Government Debt vs Secured Debt: A Case Analysis

Government Debt vs Secured Debt

Government Debt vs Secured Debt

Introduction

The question of priority between government debt and secured debt has emerged as one of the most contentious issues in India’s insolvency jurisprudence. When a company faces liquidation, multiple creditors compete for limited resources, making the order of payment critical. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of 2016 introduced a structured waterfall mechanism under Section 53 to address this challenge, fundamentally altering the traditional understanding of debt priority. This analysis examines how Indian courts have interpreted the relationship between government dues and secured creditor claims, with particular focus on the evolving legal framework and recent judicial pronouncements that have shaped current practice.

The Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal in Mumbai addressed this precise conflict in a landmark decision that reaffirmed the priority of government debt over secured debt, while also upholding the primacy of secured creditors during liquidation proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. This case exemplifies the broader tension between facilitating business recovery and protecting revenue interests, a balance that remains central to insolvency law reform in India

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and Its Waterfall Mechanism

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code represents a paradigm shift in how India handles corporate insolvency. Before its enactment, various laws governed different aspects of debt recovery, creating confusion and prolonged litigation. The Code consolidated these fragmented provisions into a unified framework designed to enable time-bound resolution of insolvency cases.

At the heart of this framework lies the waterfall mechanism prescribed by Section 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, which establishes a clear hierarchy for distributing proceeds from liquidated assets. This provision begins with a non-obstante clause, meaning it overrides conflicting provisions in other laws. The distribution priority under Section 53 follows a carefully designed sequence: first come insolvency resolution process costs and liquidation costs, which must be paid in full. Second, workmen’s dues for twenty-four months preceding liquidation and debts owed to secured creditors who have relinquished their security are treated equally. Third are wages and unpaid dues to employees other than workmen for twelve months. Fourth come financial debts owed to unsecured creditors, followed fifth by government dues and any amounts still owed to secured creditors after enforcement of their security. The remaining categories include operational creditors, preference shareholders, and finally equity shareholders[1].

This structured approach reflects deliberate policy choices made by Parliament. The Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee, which drafted the Code, explicitly recommended prioritizing secured creditors to encourage lending and reduce the cost of capital. The committee recognized that placing government dues below secured creditors would boost investor confidence and facilitate corporate rescue[2]. This represented a significant departure from the traditional crown debt doctrine, which historically gave government claims precedence.

The waterfall mechanism applies not only during liquidation but also influences distribution under resolution plans. Section 30 of the Code requires that any approved resolution plan must ensure operational creditors receive at least what they would have gotten under liquidation, effectively incorporating the Section 53 priorities into the resolution process as well.

Legal Framework Governing Priority of Claims

The Pre-IBC Regime

Before the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code came into force, the legal position regarding Government Debt vs Secured Debt was governed primarily by judicial precedents and specific statutes. The Supreme Court in Union of India vs SICOM Ltd established that secured creditors enjoyed priority over crown debt, but this priority was subordinate to any statutory first charge created in favor of the government[3]. This meant that while secured creditors generally ranked above unsecured government dues, specific tax statutes creating first charges could trump secured claims.

The Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act of 1993 established Debt Recovery Tribunals to expedite recovery by banks and financial institutions. Subsequently, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act of 2002 empowered secured creditors to enforce security interests without court intervention. However, neither statute initially addressed the priority conflict between secured creditors and government statutory charges comprehensively.

The 2016 Amendments: A Watershed Moment

The Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Act of 2016 marked a crucial turning point. This amendment inserted Chapter IVA into the SARFAESI Act and introduced Section 26E, which categorically states that after registration of security interest, debts due to secured creditors shall be paid in priority over all other debts and all revenues, taxes, cesses and rates payable to central, state or local authorities. The provision opens with a non-obstante clause, giving it overriding effect over conflicting laws[4].

Similarly, Section 31B was added to the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, providing that rights of secured creditors to realize secured debts shall have priority over all other debts and government dues including revenues, taxes, cesses and rates. These amendments represented parliamentary intent to definitively resolve the priority question in favor of secured creditors, subject to registration requirements under the Central Registry of Securitisation Asset Reconstruction and Security Interest of India (CERSAI)[5].

However, these amendments came with important conditions. Section 26D made registration with CERSAI mandatory for secured creditors to invoke provisions of Chapter III of the SARFAESI Act. Without such registration, secured creditors lose the priority benefit granted by Section 26E. This registration requirement ensures transparency and provides notice to all stakeholders about existing charges on assets.

The Rainbow Papers Controversy

The seemingly settled priority framework faced unexpected disruption with the Supreme Court’s decision in State Tax Officer vs Rainbow Papers Limited. In this case, the Gujarat State VAT officer challenged a resolution plan that had been approved without adequately providing for government tax dues. Section 48 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act creates a first charge on the dealer’s property for amounts payable as tax, interest or penalty. The National Company Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal had rejected the tax officer’s claim on grounds that it was filed beyond the stipulated timeline and that government dues did not qualify as secured debts[6].

The Supreme Court reversed these findings and held that Section 48 of the GVAT Act created a security interest by operation of law, making the state a secured creditor within the meaning of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. The Court ruled that under Section 53 of the Code, debts owed to secured creditors, including the state under the GVAT Act, rank equally with workmen’s dues for twenty-four months preceding liquidation. Most significantly, the judgment stated that if a resolution plan ignores statutory demands payable to any government or governmental authority altogether, the adjudicating authority is bound to reject it. The Court emphasized that financial creditors cannot secure their dues at the cost of statutory dues owed to the government.

This decision created considerable controversy within the insolvency community. Critics argued that the judgment failed to properly consider the waterfall mechanism under Section 53, which explicitly places government dues at a lower priority than secured creditors. The decision appeared to conflate the concept of a statutory charge created by operation of law with security interests created through consensual transactions, potentially undermining the Code’s carefully calibrated priority structure.

When review petitions were filed challenging this judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed them, reaffirming its position in October 2023[7]. This dismissal intensified concerns among lenders and insolvency professionals about the treatment of government dues in ongoing and future insolvency cases.

Clarification Through Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam

The confusion and anxiety created by Rainbow Papers found resolution in the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited vs Raman Ispat Private Limited. This case involved electricity dues owed by a corporate debtor to a state electricity distribution company. Under the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Supply Code, the electricity company had created a first charge over the debtor’s assets for unpaid electricity bills. When the corporate debtor went into liquidation, the electricity company attached its property and claimed priority status as a secured creditor.

The National Company Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal both held that the electricity company was an operational creditor and that its dues would be satisfied according to the waterfall mechanism under Section 53. The company appealed to the Supreme Court, relying heavily on the Rainbow Papers judgment to argue that it should be treated as a secured creditor with priority rights.

The Supreme Court delivered a comprehensive judgment that addressed several critical issues. First, it confirmed that Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code has overriding effect over the Electricity Act, despite the latter containing its own non-obstante clauses in Sections 173 and 174. The Court held that when a special statute like the IBC is enacted later to address a specific problem comprehensively, it prevails over general or earlier special laws[8].

Most importantly, the judgment provided crucial clarification on the Rainbow Papers decision. The Court observed that Rainbow Papers had not considered or discussed the waterfall mechanism under Section 53 at all. The judgment noted that under the careful design of Section 53, amounts payable to secured creditors and workmen are placed at the second position after liquidation costs, while government dues are placed much lower, even below unsecured and operational creditors. The Court stated this design was either not brought to the court’s notice in Rainbow Papers or was missed altogether.

The Supreme Court further clarified the meaning of government dues under the Code. While the term is not specifically defined, Section 53 refers to amounts due to central and state governments, including amounts received on account of the Consolidated Fund of India and Consolidated Fund of States. The Court held that major public utilities and statutory corporations like the electricity distribution company are not, in the ordinary sense, the central or state government. Amounts due to such entities are secured operational debts or financial debts depending on the nature of transactions, not government dues. Only amounts accruing to the Treasury under Article 265 of the Constitution, such as taxes and tariffs, constitute government dues for purposes of the waterfall mechanism.

Crucially, the Supreme Court confined the applicability of Rainbow Papers to its own factual circumstances. The judgment emphasized that Rainbow Papers dealt with the resolution process and approval of resolution plans, whereas the present case concerned liquidation and distribution under Section 53. Since Rainbow Papers had not analyzed the waterfall mechanism, its observations could not be treated as binding precedent for determining priority during liquidation.

Regulatory Framework for Priority Enforcement

SARFAESI Act Provisions

The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act provides secured creditors with powerful remedies to enforce security interests without court intervention. Under Section 13 of the Act, secured creditors can issue notice to borrowers demanding payment within sixty days, failing which they can take possession of secured assets and sell them to realize dues.

Section 26E, introduced through the 2016 amendment, creates a clear priority for registered secured creditors. However, this priority is subject to mandatory registration under Section 26B. Secured creditors must file details of their security interest with CERSAI within thirty days of creation. Section 26C provides that registration constitutes public notice from the date and time of filing, giving it legal effect against third parties.

Courts have consistently held that without CERSAI registration, secured creditors cannot claim the benefit of priority under Section 26E. The Bombay High Court in Jalgaon Janta Sahakari Bank Ltd. vs Joint Commissioner emphasized that registration is a prerequisite for invoking Chapter IVA provisions. This requirement balances the priority granted to secured creditors with the need for transparency in secured transactions[9].

Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act

The Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act establishes Debt Recovery Tribunals as specialized forums for adjudicating disputes involving banks and financial institutions. Section 31B of the Act, also inserted in 2016, mirrors Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act in granting priority to secured creditors over government dues.

However, courts have clarified that Section 31B applies only when proceedings are initiated under the RDDB Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. A secured creditor who opts to enforce security under the SARFAESI Act cannot subsequently invoke Section 31B if they fail to meet CERSAI registration requirements. The two statutes provide alternative remedies, and creditors must choose their remedy and comply with applicable conditions.

Practical Implications for Stakeholders

Impact on Financial Creditors

The judicial clarification that government dues rank below secured creditors in the liquidation waterfall provides certainty to banks and financial institutions. Lenders can more accurately assess recovery prospects when extending credit, knowing that properly secured and registered interests enjoy clear priority. This clarity reduces credit risk and potentially lowers borrowing costs for businesses.

However, secured creditors must ensure strict compliance with registration requirements. Failure to register security interests with CERSAI within the prescribed timeframe can result in loss of priority benefits. Financial institutions have accordingly strengthened their compliance processes to ensure timely registration of all security interests created in their favor.

Government Revenue Departments

The subordination of government dues in the insolvency waterfall represents a significant shift from the traditional crown debt doctrine. Tax authorities can no longer assume that their dues will be recovered before private creditors. This reality necessitates more proactive monitoring of defaulting assessees and timely initiation of recovery proceedings before insolvency sets in.

The distinction drawn in Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam between government dues (taxes, tariffs flowing to Consolidated Funds) and dues of public utilities or statutory corporations provides some relief. Public sector undertakings and government companies that supply goods or services can claim secured or operational creditor status based on their transactions, rather than being automatically relegated to the government dues category.

Insolvency Professionals

Resolution professionals and liquidators must carefully analyze the nature of various claims to correctly classify them within the waterfall mechanism. The position established by recent judgments requires professionals to distinguish between genuine government revenue dues and claims by government-owned entities that may qualify as secured or operational creditors based on transaction specifics.

The Rainbow Papers controversy highlighted the risk of approving resolution plans that inadequately address certain categories of claims. While the decision has been confined to its facts, professionals must ensure all legitimate creditor claims receive appropriate treatment in resolution plans to avoid challenges that could derail the process.

Comparative Analysis: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code vs Companies Act

The treatment of secured creditors under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code differs significantly from the regime under the Companies Act. Under the Companies Act of 2013, Section 326 provides that workmen’s dues and secured creditors’ dues rank pari passu and have priority, while Section 327 subordinates government dues to this priority. However, the Companies Act does not contain as detailed or structured a waterfall mechanism as Section 53 of the IBC.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code’s approach is more comprehensive and leaves less room for interpretational disputes. By explicitly setting out eight distinct priority categories and providing that this order has overriding effect over other laws, Parliament sought to eliminate the uncertainty that characterized the earlier regime. The Supreme Court in Swiss Ribbons Private Limited vs Union of India upheld this design, noting that the differential treatment of financial and operational creditors, and the subordination of government dues, is based on intelligible differentia and serves the Code’s objectives of maximizing value and enabling efficient resolution.

Recent Developments and Future Directions

The 2023 Discussion Paper

In January 2023, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs released a discussion paper seeking public input on proposed amendments to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. One key proposal addressed the priority of government debt over secured debt. The paper suggested that all debts owed to government authorities, whether secured through statutory charges or otherwise, should be treated equally with other unsecured creditors. Only where government entities create security interests through consensual transactions with the corporate debtor would they qualify as secured creditors with corresponding priority.

This proposal aimed to clarify the confusion created by Rainbow Papers and restore the Code’s original intent of subordinating government dues to secured creditor claims. However, the discussion paper also recognized the need to balance revenue protection with creditor rights, suggesting that the issue requires careful calibration.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill 2025

Building on the discussion paper, the government introduced the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill in 2025 to address the government dues controversy legislatively. The bill proposes amendments to Section 3 defining security interest to clarify that security interests encompass only those created through consensual transactions, not by mere operation of statute. This definitional change would legislatively overrule the Rainbow Papers interpretation and ensure government statutory charges do not confer secured creditor status.

The bill also proposes explicit language in Section 53 to confirm that government dues, regardless of how created, rank in the fifth priority category below secured creditors, unsecured financial creditors, and operational creditors. If enacted, these amendments would definitively resolve the ambiguity and provide certainty to all stakeholders about the treatment of government claims in insolvency proceedings.

Conclusion

The evolution of law regarding priority between government debt and secured debt illustrates the dynamic nature of India’s insolvency jurisprudence. From the traditional crown debt doctrine through the watershed 2016 amendments to the Rainbow Papers controversy and its subsequent clarification, the legal framework has undergone significant refinement. The current position, as established by the Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam judgment, reaffirms that secured creditors enjoy clear priority over government dues in liquidation proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

This priority structure serves important policy objectives. By assuring secured creditors of preferential treatment, the law encourages lending and reduces credit costs. The requirement of CERSAI registration balances this benefit with transparency, ensuring all stakeholders have notice of existing charges. The subordination of government dues, while marking a departure from historical practice, reflects the Code’s focus on maximizing value for all creditors and enabling efficient resolution of distressed companies.

For the framework to function effectively, stakeholders must understand their rights and obligations clearly. Secured creditors must meticulously comply with registration requirements to preserve priority rights. Government departments must adapt collection strategies to the new reality of subordinated claims. Insolvency professionals must correctly classify claims and ensure resolution plans respect the statutory waterfall. With pending legislative amendments likely to provide further clarity, India’s insolvency ecosystem continues maturing toward greater certainty and efficiency in handling corporate distress.

References

[1] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India. (2016). Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. https://ibbi.gov.in/Agenda_8_210917.pdf 

[2] Vinod Kothari Consultants. (2020). Section 53 of IBC: The Heart of Insolvency Law. https://vinodkothari.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Section-53-of-IBC.pdf 

[3] SCC Online. (2024). Varied hues of Government dues under IBC. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=06361356-e132-4738-a36f-3d6c262ba4f4 

[4] Lexology. (2022). Bombay High Court: Under SARFAESI and RDDB Act, claims of secured creditors would take priority. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0d2b41b9-7fb5-4de3-9719-8d32c4bb1a3e 

[5] IBC Laws. (n.d.). Section 26E of SARFAESI Act, 2002: Priority to secured creditors. https://ibclaw.in/section-26e-priority-to-secured-creditors/ 

[6] Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas. (2023). Government Dues under IBC: Rainbow Papers Explained. https://www.cyrilshroff.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Client-Alert-Rainbow-Review_1711.pdf 

[7] India Law. (2023). Supreme Court Re-Affirms The Law Laid Down In Rainbow Papers By Dismissing Review Petition. https://www.indialaw.in/blog/insolvency-bankruptcy/supreme-court-reaffirms-rainbow-papers-case-law-dismisses-review-petition/ 

[8] SCC Online. (2023). IBC overrides Electricity Act; Supreme Court explains hierarchy for settling dues. https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2023/07/21/ibc-overrides-electricity-act-sc-explains-hierarchy-for-settling-dues-in-insolvency-cases/ 

[9] Vinod Kothari Consultants. (2022). Tax dues subservient to dues of secured creditors under SARFAESI Act and RDDB Act. https://vinodkothari.com/2022/09/tax-dues-subservient-to-dues-of-secured-creditors-under-sarfaesi-act-and-rddb-act/ 

Authorized and Published by Rutvik Desai