NCLAT on Oppression and Mismanagement: Only Existing Members Have the Right to Seek Relief

Introduction: Understanding Member Rights in Corporate Governance

The recent pronouncement by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), Chennai Bench, has brought renewed focus to a fundamental principle of corporate governance in India. In this latest NCLAT ruling on oppression and mismanagement, the tribunal has categorically reinforced that only existing members of a company possess the legal standing to initiate proceedings for relief under the Companies Act, 2013. This principle, though seemingly straightforward, carries profound implications for minority shareholders, investors, and the broader corporate ecosystem in India.

The judgment underscores a critical aspect of corporate jurisprudence that the right to seek remedies against oppressive conduct or mismanagement is intrinsically linked to one’s status as a current member of the company. This ruling serves as a reminder that corporate law protections are designed to safeguard those who have a continuing stake in the company’s affairs, rather than extending to past members or those whose membership status remains disputed.

The Legislative Framework: Companies Act, 2013

The Companies Act, 2013 represents a paradigm shift in Indian corporate governance, introducing robust mechanisms to protect minority shareholders from the tyranny of majority rule. Chapter XVI of the Act, comprising Sections 241 to 246, forms the cornerstone of legal protection against oppression and mismanagement in companies. These provisions were enacted recognizing that while majority rule remains the bedrock of corporate democracy, unchecked majority power can lead to the exploitation of minority shareholders and deviation from proper corporate governance standards.

The Act deliberately avoids providing rigid definitions of ‘oppression’ and ‘mismanagement,’ leaving it to judicial interpretation to evolve these concepts based on the facts and circumstances of each case. This approach allows the law to remain flexible and responsive to diverse situations where minority interests may be prejudiced. However, the Act is explicit about who can invoke these protective provisions, establishing clear thresholds for locus standi.

Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013 empowers members to approach the National Company Law Tribunal when they believe that the company’s affairs are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest, or in a manner prejudicial or oppressive to any member, or prejudicial to the interests of the company itself. The section also covers situations where material changes in management or control occur that are likely to affect the company’s affairs adversely. This provision operates as a statutory safeguard, ensuring that those who have invested their capital and reposed faith in the company’s management are not left without remedy when things go awry.

Who Can Seek Relief: The Locus Standi Requirement

Section 244 of the Companies Act, 2013 establishes the critical threshold requirements for maintaining an application under Section 241. This provision defines with precision who possesses the legal standing to approach the tribunal for relief against oppression and mismanagement. The requirements vary depending on whether the company has share capital or operates without it, reflecting the legislature’s understanding that different corporate structures require tailored approaches.

For companies with share capital, the applicant must satisfy specific numerical and value-based criteria. The law permits an application to be filed by not less than one hundred members, or not less than one-tenth of the total number of members, whichever is less. Alternatively, any member or members holding not less than one-tenth of the issued share capital of the company may apply. Crucially, the section mandates that any applicant must have paid all calls and other sums due on their shares, ensuring that only members in good standing can invoke the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

In the case of companies without share capital, the threshold is set at not less than one-fifth of the total number of members. These numerical requirements serve dual purposes: they prevent frivolous litigation by establishing meaningful thresholds while ensuring that minority shareholders with substantial stakes are not denied access to justice. The underlying principle is that the right to seek relief must be exercised by those who have a genuine and continuing interest in the company’s proper governance.

The NCLAT Chennai’s ruling reinforces that membership status must exist at the time of filing the application and must continue throughout the proceedings. A person who was once a member but has since ceased to hold that status cannot maintain proceedings under these provisions. Similarly, someone whose claim to membership is itself disputed and sub judice cannot be deemed to satisfy the locus standi requirements under Section 244. This interpretation, consistent with the evolving NCLAT jurisprudence on oppression and mismanagement, aligns with the fundamental principle that statutory remedies are designed to protect current stakeholders who have an ongoing interest in rectifying the company’s affairs.

Defining Oppression and Mismanagement: Judicial Interpretation

Although the Companies Act, 2013 refrains from explicitly defining oppression and mismanagement, Indian courts have developed a nuanced jurisprudence explaining these concepts through decades of case law. Oppression, in the context of company law, represents conduct that involves a visible and substantial departure from the standards of fair dealing. It encompasses actions that demonstrate a lack of probity or fair dealing toward members in matters concerning their rights as shareholders. The conduct must be burdensome, harsh, and wrongful, going beyond mere disagreement or dissatisfaction with management decisions.

The essence of oppression lies in the abuse of majority power to the detriment of minority interests. It occurs when those in control of the company exercise their powers in a manner that disregards the interests of minority shareholders, treating them unfairly and inequitably. Courts have held that oppression need not necessarily involve illegality in the strict sense; rather, it encompasses conduct that, while perhaps technically within the letter of the law, violates principles of good faith and fair dealing that should govern corporate relationships.

Mismanagement, distinct yet often overlapping with oppression, refers to the conduct of company affairs in a manner that is prejudicial to the interests of the company or its members. It encompasses situations where those entrusted with the company’s management demonstrate incompetence, negligence, or dishonesty in handling corporate affairs. Mismanagement may manifest through various actions: conducting the business recklessly, engaging in transactions that benefit directors at the company’s expense, maintaining inadequate books of accounts, or systematically violating statutory requirements.

The distinction between oppression and mismanagement, while conceptually clear, often blurs in practice. Many situations involve elements of both, where the majority not only mismanages the company but does so in a manner that specifically prejudices minority shareholders. What remains constant across both concepts is the requirement that the conduct complained of must be substantial and continuing, not isolated incidents or mere errors in business judgment. Courts have consistently held that the tribunal’s power to intervene is exercisable only when there is persistent disregard for the interests of the company or its members.

Powers and Remedies Available Under Section 242

Section 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 confers extensive powers upon the NCLT to grant appropriate remedies when oppression or mismanagement is established. These powers reflect the legislature’s intent to provide the tribunal with sufficient flexibility to craft remedies tailored to the specific circumstances of each case. The section represents a significant enhancement over previous legislation, empowering the tribunal to make orders that are “just and equitable” in the circumstances.

The tribunal’s powers under Section 242 include the authority to regulate the conduct of the company’s affairs in the future, imposing specific directions on how the company should be managed. It may order the purchase of shares of any member by other members or by the company itself, providing an exit mechanism for oppressed minorities. The tribunal can also reduce the company’s share capital if necessary to achieve fairness among shareholders. These provisions recognize that sometimes the most appropriate remedy is to facilitate a clean break between warring factions within a company.

Section 242 also empowers the tribunal to order the termination, setting aside, or modification of agreements between the company and managing directors, managers, or other persons. This power is particularly significant as it allows the tribunal to undo prejudicial arrangements that may have been entered into through the abuse of majority power. The tribunal can further direct rectification of the company’s register of members, ensuring that shareholding patterns accurately reflect legitimate ownership.

Among the most significant powers is the tribunal’s authority to direct that matters to be inquired into by inspectors be investigated, to order recovery of undue gains made by any managing director, manager, or officer of the company, and to provide for the costs of proceedings to be borne by the company or the parties responsible for necessitating the proceedings. The tribunal may also impose exemplary costs where it finds that the application was frivolous or vexatious. These remedial powers ensure that the tribunal can fashion relief that not only addresses past wrongs but also prevents future misconduct and establishes accountability.

The Tata Sons Litigation: A Watershed Moment

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Tata Consultancy Services Limited v. Cyrus Investments Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (2021) [1] stands as one of the most significant pronouncements on oppression and mismanagement in recent times. This case arose from the removal of Mr. Cyrus Mistry as director of Tata Sons and various Tata Group companies. Following his removal, two investment companies holding shares in Tata Sons filed applications under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013, alleging oppression and mismanagement.

The NCLT initially dismissed these applications, finding no evidence of oppression or mismanagement. However, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) reversed this decision, holding that there was indeed oppression and mismanagement, and controversially ordered the reinstatement of Mr. Mistry as director. This decision created significant uncertainty in corporate circles about the extent of tribunals’ powers and the grounds on which findings of oppression could be based.

The Supreme Court’s intervention brought much-needed clarity to several critical issues. The court held that the mere existence of a lack of confidence between majority and minority shareholders does not automatically constitute grounds for finding oppression. Corporate decisions made in accordance with the company’s articles of association and statutory provisions cannot be characterized as oppressive merely because they adversely affect certain shareholders. The court emphasized that business decisions taken by those in control of the company, even if they turn out to be disadvantageous, do not amount to oppression unless they demonstrate a lack of probity or fair dealing.

Significantly, the Supreme Court ruled that Sections 241 and 242 do not empower tribunals to order reinstatement of directors who have been validly removed. The court observed that such an order would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme and would effectively impose an unwanted director on the company, contrary to the will of the majority shareholders. The judgment clarified that while tribunals have wide powers to grant relief, these powers must be exercised within the framework of the Act and cannot extend to reliefs that would fundamentally alter the balance of corporate governance established by law.

The Tata Sons case established that tribunals cannot adjudicate on apprehensions of future conduct based on provisions in the articles of association. Relief under Section 241 must be based on actual prejudicial conduct, not on speculation about what might happen in the future. This aspect of the judgment reinforces the principle that oppression must be real and demonstrable, not hypothetical or anticipated.

Government’s Role: Public Interest Litigation Under Section 241(2)

Section 241(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 grants the Central Government the power to approach the tribunal if it forms the opinion that a company’s affairs are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest. This provision represents recognition that corporate misconduct can have ramifications beyond the immediate circle of shareholders, affecting broader societal interests. The government’s power to intervene serves as a check against corporate behavior that, while perhaps not directly oppressive to shareholders, nonetheless harms public welfare.

The scope and proper exercise of this power came under judicial scrutiny in Union of India v. Delhi Gymkhana Club (2021) [2]. This case involved Delhi Gymkhana Club, a company registered under Section 8 of the Companies Act, 2013, operating as a not-for-profit entity. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs filed an application under Section 241(2) alleging mismanagement and conduct prejudicial to public interest. The case raised fundamental questions about when the government can legitimately invoke Section 241(2) and what constitutes “public interest” in this context.

The NCLAT’s observations in this case significantly shaped the understanding of governmental power under Section 241(2). The tribunal held that when the Central Government makes an application under this provision, it must first record its opinion that the company’s affairs are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest. This recording of opinion is not a mere formality but a jurisdictional requirement. However, importantly, the tribunal clarified that it cannot review the sufficiency of the material on which the government has based its opinion, especially when no mala fide intention is attributed to the government.

Regarding the interpretation of “public interest,” the NCLAT adopted a broad and purposive approach. The tribunal held that public interest need not encompass all citizens of India. It would be sufficient if even a section of society is affected, such as potential members being denied fair opportunity for membership. This interpretation ensures that Section 241(2) remains an effective tool for addressing corporate conduct that affects identifiable groups within the public, even if those groups are relatively small.

The Delhi Gymkhana Club judgment reinforced that governmental intervention under Section 241(2) is a legitimate exercise of regulatory power, aimed at ensuring that companies, particularly those enjoying special privileges or operating in sectors affecting public welfare, conduct their affairs in accordance with law and principles of fairness. The provision serves as a reminder that corporate entities, while privately managed, operate within a framework of public accountability, especially when their activities have broader social implications.

Threshold Requirements and the Manner of Acquiring Shares

The NCLAT Chennai’s pronouncement that the threshold to maintain oppression and mismanagement proceedings is not limited to the mere holding of shares but extends to the manner in which shares were acquired represents a significant development in corporate jurisprudence [3]. This ruling addresses situations where a person may technically hold shares but acquired them through means that call into question their status as legitimate members entitled to invoke the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

This principle recognizes that the right to seek relief under Sections 241 and 242 presupposes legitimate membership. If the acquisition of shares itself is tainted by fraud, illegality, or is subject to legal challenge, the purported member’s standing to seek relief becomes questionable. For instance, if shares were acquired through misrepresentation, undue influence, or in violation of applicable laws or regulations, the holder of such shares cannot claim the benefits of membership, including the right to maintain oppression proceedings.

The tribunal’s approach ensures that the protective provisions of the Companies Act are not misused by those who have obtained membership through improper means to then complain about the very company they may have joined under false pretenses. It also addresses situations where membership itself is disputed, with competing claims to share ownership. In such cases, the tribunal must first determine the legitimacy of membership before examining allegations of oppression or mismanagement.

This interpretation aligns with the broader principle that one cannot take advantage of their own wrong. A person who has acquired shares through questionable means cannot then invoke statutory protections designed for bona fide members. Moreover, this approach protects companies from being subjected to oppression proceedings initiated by persons whose claim to membership is itself illegitimate or disputed. It ensures that the serious machinery of oppression and mismanagement proceedings is activated only by those who genuinely possess the rights and standing that the law requires.

Monetary Relief and Fraud: NCLAT Delhi’s Clarification

Section 242(2)(c) specifically empowers the tribunal to direct recovery of undue gains made by any managing director, manager, or officer of the company and to transfer such gains either to the Investor Education and Protection Fund or for repayment to identifiable victims. This power reflects the remedial and compensatory nature of oppression proceedings, ensuring that those who have profited from misconduct do not retain the fruits of their improper actions.

The significance of this NCLAT clarification lies in establishing that victims of oppression and mismanagement need not pursue multiple proceedings in different forums to obtain complete relief. If fraud is established within oppression proceedings, the tribunal possesses adequate powers to grant monetary compensation. This interpretation promotes judicial efficiency and ensures that parties obtain holistic relief without the need for fragmented litigation across multiple jurisdictions.

However, the tribunal’s power to grant monetary relief is not unlimited. It must be exercised in accordance with principles of fairness and must be supported by evidence demonstrating actual loss or undue gain. The tribunal cannot grant punitive damages or compensation that goes beyond making good the actual prejudice suffered. Moreover, the relief must be directed toward rectifying the specific wrong complained of in the context of oppression or mismanagement, rather than serving as a general remedy for all grievances arising from the corporate relationship.

Class Action and Collective Remedies

The Companies Act, 2013 introduced class action provisions through Sections 245 and 245A, providing a mechanism for collective action by members and depositors against companies and their management. These provisions represent a significant enhancement in shareholder rights, allowing groups of similarly situated persons to collectively seek remedies for common grievances. Class action mechanisms are particularly valuable in situations where individual claims might be too small to justify separate litigation but collectively represent substantial harm.

Under Section 245, members and depositors can file class action suits when they have a common grievance arising from fraudulent, unlawful, or wrongful conduct by the company or its management. The thresholds for maintaining class actions are similar to those for oppression proceedings: for companies with share capital, at least one hundred members or not less than such percentage as prescribed of total members (whichever is less), or members holding not less than such percentage of issued share capital as prescribed. For depositors, similar numerical thresholds apply.

Class action provisions serve a dual purpose. They provide an efficient mechanism for addressing widespread harm affecting multiple stakeholders, avoiding the need for numerous individual proceedings. Simultaneously, they create a powerful deterrent against misconduct by management, as the potential for collective action by aggrieved parties creates substantial risk for those contemplating improper conduct. The tribunal’s power to award exemplary damages in class action proceedings further strengthens this deterrent effect.

The relationship between class action provisions and oppression proceedings under Section 241 requires careful navigation. While both mechanisms aim to protect shareholder interests, they serve somewhat different purposes. Oppression proceedings typically focus on ongoing conduct affecting the company’s governance and seek forward-looking relief to rectify the company’s affairs. Class actions, conversely, often seek compensation for past wrongs and may be more remedial in nature. In practice, these mechanisms may operate complementarily, with applicants choosing the appropriate remedy based on the nature of their grievances and the relief sought.

Interim Relief: Protecting Members During Proceedings

The power to grant interim relief during oppression and mismanagement proceedings represents a critical aspect of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Section 242(4) authorizes the tribunal to make interim orders during the pendency of proceedings, ensuring that the complaining members’ interests are protected while the final determination of their grievances is ongoing. This power recognizes that oppression, by its nature, is often continuing conduct, and without interim protection, irreparable harm might occur before final relief can be granted.

In Smt. Shreyans Shah v. The Lok Prakashan Ltd. & Ors., the NCLAT held that the tribunal can pass interim orders if a prima facie case is made out [5]. However, the tribunal emphasized that interim relief cannot extend beyond the scope of Section 242(4) and must be directed toward preventing the company’s affairs from being conducted in contravention of law or the articles of association. The applicant must demonstrate not only a prima facie case but also that serious and justiciable issues require examination, and that interim protection is necessary to preserve the status quo or prevent irreparable injury.

Courts have held that interim relief in oppression proceedings must be exercised with caution. The power should not be used to interfere with day-to-day management decisions or to give effect to the wishes of minority shareholders in matters where majority rule legitimately applies. Interim orders must strike a delicate balance: providing necessary protection to prevent further prejudice while avoiding unwarranted interference with the company’s business operations and the legitimate exercise of majority powers.

Common forms of interim relief include restraining the company from taking certain actions pending final determination, such as prohibiting changes to the board composition, restraining alienation of company assets, or preventing alteration of the memorandum or articles of association. The tribunal may also appoint observers to report on the company’s affairs or direct that certain decisions require tribunal approval during the pendency of proceedings. These measures ensure that the final relief, when granted, remains meaningful and that the complained-of conduct does not continue unabated during litigation.

Disputed Membership and Title to Shares

The issue of disputed membership and title to shares presents particularly complex challenges in oppression proceedings. In Aruna Oswal v. Pankaj Oswal & Ors., the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a person whose title to shares is itself disputed can maintain proceedings under Section 241 [6]. The court held that where questions of right, title, and interest in shares are pending before civil courts, the purported shareholder lacks the standing to pursue oppression proceedings in respect of those disputed shares.

This principle serves important purposes in maintaining coherence in the legal system. It prevents parallel proceedings in different forums addressing the same fundamental question: who is the rightful owner of the shares? Allowing oppression proceedings to continue while ownership remains contested would risk contradictory findings and could prejudice the eventual determination of title. Moreover, it would enable persons with questionable claims to membership to potentially obtain interim relief or influence corporate governance through oppression proceedings.

The requirement that membership must be clear and undisputed before oppression proceedings can be maintained protects companies from being subjected to challenges by persons whose claim to be members is itself contentious. It ensures that the serious jurisdiction of oppression and mismanagement proceedings is invoked only by those who genuinely possess the rights they seek to enforce. This approach also prevents strategic abuse of oppression provisions by parties engaged in disputes over share ownership.

However, the principle does not mean that any dispute raised about membership automatically defeats standing in oppression proceedings. The dispute must be genuine and substantial, typically evidenced by pending proceedings in an appropriate forum addressing the question of title. Frivolous or manufactured disputes about membership, raised solely to defeat oppression proceedings, will not suffice to deny standing to members whose ownership is otherwise clear and established.

Relationship with Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution

The relationship between oppression proceedings and arbitration has emerged as an area of significant interest, particularly in light of India’s policy favoring arbitration for commercial disputes. Companies increasingly incorporate arbitration clauses in their shareholder agreements and articles of association, raising questions about whether such clauses can oust the tribunal’s jurisdiction over oppression and mismanagement complaints.

The general principle emerging from recent jurisprudence is that arbitration clauses do not automatically preclude oppression proceedings under Section 241. The tribunal’s jurisdiction arises from statute and serves important public purposes beyond merely resolving private disputes between shareholders. Matters of oppression and mismanagement often involve questions of corporate governance that transcend purely contractual disputes and implicate the company’s compliance with statutory obligations and principles of corporate democracy.

However, the existence of arbitration agreements remains relevant. In cases decided in 2024, tribunals have held that raising allegations of fraud in an application concerning oppression and mismanagement does not, by itself, prevent arbitration from proceeding. The arbitration clause may remain valid and enforceable despite allegations of oppressive conduct. Courts have increasingly adopted a nuanced approach, examining whether the specific relief sought and issues raised fall within the scope of arbitrable disputes or require the special jurisdiction of the tribunal.

The interplay between arbitration and tribunal proceedings requires careful case-by-case analysis. Where shareholders have explicitly agreed to resolve disputes through arbitration and the matters complained of essentially arise from breach of contractual arrangements between shareholders, arbitration may be the more appropriate forum. Conversely, where the complaint involves violations of statutory duties, prejudice to the company itself, or conduct that requires the tribunal’s special remedial powers, oppression proceedings remain the proper avenue. The trend suggests that courts are moving toward allowing both mechanisms to operate in their appropriate spheres rather than viewing them as mutually exclusive.

Penalties for Non-Compliance and Frivolous Applications

The Companies Act, 2013 incorporates stringent penalty provisions to ensure compliance with tribunal orders and to deter frivolous litigation. Section 245 addresses two distinct situations warranting penalties: companies that fail to comply with tribunal orders, and applicants who file frivolous applications. These provisions recognize that the effectiveness of oppression remedies depends both on ensuring compliance with orders and preventing abuse of the legal process.

For companies and their officers who fail to comply with tribunal orders, Section 245 prescribes substantial penalties. The company may be fined between five lakh rupees and twenty-five lakh rupees. Officers in default face imprisonment of up to three years and fines between twenty-five thousand rupees and one lakh rupees, or both. These penalties reflect the seriousness with which non-compliance with tribunal orders is viewed. Once the tribunal has determined that relief is warranted and has fashioned appropriate remedies, willful non-compliance undermines the entire statutory scheme for protecting shareholders.

Regarding frivolous applications, Section 245 empowers the tribunal to impose costs of up to one lakh rupees payable by the applicant to the opposite party if it finds that the application was frivolous or vexatious. This provision serves as a check against abuse of oppression provisions for ulterior motives or as tools for harassment. The threat of costs awards encourages parties to carefully consider the merits of their claims before initiating proceedings and helps maintain the integrity of the tribunal’s processes.

The determination of whether an application is frivolous requires careful evaluation. Not every unsuccessful application is frivolous. An application may fail on merits without being vexatious. For an application to be deemed frivolous, it must lack any reasonable basis or be filed with the obvious intent to harass or pressure the company rather than to obtain legitimate relief. Tribunals exercise this power judiciously, recognizing that genuine grievances may sometimes fail on technical grounds or evidentiary issues without reflecting ill intent by the applicant.

Conclusion: Balancing Corporate Democracy with Minority Protection

The NCLAT Chennai’s ruling reinforcing that only existing members can seek relief against oppression and mismanagement encapsulates a fundamental principle of corporate governance: statutory protections are designed for those who have a continuing stake in the company’s proper functioning. This principle maintains the delicate balance between facilitating legitimate shareholder remedies and preventing abuse of the legal system by those who lack genuine standing.

The broader framework of oppression and mismanagement law under the Companies Act, 2013 reflects the legislature’s careful attempt to balance competing interests inherent in corporate structures. Majority rule remains the foundation of corporate democracy, essential for effective decision-making and business operations. Yet unchecked majority power creates risks of exploitation and unfairness to minority shareholders who have invested their capital and trust in the enterprise.

The provisions examined in this analysis demonstrate how law seeks to achieve this balance. Clear thresholds for standing ensure that minority shareholders with substantial interests can access remedies while preventing every disgruntled shareholder from initiating proceedings. The tribunal’s extensive remedial powers enable tailored relief addressing the specific prejudice suffered. Limitations on these powers, as established through cases like Tata Sons, ensure that judicial intervention does not unduly disrupt legitimate business operations or undermine the principle that those who hold majority stakes generally have the right to control corporate direction.

Looking forward, several challenges remain in the evolution of oppression and mismanagement jurisprudence. The increasing complexity of corporate structures, the globalization of business operations, and the rise of diverse investment vehicles create new scenarios where traditional principles may require thoughtful application. The interaction between oppression proceedings and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms will likely continue to generate important jurisprudential developments. Courts and tribunals will need to remain vigilant in distinguishing between legitimate business decisions that disadvantage some shareholders and genuinely oppressive conduct that warrants legal intervention.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of oppression and mismanagement provisions depends not merely on the statutory framework but on principled and consistent application by tribunals. As the NCLAT Chennai’s ruling on oppression and mismanagement demonstrates maintaining fundamental requirements like proper membership status serves important purposes in ensuring that these powerful remedies remain available to those they were designed to protect, while preventing their misuse. In this ongoing project of balancing corporate democracy with minority protection, clarity about who can invoke these remedies and under what circumstances represents an essential foundation for just and predictable outcome

References

[1] Supreme Court of India. (2021). Tata Consultancy Services Limited v. Cyrus Investments Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/5416696/ 

[2] NCLAT. (2021). Union of India v. Delhi Gymkhana Club. Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/104728120/ 

[3] LiveLaw. (2023). NCLAT Chennai: Threshold To Maintain Oppression Proceedings Not Limited To Holding Of Shares Alone. Available at: https://www.livelaw.in/ibc-cases/nclat-chennai-threshold-maintain-oppression-proceedings-not-limited-holding-shares-alone-extends-manner-acquiring-shares-241061 

[4] TaxScan. (2023). Monetary Relief on Fraud Can Only Be Granted by NCLT: NCLAT. Available at: https://www.taxscan.in/monetary-relief-on-fraud-committed-by-oppression-and-mismanagement-can-only-be-granted-by-nclt-u-s-242-of-companies-act-nclat/309759 

[5] Indian Kanoon. (n.d.). Smt. Shreyans Shah v. The Lok Prakashan Ltd. & Ors. Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/188421388/ 

[6] Indian Kanoon. (n.d.). Aruna Oswal v. Pankaj Oswal & Ors. Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/138937175/ 

[7] Ministry of Corporate Affairs. (2013). The Companies Act, 2013. Available at: https://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/CompaniesAct2013.pdf 

[8] India Code. (n.d.). Section 241 – Application to Tribunal for Relief. Available at: https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_22_29_00008_201318_1517807327856&sectionId=49167&sectionno=241&orderno=245 

[9] iPleaders. (2023). Section 241 of Companies Act, 2013. Available at: https://blog.ipleaders.in/section-241-of-companies-act-2013