows the management of the company to remain with the debtor subject to oversight by the resolution professional. The Creditor-Initiated Insolvency Resolution Process must be concluded within 150 days, extendable by up to 45 days, with the Committee of Creditors retaining authority to convert the process into a regular Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process and seek an order from the National Company Law Tribunal for such conversion if circumstances warrant.

This out-of-court mechanism aims to facilitate faster and more cost-effective insolvency resolution with minimal business disruption. By permitting existing management to continue operations under professional oversight, the process recognizes that not all defaults stem from management malfeasance; many result from temporary liquidity mismatches or market conditions. The reduced timeline and out-of-court nature ease the burden on judicial systems while promoting ease of doing business and improving access to credit. However, critics note that limiting initiation rights to select financial institutions creates differential treatment among creditors, and that triggering the process upon default may not prevent value erosion that has already begun.

Recent Amendments and Ongoing Refinements

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code has undergone multiple amendments since its enactment, reflecting the legislature’s responsiveness to implementation challenges and judicial interpretations. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act 2019 addressed several critical issues that arose during the Code’s initial years of operation. Section 4 of the 2019 Amendment extended the mandatory timeline for completing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process from 270 days to 330 days, explicitly including time taken in legal proceedings within this outer limit. This amendment responded to concerns that strict deadlines without accounting for judicial delays could result in viable companies being forced into liquidation through no fault of stakeholders.

The Supreme Court in the Essar Steel judgment examined the constitutional validity of these timeline provisions. While recognizing that mandatory deadlines without exceptions could potentially violate Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution by imposing unreasonable restrictions on litigant’s; rights, the Court adopted a pragmatic approach. Rather than striking down the provisions entirely, the Court held that it may be open in some cases for the Adjudicating Authority or Appellate Tribunal to extend time beyond 330 days when circumstances warrant, thereby reading flexibility into the statutory framework to preserve its constitutional validity.

The 2019 Amendment also introduced Section 29A, which disqualifies certain categories of persons from submitting resolution plans. This provision aims to prevent erstwhile promoters who contributed to the corporate debtor’s financial distress from regaining control through the resolution process. Disqualified persons include those who are promoters or in management or control of corporate debtors with accounts classified as non-performing assets at least one year prior to the commencement of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, persons who have been convicted for offences punishable with imprisonment for two years or more, persons disqualified from being directors under the Companies Act 2013, and persons who have executed enforceable guarantees in favor of creditors in respect of corporate debtors undergoing resolution.

Conclusion: Towards a Mature Insolvency Ecosystem

The evolution of corporate group insolvency law in India demonstrates the dynamic interplay between legislative frameworks, judicial interpretation, and regulatory oversight. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 established the foundational architecture for time-bound, creditor-driven resolution of financial distress. When confronted with the complexities of group insolvency scenarios, Indian courts rose to the challenge, developing pragmatic solutions through cases like Videocon Industries. These judicial innovations, while necessary and commendable, highlighted the urgent need for comprehensive statutory provisions that could provide certainty, predictability, and consistency in handling group insolvency cases.

The proposed Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill 2025 represents a significant step toward creating a mature insolvency ecosystem capable of addressing the realities of modern corporate structures. By formalizing group insolvency mechanisms that emphasize coordination over forced consolidation, the legislation balances efficiency with creditor protection. The cross-border insolvency framework positions India to engage effectively with international insolvency cooperation, facilitating recovery of overseas assets and participation in global resolution proceedings. These reforms, combined with innovations like the Creditor-Initiated Insolvency Resolution Process, signal India’s commitment to evolving its insolvency regime in response to economic realities and stakeholder needs. As the legislation undergoes parliamentary scrutiny and eventual implementation, continued monitoring, stakeholder engagement, and regulatory guidance will be essential to ensure that these ambitious reforms achieve their intended objectives of maximizing value, protecting creditor rights, and strengthening India’s position as a creditor-friendly jurisdiction.

References

[1] SCC Times. (2021). SBI v. Videocon Case: Doctrine of Substantial Consolidation. Retrieved from https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2021/01/09/sbi-v-videocon-case-doctrine-of-substantial-consolidation/ 

[2] Ministry of Corporate Affairs. (2023). Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Retrieved from https://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/TheInsolvencyandBankruptcyofIndia.pdf 

[3] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India. (2019). Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors. (2019) ibclaw.in 07 SC. Retrieved from https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/d46a64719856fa6a2805d731a0edaaa7.pdf 

[4] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India. (2019). Group Insolvency: Harnessing Synergies. Retrieved from https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/resources/eab27488d871106920be49844c1a78fe.pdf 

[5] National Company Law Tribunal. (2019). State Bank of India v. Videocon Industries Limited and Others, MA 1306/2018. Retrieved from https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/48cb50915c29188847ad3b13f7f6f3d6.pdf 

[6] Vinod Kothari Consultants. (2020). Videocon Ruling: Setting a Benchmark for Group Insolvency. Retrieved from https://vinodkothari.com/2020/02/videocon-ruling-group-insolvency/ 

[7] IBC Laws. (2022). Videocon Insolvency vis-à-vis Oppression and Mis-management under the Companies Act. Retrieved from https://ibclaw.in/videocon-insolvency-vis-a-vis-oppression-and-mis-management-under-the-companies-act-by-ms-sanjana-sachdev-and-mr-pranav-dwivedi/ 

[8] PRS Legislative Research. (2025). The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill, 2025. Retrieved from https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-insolvency-and-bankruptcy-code-amendment-bill-2025 

[9] India Corporate Law. (2025). New Paradigms for Group and Cross-Border Insolvency under the IBC Amendment Bill 2025. Retrieved from https://www.irccl.in/post/new-paradigms-for-group-and-cross-border-insolvency-under-the-ibc-amendment-bill-2025