Applicability of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) to Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)

Introduction

The introduction of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code in 2016 marked a transformative moment in India’s corporate restructuring landscape. The legislation was designed to provide a time-bound mechanism for resolving insolvency and bankruptcy matters for corporate entities, partnership firms, and individuals. However, the applicability of IBC to NBFCs has remained a subject of intense judicial scrutiny and legislative evolution. The question of whether Non-Banking Financial Companies fall within the purview of the Code has generated significant debate among stakeholders, practitioners, and adjudicating authorities, primarily because of the systemic importance these entities hold in the financial ecosystem.

The Code excluded financial service providers from its initial scope, creating uncertainty surrounding the applicability of IBC to NBFC insolvency proceedings. This exclusion was rooted in the understanding that financial firms, particularly those handling public deposits and providing critical financial intermediation services, require specialized resolution mechanisms distinct from ordinary corporate debtors. The collapse of major NBFCs such as Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services and Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited exposed critical gaps in the existing regulatory framework and catalyzed the government’s decision to bring certain categories of NBFCs within the Code’s ambit through targeted statutory and regulatory modifications [1].

Legislative Framework Governing Financial Service Providers

The Code defines “corporate person” to mean a company, limited liability partnership, or any other person incorporated with limited liability, but explicitly excludes financial service providers from this definition. This exclusion is critical because only corporate persons as defined can be subjected to the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under the Code. The term “financial service provider” is defined to mean a person engaged in the business of providing financial services pursuant to authorization or registration granted by a financial sector regulator [2].

Financial services under the Code encompass a broad range of activities including accepting deposits, safeguarding and administering assets consisting of financial products belonging to another person, effecting contracts of insurance, offering or managing assets consisting of financial products, rendering advice on buying or selling financial products, availing financial services, selling or providing payment instruments, and other related activities. These services represent the core functions traditionally associated with banks, insurance companies, and other financial intermediaries that handle public money and maintain the stability of the financial system [3].

The Reserve Bank of India Act provides the foundational regulatory framework for NBFCs in India. An NBFC is defined as a financial institution which is a company and whose principal business involves receiving deposits under any scheme or arrangement, or engaging in activities such as loans and advances, acquisition of shares, stocks, bonds, debentures, or securities issued by government or other marketable securities, leasing, hire-purchase, insurance business, or chit business. The definition specifically excludes institutions whose principal business relates to agricultural activity, industrial activity, purchase or sale of goods other than securities, providing services, or dealing in immovable property. This definitional framework creates a category of entities that perform banking-like functions without holding a banking license.

The statutory scheme governing NBFCs includes provisions for registration, maintenance of reserves, and regulatory oversight by the Reserve Bank of India. Every NBFC must obtain a certificate of registration from the Reserve Bank of India and maintain a minimum net owned fund as prescribed. The regulatory framework also empowers the Reserve Bank of India to inspect NBFCs, call for information, issue directions, and take corrective action when the affairs of an NBFC are conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of depositors or creditors [4].

Applicability of IBC to NBFCs: The Intersection of Insolvency Law and Financial Regulation

The Code initially maintained a clear separation between financial service providers and other corporate entities. This distinction was based on the premise that financial firms require specialized resolution mechanisms given their interconnectedness with the broader financial system and the presence of public stakeholders. The Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee, which provided the foundation for the Code, had specifically recommended that financial firms be excluded from the general insolvency framework, anticipating that a separate regime would be developed for such entities.

However, the question of the applicability of IBC to NBFCs has remained a matter of debate, as the Code did not completely foreclose the possibility of bringing financial service providers within its ambit. Section 227 of the Code grants the Central Government the power to notify financial service providers or categories of financial service providers for the purpose of their insolvency and liquidation proceedings, which may be conducted under the Code in such manner as may be prescribed. This provision provides flexibility and enables the government, in consultation with financial sector regulators, to extend the Code’s application to specific categories of financial service providers when deemed necessary. [5].

The amendment to the Code through the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act in 2020 clarified that insolvency and liquidation proceedings for financial service providers or categories of financial service providers may be conducted with such modifications and in such manner as may be prescribed. This amendment removed any ambiguity about the government’s power to create a modified insolvency framework for financial service providers while recognizing that a one-size-fits-all approach would be inappropriate for entities performing financial intermediation functions.

Judicial Interpretation of Financial Service Provider Status

Judicial interpretation has played a decisive role in determining the applicability of IBC to NBFCs, particularly through the construction of the term “financial service provider”. In the case involving Jindal Saxena Financial Services, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal examined whether an NBFC registered with the Reserve Bank of India could be subjected to the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. The tribunal held that the Code is a self-contained legislation relating to reorganization and insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms, and individuals, but an exception has been specifically carved out keeping financial service providers outside the purview of the Code [6].

The tribunal emphasized that merely being registered as an NBFC does not automatically exempt all transactions undertaken by such an entity from the Code’s application. However, where an NBFC is engaged in providing financial services as defined in the Code and holds valid registration from the Reserve Bank of India, it qualifies as a financial service provider excluded from the definition of corporate person. The tribunal noted that the NBFC in question had been granted a certificate of registration by the Reserve Bank of India to commence or carry on the business of a non-banking financial institution, and the memorandum of association showed objectives including carrying on investment company business and all types of financial operations including housing finance, consumer finance, and industrial finance.

Another significant judgment involved Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited’s application against RHC Holdings. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal addressed the contention that not all NBFCs should be treated as financial service providers, particularly those that are non-deposit taking entities or holding companies. The appellant argued that the legislative intent in exempting financial service providers was to protect systemically important entities where public money is involved, and this protection should not extend to entities that do not impact public interest. However, the tribunal held that the definition of financial services is inclusive and not limited to the nine activities specifically enumerated in the Code. Any entity providing services that fall within the broad definition of financial services and registered with a financial sector regulator qualifies as a financial service provider [7].

These judicial pronouncements established the principle that NBFCs registered with the Reserve Bank of India and engaged in providing financial services as defined in the Code are excluded from the definition of corporate person and cannot be subjected to the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process unless specifically brought within the Code’s ambit through notification under Section 227. The courts recognized that the legislative intent was to exclude entities performing financial intermediation functions from the general insolvency framework while preserving the government’s discretion to bring specific categories within the Code’s purview when necessary.

The Notification Framework for NBFCs under IBC

The deteriorating financial condition of several large NBFCs and the systemic risks posed by their potential failure prompted the government to exercise its powers under Section 227 of the Code. On November 15, 2019, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs notified the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Insolvency and Liquidation Proceedings of Financial Service Providers and Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules. These rules established a special framework for conducting insolvency and liquidation proceedings for financial service providers, incorporating elements of the Code while introducing modifications tailored to the unique characteristics of financial firms.

On November 18, 2019, the government issued a specific notification designating the Reserve Bank of India as the appropriate regulator for NBFCs, including housing finance companies, with an asset size of five hundred crore rupees or more as per the last audited balance sheet. This threshold-based approach ensured that only systemically important NBFCs would be subjected to the modified insolvency framework, while smaller NBFCs would continue to be governed by the existing regulatory mechanisms under the Reserve Bank of India Act. The notification effectively brought a significant segment of the NBFC sector within the Code’s operational framework while maintaining regulatory oversight and specialized provisions for financial firms [8].

The rules provide that the provisions of the Code relating to the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, liquidation process, and voluntary liquidation process for a corporate debtor shall apply mutatis mutandis to financial service providers, subject to specific modifications. These modifications reflect the unique nature of financial service providers and the need to balance creditor rights with systemic stability concerns and the protection of third-party assets held in trust or custody by such entities.

The Regulator-Driven Framework for NBFC Insolvency

Unlike the creditor-driven model that characterizes the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process for ordinary corporate debtors, the framework for NBFCs introduces significant regulatory oversight and control. An insolvency application against an NBFC can only be initiated by the appropriate regulator, which is the Reserve Bank of India for NBFCs notified under the rules. This requirement ensures that insolvency proceedings are commenced only after careful consideration of the systemic implications and upon an informed decision by the regulatory authority. The Reserve Bank of India’s comprehensive database of credit information and regulatory oversight enables it to assess whether initiating insolvency proceedings serves the public interest and the interests of depositors and creditors.

Upon filing of an application by the Reserve Bank of India, an interim moratorium comes into effect immediately. This interim moratorium continues until the adjudicating authority admits or rejects the application. The interim moratorium provides protection against actions by individual creditors during the critical period between filing and admission, preventing a chaotic rush to enforce claims that could further destabilize the financial service provider. The license and registration authorizing the financial service provider to engage in the business of providing financial services shall not be suspended or cancelled during the interim moratorium and the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, ensuring continuity of operations.

When the adjudicating authority admits the application, it appoints an Administrator proposed by the Reserve Bank of India rather than a resolution professional selected through the usual process. The Administrator exercises powers and performs functions equivalent to those of an insolvency professional, interim resolution professional, resolution professional, or liquidator as the case may be, but operates under the guidance and oversight of the Reserve Bank of India. This arrangement recognizes that resolution of financial service providers requires specialized expertise in financial regulation and risk management that may not be possessed by general insolvency professionals [9].

The Reserve Bank of India may constitute an Advisory Committee consisting of three or more members with expertise in finance, economics, accountancy, law, public policy, or other relevant areas to assist the Administrator in the operations of the financial service provider during the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. The Advisory Committee provides technical guidance and ensures that decisions made during the resolution process take into account the specific characteristics of financial service provision and the interests of various stakeholders including depositors, creditors, and the financial system as a whole.

Treatment of Third-Party Assets and Regulatory Approval

The rules contain specific provisions addressing the treatment of third-party assets in the custody or possession of the financial service provider. Financial service providers often hold assets in trust for beneficiaries, maintain segregated client accounts, or safeguard securities and funds belonging to customers. The moratorium provisions do not apply to such third-party assets or properties in custody or possession of the financial service provider, including any funds, securities, and other assets required to be held in trust for the benefit of third parties. The Administrator is required to take control and custody of these third-party assets only for the purpose of dealing with them in the manner notified by the Central Government, ensuring that legitimate interests of third parties are protected during the insolvency process.

On January 30, 2020, the government issued a notification specifying the manner of dealing with third-party assets in custody or possession of financial service providers. The notification requires the Administrator to ensure that third-party assets owned by persons other than the financial service provider at the insolvency commencement date are maintained separately and distinctly from the assets of the financial service provider. This segregation prevents the commingling of third-party assets with the insolvent estate and protects the rights of parties who have entrusted assets to the financial service provider for safekeeping or other purposes.

A critical modification in the NBFC insolvency framework relates to regulatory approval of the resolution plan. After the Committee of Creditors approves a resolution plan, the Administrator must seek a no objection from the Reserve Bank of India regarding the persons who would be in control or management of the financial service provider after approval of the resolution plan. The Reserve Bank of India must issue the no objection based on the fit and proper criteria applicable to the business of the financial service provider, without prejudice to the disqualification provisions applicable to resolution applicants. If the Reserve Bank of India does not refuse the no objection within forty-five working days of receiving the application, it is deemed that no objection has been granted. This provision ensures that only suitable persons assume control of the financial service provider while preventing indefinite delays in the resolution process.

The DHFL Case: Pioneering NBFC Resolution under IBC

The insolvency resolution of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited represents the first major test of the modified framework for financial service providers and a defining moment in the applicability of IBC to NBFCs. In November 2019, the Reserve Bank of India superseded the board of directors of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited under Section 45-IE of the Reserve Bank of India Act, appointing an Administrator to manage the affairs of the company. The supersession was necessitated by serious governance concerns, financial irregularities, and the company’s inability to meet its payment obligations, which posed risks to depositors and the financial system.

On November 29, 2019, the Reserve Bank of India filed an application before the National Company Law Tribunal seeking initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited. The tribunal admitted the application on December 3, 2019, marking the commencement of insolvency proceedings against the first financial service provider under the newly notified rules. The case involved claims from financial creditors exceeding eighty thousand crore rupees and raised complex questions about the treatment of depositors, the valuation of assets, and the allocation of proceeds from fraudulent and wrongful trading recoveries.

The Committee of Creditors, comprising major banks and financial institutions, evaluated multiple resolution plans submitted by prospective applicants. After a detailed evaluation process, the Committee of Creditors approved the resolution plan submitted by Piramal Capital and Housing Finance Limited with a vote of 93.65 percent in January 2021. The resolution plan provided for the acquisition of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited’s business as a going concern, payment to creditors based on a waterfall mechanism, and change in the status of the company from a deposit-taking housing finance company to a non-deposit-taking housing finance company as required by the Reserve Bank of India’s no objection.

Challenges to the resolution plan were raised by certain creditors and the former promoters. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal partially modified the tribunal’s order, directing reconsideration of the treatment of recoveries from avoidance transactions under Section 66 of the Code. However, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the resolution plan approved by the Committee of Creditors and set aside the appellate tribunal’s modifications. The Supreme Court held that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering with clauses pertaining to the treatment of recoveries from fraudulent and wrongful trading. The court emphasized that the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors cannot be interfered with and that the resolution plan becomes binding once approved by the adjudicating authority.

The Supreme Court also addressed the rights of former promoters whose board was superseded under Section 45-IE of the Reserve Bank of India Act. The court held that supersession under the Reserve Bank of India Act has a permanent effect where directors vacate their offices, unlike the temporary suspension under the Code. Therefore, the former promoters had no right to participate in Committee of Creditors meetings or demand access to the resolution plan during the process. However, once approved by the tribunal, the resolution plan becomes a public document and the former promoters are entitled to certified copies. The Supreme Court’s judgment provided critical clarity on the interplay between the Reserve Bank of India’s regulatory powers and the Code’s insolvency framework.

Regulatory Powers for NBFC Resolution

The amendments to the Reserve Bank of India Act introduced through the Finance Act 2019 significantly enhanced the regulatory authority’s powers concerning NBFC resolution. Section 45-IE of the Reserve Bank of India Act empowers the Reserve Bank of India to supersede the board of directors of an NBFC (other than a government company) if satisfied that in the public interest, or to prevent the affairs of the NBFC from being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of depositors or creditors, or for securing proper management of the NBFC, or for financial stability, it is necessary to do so. The supersession can be ordered for a period not exceeding five years, extendable for another five years.

Upon supersession of the board of directors, the chairman, managing director, and other directors vacate their offices from the date of supersession. All powers, functions, and duties that may be exercised by the board of directors or by resolution in general meeting are transferred to the Administrator appointed by the Reserve Bank of India. The Administrator is bound to follow directions issued by the Reserve Bank of India and may be assisted by a committee of experts with experience in law, finance, banking, administration, or accountancy. This framework provides the Reserve Bank of India with comprehensive control over the management of a distressed NBFC pending resolution.

Section 45-MBA of the Reserve Bank of India Act provides the regulatory authority with extensive powers for resolution of NBFCs. After inspecting the books of accounts of an NBFC, the Reserve Bank of India may frame schemes of amalgamation, reconstruction, or splitting up of viable and non-viable businesses to preserve the continuity of the NBFC. The schemes may provide for establishment of bridge institutions or temporary institutional arrangements, reduction of pay and allowances of senior management, cancellation of shares held by promoters or senior management, and sale of assets. These resolution tools enable the Reserve Bank of India to undertake restructuring measures outside the formal insolvency framework when appropriate.

The interaction between the Reserve Bank of India’s regulatory powers and the Code’s insolvency framework creates a comprehensive toolkit for addressing NBFC distress. The Reserve Bank of India can exercise its powers under the Reserve Bank of India Act for early intervention and resolution, or initiate insolvency proceedings under the Code when restructuring is not viable. This flexibility allows the regulatory authority to tailor the resolution strategy to the specific circumstances of each case, balancing the interests of creditors with systemic stability concerns.

Challenges and Concerns in the NBFC Insolvency Framework

The modified framework for NBFC insolvency, while representing a significant advancement, presents several challenges and areas requiring further clarification. The requirement that only the Reserve Bank of India can initiate insolvency proceedings against NBFCs departs from the creditor-driven model and may delay the commencement of resolution in cases where the regulator is hesitant to take action. Financial creditors and operational creditors who would have standing to initiate insolvency proceedings against ordinary corporate debtors must rely on the Reserve Bank of India to file applications on their behalf, potentially limiting their ability to enforce claims.

The interaction between the Reserve Bank of India’s no objection requirement and the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors raises questions about the balance of power in the resolution process. While the Supreme Court upheld the primacy of the Committee of Creditors’ commercial decisions in the Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited case, the Reserve Bank of India’s no objection based on fit and proper criteria introduces an additional layer of scrutiny. If the Reserve Bank of India withholds no objection to a resolution plan approved by the Committee of Creditors, it could create deadlock and delay resolution. The deemed approval mechanism after forty-five working days provides some safeguard, but the practical application of this provision remains to be tested.

The definition of financial service provider and the determination of which NBFCs fall within this category continue to generate uncertainty. The rules apply only to NBFCs with assets of five hundred crore rupees or more, but the definitional question of whether all registered NBFCs are financial service providers affects NBFCs below this threshold. Courts have held that NBFCs registered with the Reserve Bank of India and engaged in providing financial services are excluded from the Code’s general application, but this creates a gap for smaller NBFCs that may not be systemically important yet require insolvency resolution mechanisms.

The treatment of depositors in NBFC insolvency proceedings raises important policy questions. Depositors are typically unsecured creditors under the Code’s waterfall mechanism and may receive limited recoveries compared to secured financial creditors. However, depositors in NBFCs are often retail individuals who placed funds based on trust in the regulatory framework and may not have the sophistication to assess credit risk. The framework does not provide preferential treatment for depositors as is the case for banks under deposit insurance schemes, potentially undermining public confidence in NBFCs.

Comparative Analysis with Other Jurisdictions

Financial institution resolution frameworks in other jurisdictions provide useful context for evaluating India’s approach to NBFC insolvency. The United States established the Orderly Liquidation Authority under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to provide a specialized resolution mechanism for systemically important financial institutions. The Orderly Liquidation Authority enables the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to conduct an orderly liquidation of covered financial companies to prevent the disorderly collapse that could threaten financial stability. The framework requires agreement among the Treasury Department, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Federal Reserve, ensuring coordinated decision-making.

The United Kingdom employs a special resolution regime for banks and certain investment firms, administered by the Bank of England. The regime provides resolution tools including transfer of the business to a private sector purchaser, transfer to a bridge bank, transfer to an asset management vehicle, and bail-in of creditors. The framework prioritizes continuity of critical functions, protection of depositors and public funds, and minimization of disruption to the financial system. The resolution authority exercises extensive powers to restructure the failing institution while imposing losses on shareholders and creditors according to a specified hierarchy.

The European Union established the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive creating a harmonized framework for resolution of credit institutions and investment firms across member states. The directive requires institutions to prepare recovery plans and resolution authorities to prepare resolution plans. When an institution is failing or likely to fail, resolution authorities can apply resolution tools including sale of business, establishment of a bridge institution, asset separation, and bail-in. The framework emphasizes burden-sharing by shareholders and creditors while protecting depositors and essential functions.

These international frameworks share common features including regulatory authority over resolution decisions, specialized tools tailored to financial institutions, protection of depositors and critical functions, and mechanisms to impose losses on shareholders and creditors while maintaining financial stability. India’s framework for NBFC resolution incorporates many of these elements through the combination of the Reserve Bank of India’s regulatory powers and the modified Code provisions. However, the framework remains in early stages of implementation and may require further refinement based on experience.

Future Directions and Reforms

The framework for NBFC insolvency under the Code represents an interim arrangement pending development of a comprehensive financial resolution regime. The government had proposed the Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance Bill in 2017 to create a specialized resolution framework for financial sector entities including banks, insurance companies, and NBFCs. The bill was withdrawn in 2018 due to concerns about certain provisions, particularly the bail-in mechanism that could have imposed losses on depositors. However, the need for a comprehensive framework addressing resolution of all categories of financial service providers remains.

Future reforms should address the gaps and ambiguities in the current framework. Clarification of the definition of financial service provider and the criteria for determining which entities fall within this category would reduce uncertainty and litigation. Development of clear guidelines for the Reserve Bank of India’s exercise of discretion in initiating insolvency proceedings would enhance predictability and ensure consistent treatment of similarly situated NBFCs. Establishment of a depositor protection mechanism for NBFCs, similar to deposit insurance for banks, would strengthen public confidence and align the framework with international best practices.

The framework could benefit from enhanced coordination mechanisms between the Reserve Bank of India, the Committee of Creditors, and the adjudicating authority. While the Reserve Bank of India’s oversight ensures regulatory concerns are addressed, overly restrictive regulatory intervention could undermine the efficiency of the resolution process. Development of protocols and timelines for regulatory review and no objection would balance these considerations. The Advisory Committee mechanism could be strengthened with clearer mandates and decision-making authority to provide meaningful input during the resolution process.

The application of the framework to non-deposit taking NBFCs and holding companies raises questions about the appropriate scope of the special regime. These entities may not pose the same systemic risks as deposit-taking NBFCs, and subjecting them to the regulator-driven framework may not be necessary. The government could consider differentiating between categories of NBFCs based on their systemic importance, business models, and stakeholder profiles, applying graduated levels of regulatory oversight and procedural requirements accordingly.

Conclusion

The applicability of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) to Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) represents a carefully calibrated approach balancing the need for effective insolvency resolution with the unique characteristics of financial service providers. The initial exclusion of financial service providers from the Code’s scope reflected concerns about systemic stability and the complexity of resolving financial firms. However, the failures of major NBFCs demonstrated that the absence of a clear insolvency framework created significant risks to creditors and the financial system.

The framework established through Section 227 of the Code and the subsequent rules introduces a modified insolvency regime for systemically important NBFCs. By combining the procedural mechanisms of the Code with regulatory oversight by the Reserve Bank of India, specialized provisions for third-party assets, and requirements for regulatory approval of resolution plans, the framework addresses many of the concerns that warranted the initial exclusion of financial service providers. The successful resolution of Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited demonstrates that the framework can facilitate orderly resolution of large, complex financial institutions.

Nevertheless, the framework remains a work in progress requiring refinement based on experience and evolving regulatory needs. The tension between creditor rights and regulatory oversight, the treatment of depositors, the scope of the financial service provider exclusion, and the relationship with other regulatory powers all require careful consideration. The development of a comprehensive financial resolution regime would provide a more robust foundation for addressing distress in the financial sector while the current framework serves as an important interim mechanism enabling resolution of systemically important NBFCs under judicial supervision.

The evolution of NBFC insolvency law reflects broader themes in India’s financial sector regulation, including the movement toward greater transparency and accountability, the recognition that no institution is too big to fail, and the importance of balancing multiple stakeholder interests in resolution processes. As the framework matures through implementation and potential legislative reforms, it will contribute to a more resilient financial system capable of addressing distress in financial institutions while protecting creditors, depositors, and the public interest.

References

[1] Bansal, S. (2018). NBFCs and IBC: The Lost Connection. Bar & Bench. https://www.barandbench.com/columns/nbfcs-and-ibc-the-lost-connection 

[2] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Section 3(17). https://ibclaw.in/section-3-definitions-under-insolvency-and-bankruptcy-code-2016-ibc-2016-part-i-preliminary/ 

[3] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Section 3(16). https://ibclaw.in/section-3-definitions-under-insolvency-and-bankruptcy-code-2016-ibc-2016-part-i-preliminary/ 

[4] Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, Chapter III-B. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2398/1/a1934-2.pdf 

[5] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, Section 227. https://ibclaw.in/section-227-power-of-central-government-to-notify-financial-service-providers-etc/ 

[6] Randhiraj Thakur, Director Mayfair Capital Private Limited v. Jindal Saxena Financial Services Private Limited, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 32 & 50 of 2018, NCLAT (2018). 

[7] Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd. v. RHC Holding Private Ltd., NCLAT (2019). https://ibclaw.in/the-definition-of-financial-services-as-defined-in-sec-316-of-the-code-is-not-limited-to-the-9-activities-as-shown-at-clause-a-to-i-of-sec-316-housing-development-finance-corporation-ltd-vs/ 

[8] Ministry of Corporate Affairs. (2019). Notification S.O. 4139(E). https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1591728 

[9] Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Insolvency and Liquidation Proceedings of Financial Service Providers and Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2019. https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2019/11/road-to-resolution-of-financial-service-providers-a-firm-first-step-ibc/